SMiiiaii,^ 


E  S  SAYS 


CAL  AND  HISTORICAL 


CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER. LL.D. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


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ESSAYS 

POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 


SECOND  EDITIOK 


BY    THE    SAME    AUTHOR 

"THE  MARQUIS  DE  LAFAYETTE  IN 
THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION" 

BY 
CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER,  LL.D. 

FOBMER  MINISTEB  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  TO  ADSTBIA-HONQABT 
AMBASSADOR  TO  BDS8IA  AND  TO  QEBMANY 

Two  volumes,  1031  pages.     Two  portraits,  ten  maps. 
Royal  octavo.     Cloth,  gilt  top,  uncut,  $8.00  net. 

"  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  he  has  quadrupled  the  amount 

of  accessible  material  concerning  the  central  figure  of  his  book.    We 

can  recall  no  biographical  work  in  American  History  containing 

such  a  wealth  of  original  material  concerning  the  subject  treated. 

...    In  every  respect  the  book  shows  skill  and  thoroughness." 

— The  Nation. 


J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS  PHILADELPHIA 


ESSAYS 

POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 


BY 

CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER,  LL.D. 

AUTHOR    OF    "the    MABQDIS    DE    LA  PATETTE    IN    THE    AMERICAN    BEVOLDTION* 

FOBMEB   MINISTER   OP   THE    CNITED   STATES   TO   AnSTHIA-HCNQABY 

AMBASSADOB   TO  BDSSIA   AND  TO  QEBUAKr 


PHILADELPHIA  AND  LONDON 
J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

1914 


COPYRIGHT,  1914,  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 


PUBUSHED  OCTOBER,  1914 


PRINTED  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

AT  THE  WASHINGTON  SQUARE  PRESS 

PHILADELPHIA,  U.  S.  A. 


CONTENTS 

The  Eubopean  Attitude  Toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  ...      7 

Hj       The  Treatt  Obligations  op  the  United  States  Relating  to 

the  Panama  Canal 38 

Diplomacy  as  a  Profession 54 

Some  Modern  Developments  op  International  Law 90 

Lord  Cornwallis  in  America 129 

'^       The  Relations  op  the  United  States  to  Arbitration  for  the 
^  Settlement  op  International  Disputes 189 

General  Howe's  Campaigns  in  the  Revolutionary  War 202 


nr^. 


186429 


ESSAYS 

POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

THE  EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARD 
THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Sead  Before  the  American  Society  of  International  Law,  at 
Washington,  April  24,  1914 

In  seeking  to  determine  the  sentiments  of  Euro- 
pean  statesmen  or  the  general  trend  of  public 
opinion  on  the  continent  in  regard  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  it  can  scarcely  be  said  that  there  is  a  suffi- 
cient acquaintance  with  it  in  Europe  to  make  it  an 
object  of  close  examination  or  of  prime  importance 
amongst  the  political  questions  that  usually  call 
forth  active  interest  in  men's  minds;  nor  can  it  be 
classed  amongst  the  set  of  subjects  which  are  always 
near  the  surface  in  European  life  with  which  every 
man  has  made  himself  familiar  and  upon  which  he 
has  a  decided  opinion.  It  has  its  value,  however,  as 
a  possible  international  question  which  may  present 
itself  under  given  circumstances  and  may  call  for 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

immediate  attention  some  clay,  although  at  present  a 
remote  contingency.  And  as  such  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  no  stranger  to  the  political  leaders  and 
Cabinet  Ministers  of  Europe.  A  hundred  years  of 
American  statesmanship  and  diplomacy  have  sus- 
tained the  policy  involved  in  President  Monroe's 
declaration,  in  the  midst  of  the  vicissitudes  and 
against  all  the  obstacles  which  have  presented  them- 
selves during  that  time,  with  such  determination  and 
such  consistent  vigor  that  there  is  no  foreign  ob- 
server or  political  student  who  does  not  know  that 
the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  have  become 
an  integral  part  of  American  national  existence. 

But,  from  the  point  of  view  of  European  nations 
this  is  not,  of  course,  a  matter  likely  to  call  forth 
sympathetic  attention  either  in  the  sense  of  politics 
or  of  international  law;  because,  whilst  its  field  of 
activity  lies  across  the  Atlantic  out  of  the  atmos- 
phere of  European  life  and  not  connected,  for  the 
present  at  least,  with  the  rivalries  or  the  varied 
sources  of  ambition  or  jealousy  always  much  nearer 
at  hand,  it  could  not  well  in  any  case  be  brought  into 
play  with  a  spirit  of  friendship  toward  European 
interests.  It  must,  from  its  own  nature,  either  re- 
main dormant  or  awake  in  opposition  to  some  Euro- 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

pean  impulse.  The  case  cannot  be  otherwise,  for 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  in  itself  the  political  line 
of  demarcation  between  the  two  continents ;  it  sprang 
up  under  circumstances  which  made  inevitable  the 
separation  between  the  ruling  ambitions  and  the 
national  aspirations  of  the  old  world  from  those  of 
the  new,  between  the  conscious  supremacy  of  the 
youthful  people  whose  ideals  were  expressed  by 
liberty  and  independence  on  this  side  of  the  ocean 
and  the  inflexible  conservatism  of  the  older  nations 
on  the  other  who  still  clung  to  their  own  methods  of 
governing  men. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  had  restored,  as  it  was 
hoped,  the  equilibrium  upon  the  continent  and  had 
given  by  its  definitive  understanding  amongst  the 
powers  a  renewed  confidence  that  the  principles  of 
absolute  monarchical  government  were  firmly  estab- 
lished once  more  upon  a  foundation  of  common  in- 
terest. With  the  terrors  of  the  French  Revolution 
still  fresh  in  their  minds  as  a  menace  to  the  tradi- 
tions upon  which  the  authority  and  prestige  of  Euro- 
pean government  were  acknowledged  to  depend,  the 
Powers  turned  to  each  other  for  mutual  support  in 
maintaining  the  established  system  as  the  source  of 
benefit  to  all ;  and  to  this  end  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  Emperor  of  Austria,  and  the  King  of  Prussia 
declared  that:  *' looking  upon  themselves  as  dele- 
gated by  Providence  to  rule  each  over  his  own  peo- 
ple," they  would  lend  one  another,  on  every  occasion 
and  in  every  place,  assistance,  aid,  and  support,  in 
the  administration  of  government  both  internal  and 
external,  according  td  the  precepts  of  justice, 
charity  and  peace. 

Thus  came  into  existence,  by  a  treaty  in  1815, 
the  Holy  Alliance,  to  which  the  King  of  France  after- 
wards gave  his  adherence.  It  had  for  its  object  the 
protection  of  the  divine  right  of  Kings  and  resist- 
ance to  every  form  of  liberal  thought.  Its  ultimate 
declarations  defined  *' revolt"  against  constituted 
authority  as  a  **crime"  and  set  forth  the  ''undoubted 
right"  of  the  European  Powers  to  take  a  hostile 
attitude  toward  those  states  in  which  the  overthrow 
of  the  government  was  in  contemplation;  because 
tliey  held  ' '  equally  null;  and  disallowed  by  the  public 
law  of  Europe,  any  pretended  reform  effected  by 
revolt  and  open  force."  The  Alliance  asserted  its 
determination,  in  consequence  of  this,  **to  repel  the 
maxim  of  rebellion,  in  whatever  place  and  under 
whatever  form  it  might  show  itself. ' ' 

Great  Britain,  though  at  first  inclined  to  give  at 

10 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

least  a  tacit  consent  to  the  undertakings  of  the  Alli- 
ance, found  herself  isolated  very  soon  after  the  full 
purpose  of  it  became  known ;  for  she  could  not  con- 
sistently take  part  in  a  movement  intended  not  only 
to  re-establish  absolute  monarchy  but  to  combat 
all  liberal  ideas  derived  from  the  free  will  of  the 
people,  since  her  own  government  was  in  itself  the 
expression  of  the  public  conscience  and  traced  its 
origin  to  revolution,  even  to  rebellion.  But  to  the 
United  States  the  principle  of  the  Holy  Alliance  was 
a  direct  challenge  in  all  that  related  to  the  traditions 
of  the  nation  and  to  the  spirit  and  character  of  the 
race  trained  and  developed  by  generations  of  self- 
reliance  to  a  point  where  freedom  of  thought  had 
taken  its  place  amongst  the  high  ideals  of  human 
life ;  for,  how  would  it  be  possible  to  establish  a  more 
violent  contradiction  than  that  between  the  reac- 
tionary brute  force  in  the  declared  intentions  of  the 
sovereigns  by  divine  right  who  entered  into  the  Holy 
Alliance  rfor  the  purpose  of  combined  support  and 
protection  and  the  unconquerable  spirit  of  the  inde- 
pendent people  now  masters  in  North  America, 
amongst  whom  the  leaders  of  political  thought  were 
Jefferson,  Adams,  Madison,  and  Monroe  himself? 

From  this  situation  and  from  the  events  that  were 

11 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

taking  place  about  it,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  al- 
most inevitable.  It  remained  only  for  the  quarrels 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies  to  fix  its  point  of 
departure. 

One  after  another,  the  American  colonies  of 
Spain  had  revolted  against  the  central  authority  at 
Madrid, — not  so  much  because  of  administrative 
abuses,  of  which  no  doubt  there  were  sufficient  at 
hand  for  the  purpose,  as  from  the  incapacity  of 
Spain  to  govern  at  all  during  the  long  period  when 
the  Napoleonic  w^ars  not  only  weakened  her  grasp 
across  the  sea  but  tied  her  hands  so  as  to  prevent 
her  from  controlling  even  her  own  affairs  at  home. 
Her  magnificent  dominions,  which  the  Conde  de 
Aranda  had  dreamed  but  a  few  years  before  of 
erecting  into  three  or  four  separate  kingdoms  each 
governed  by  a  Prince  of  the  House  of  Bourbon,  all 
subordinated  to  the  controlling  power  of  the  King  of 
Spain,  were  slipping  away,  and  led  by  patriots  of 
their  own  kin  had  declared  their  independence  of  the 
Spanish  Crown ;  the  insurrection  began  in  Mexico  in 
1810,  under  the  leadership  of  Hidalgo  and  Morales ; 
Venezuela  enacted  a  constitution  in  1811;  New 
Granada  followed  under  Bolivar,  in  1814 ;  Peru,  led 
by  General  San  Martin,  declared  itself  independent, 

12 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

as  did  also  Chile,  the  Republic  of  Buenos  Aires,  and 
the  countries  of  Central  America. 

In  Spain  itself  a  constitution  had  been  established 
by  the  Cortes  which  was  forcibly  overthrown  through 
the  intervention  of  France,  and  French  troops  had 
been  employed,  even  in  the  same  year  in  which  Presi- 
dent Monroe  delivered  his  message,  to  restore  abso- 
lute authority  in  the  Spanish  kingdom  by  securing 
to  Ferdinand  VII  the  advantages  of  that  form  of 
''  justice,  charity  and  peace  "  which  was  the  de- 
clared object  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  its  support  and 
strict  maintenance  of  legitimate  power  and  the  sup- 
pression of  liberal  ideas  wherever  they  were  found. 
Encouraged  by  the  success  which  he  had  obtained 
through  the  aid  thus  afforded  him  by  France,  King 
Ferdinand  appealed  to  the  Holy  Alliance  to  come  to 
his  assistance  in  regaining  control  over  the  South 
American  Republics,  in  compliance  with  which  it  was 
decided  that  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  should 
hold  a  conference  at  Paris  in  order,  as  they  an- 
nounced, 'Ho  aid  Spain  in  adjusting  the  affairs  of 
the  revolted  countries  of  America." 

This  purpose  was  known  in  the  United  States 
through  communications  which  had  taken  place  sev- 
eral years  before ;  and  Mr.  Adams,  writing  in  1819 

13 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

as  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Thompson,  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  had  said:  '*It  is  now  well  ascertained 
that  before  the  Congress  of  the  great  European 
Powers  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  their  mediation  had 
been  solicited  by  Spain,  and  agreed  to  be  given  by 
them  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  Spanish  do- 
minion throughout  South  America,  under  certain 
conditions  of  commercial  privileges  to  be  guaranteed 
to  the  inhabitants.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  had  been  informed  of  this  project  before  the 
meeting  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  that  it  had  been  pro- 
posed by  some  of  the  allied  Powers  that  the  United 
States  should  be  invited  to  join  them  in  this  media- 
tion. Wlien  this  information  was  received,  the  min- 
isters of  the  United  States  to  France,  England  and 
Russia  were  immediately  instructed  to  make  known 
to  those  respective  governments  that  the  United 
States  would  take  no  part  in  any  plan  of  mediation 
or  interference  in  the  contest  between  Spain  and 
South  America,  which  should  be  founded  on  any 
other  basis  than  that  of  the  total  independence  of  the 
Colonies." 

Mr.  Canning,  at  the  British  foreign  oflfice,  growing 
apprehensive  of  the  turn  that  public  attention  on  the 
continent  had  taken  in  the  direction  of  South  Amer- 

14 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ica,  intimated  the  unwillingness  of  Great  Britain  to 
join  in  the  movement  of  the  Powers  toward  the  coer- 
cion of  the  Spanish  colonies.  Indeed,  England's 
interests  had  materially  advanced  in  South  America 
by  the  extension  of  her  commerce  which  had  followed 
upon  the  independence  of  the  colonial  dominions 
there  and  the  consequent  opening  of  the  ports  of  the 
southern  republics  to  foreign  traffic,  and  she  feared 
to  see  herself  deprived  of  these  growing  advantages 
to  her  trade  if  those  countries  were  reduced  again 
to  subjection  by  their  ancient  metropolitan  under 
whose  authority  their  commercial  operations  would 
once  more  be  controlled  and  monopolized  from 
Madrid.  Besides  this,  British  statesmen  were  evi- 
dently fearful  of  the  somew^iat  dominating  influence 
of  France  in  the  atf  airs  of  Spain,  particularly  since 
the  re-establishment  of  Ferdinand  VII  and  his  re- 
storation to  his  throne  as  an  autocratic  sovereign 
had  taken  place  through  the  means  of  French  inter- 
vention. It  was  suspected  in  England  that  if  the 
power  of  the  Holy  Alliance  should  extend  itself  now 
to  the  revolted  colonies,  as  men  began  to  think  it 
might  do,  and  should  carry  with  it  into  them  also 
the  reasserted  authority  of  the  Spanish  Crown,  the 
obligation  of  Spain  would  have  become  so  great 

15 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

toward  her  near  neighbor  and  ally  that  King  Ferdi- 
nand might  feel  impelled  by  gratitude  to  transfer 
to  France,  as  a  reward  for  her  friendship,  the  island 
of  Cuba,  which  Great  Britain  was  believed  to  covet 
for  herself. 

At  all  events,  it  did  not  comport  with  British 
policy  that  England  should  associate  herself  with 
the  proposed  movement;  it  appeared,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  her  government  was  quite  ready  to  oppose 
it  decisively.  Mr.  Rush,  the  American  Minister  in 
London,  reported  this  to  Mr.  Adams,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  in  the  accounts  which  he  sent  home  of  his 
conversations  w^ith  Mr.  Canning;  for  the  latter  re- 
ferred somewhat  frequently  to  the  affairs  of  Spain 
in  the  course  of  their  official  and  personal  relations, 
as  well  as  in  a  confidential  correspondence  between 
them  which  reached  its  culminating  point  when  Can- 
ning addressed  an  unofficial  and  confidential  note  to 
Rush  on  August  20,  1823,  in  which  he  said:  *'Is  not 
the  moment  come  when  our  governments  might  un- 
derstand each  other  as  to  the  Spanish-American 
Colonies'?  And  if  we  can  arrive  at  such  an  under- 
standing would  it  not  be  expedient  for  ourselves, 
and  beneficial  for  all  the  world,  that  the  principles 
of  it  should  be  clearly  settled  and  plainly  avowed? 

16 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

*'For  ourselves  we  have  no  disguise. 

''We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by 
Spain  to  be  hopeless. 

"We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of 
them,  as  independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and 
circumstances. 

"We  are,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to  throw 
any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  be- 
tween them  and  the  mother  country  by  amicable 
negotiation. 

"We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of 
them  ourselves. 

"We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  trans- 
ferred to  any  other  power  with  inditf erence. " 

Mr.  Canning  suggested  that  if  these  were  the 
opinions  of  the  United  States  Government  with  that 
of  Great  Britain,  "why  should  we  hesitate  mutually 
to  confide  them  to  each  other,  and  to  declare  them  in 
the  face  of  the  world!"  ^ 

England  had  arrived,  therefore,  though  by  a  dif- 
ferent course  of  reasoning  and  with  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent object  in  view,  at  the  same  conclusion  with 
ourselves,  that  the  overthrow  of  the  South  American 

'  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  January, 
1902. 

2  17 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Republics  must  be  prevented,  and  she  offered  to 
unite  her  strength  with  ours  with  that  end  in  view. 
Her  influence  at  that  moment  was  so  great  with  the 
continental  Powers  that  there  could  be  no  reason- 
able doubt  that  Canning  was  right  in  his  judgment 
when  he  declared  that  if  any  European  Power  looked 
to  a  forcible  enterprise  for  reducing  the  Colonies  to 
subjection  on  behalf  of  Spain,  or  meditated  the  ac- 
quisition of  any  part  of  them  to  itself,  such  a  decla- 
ration as  he  proposed,  if  made  by  the  governments 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  "would  be 
at  once  the  most  effectual  and  the  least  offensive 
mode  of  intimating  their  joint  disapprobation";  for 
it  would  at  the  same  time  put  an  end  to  all  the  jeal- 
ousies of  Spain  with  respect  to  her  remaining  colo- 
nies; and  he  gave  it  as  his  final  opinion  that  ''there 
has  seldom,  in  the  history  of  the  world,  occurred  an 
opportunity  when  so  small  an  effort  of  two  friendly 
governments  might  produce  so  unequivocal  good  and 
prevent  such  extensive  calamities." 

The  situation  was  a  perplexing  one  to  President 
Monroe,  who  discerned  in  it  the  obligation  of  the 
United  States  to  maintain  their  principles  of  free 
government ;  yet  he  feared  to  overstep  the  fixed  line 
in  American  politics  and  enter  into  the  conflict  of 

18 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

European  affairs.  ' '  Shall  we  entangle  ourselves  at 
all  in  European  politics  and  wars,  on  the  side  of  any 
power  against  others,"  or,  ''if  a  case  can  exist  in 
which  a  sound  maxim  may  and  ought  to  be  departed 
from,  is  not  the  present  instance  precisely  that 
easel"  "Has  not  the  epoch  arrived  when  Great 
Britain  must  take  her  stand,  either  on  the  side  of 
the  monarchs  of  Europe  or  of  the  United  States?" 
questions  which,  with  the  consciousness  of  his  own 
responsibility,  he  had  submitted  to  Mr.  Jefferson 
and  Mr.  Madison,  begging  them  for  their  opinions; 
and  he  announced  at  the  same  time:  "My  own  im- 
pression is  that  we  ought  to  meet  the  proposal  of  the 
British  government,  and  make  it  known,  that  we 
would  view  an  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers,  and  especially  an  attack  on  the  colonies, 
by  them,  as  an  attack  on  ourselves,  presuming  that 
if  they  succeeded  with  them,  they  would  extend  it  to 
us."  2  These  questions  Jefferson  declared  were  the 
most  momentous  that  had  ever  been  offered  to  his 
contemplation  since  that  of  independence.  "That 
made  us  a  nation,"  said  he,  "this  sets  our  compass 
and  points  the  course  which  we  are  to  steer  through 

-President  Monroe  to  Mr.  Jefferson,  17th  October,  1823.     J.  B. 
Moore,  Digest  of  Int.  Law,  vol.  6,  p.  393. 

19 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  ocean  of  time  opening  to  us."  ''One  nation, 
most  of  all,  could  disturb  us, — Great  Britain  can  do 
us  the  most  harm  of  any  one,  or  all  on  earth;  and 
with  her  on  our  side  we  need  not  fear  the  whole 
world." 

But  England  was  not,  as  the  event  proved,  a  par- 
ticipant in  the  pronouncement  of  President  Monroe, 
when  it  was  finally  made,  because  he  spoke  of  his  own 
motion  and  by  his  own  authority  when  he  addressed 
his  message  to  Congress ;  though  the  correspondence 
with  Canning  shows  beyond  question  that  Great 
Britain  was  ready  to  join  with  the  United  States  in 
their  warning  to  the  Powers  not  to  lay  forcible  hands 
upon  the  Eepublics  of  South  America,  and  she  is  to 
be  regarded  to  that  extent  as  having  been  a  factor, 
perhaps  a  very  important  factor,  in  the  formation  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  She  recognized  the  South 
American  States  subsequently  by  making  commer- 
cial treaties  with  them  without  great  delay,  and  the 
message  of  the  President  found  a  cordial  reception 
in  Great  Britain,  having  been  published  in  the  An- 
nual Register  with  the  comment  that:  "This  coin- 
cidence of  view  and  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  two 
great  maritime  powers  of  the  Old  and  New  World 
was,  of  course,  decisive  against  the  further  enter- 

20 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tainment  by  the  allies  of  any  sucli  purpose  as  that 
which  has  been  imputed  to  them. ' ' 

But  on  the  continent  the  President's  message 
aroused  a  storm  of  opposition,  which  might  have 
been  expected.  As  a  declaration  coming  from  a 
goverimient  not  yet  half  a  century  old,  without  pres- 
tige in  the  eyes  of  European  statesmen,  certainly 
without  formidable  power  as  against  the  united 
strength  of  Europe,  it  was  spoken  of  with  contempt 
and  looked  upon  as  a  display  of  American  arrogance. 

No  formal  communication  of  the  contents  of  the 
message  having  been  made  by  the  United  States  to 
the  Holy  Alliance  or  to  any  Power,  the  declaration 
was  not  considered  to  be  international;  nor  was  it 
regarded  as  having  a  legal  validity  that  could  affect 
the  conduct  of  any  other  nation,  for  as  a  purely 
domestic  communication  to  the  United  States  Con- 
gress it  was  not  held  to  be  a  rule  of  international 
law  that  could  legally  affect  any  other  country, 
neither  was  any  one  bound  to  take  formal  or  official 
notice  of  it. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  international  law,  this 
may  be  said  to  be  substantially  the  conviction  of 
European  jurists  and  statesmen  to-day: — that  is  to 
Bay,  that  the  message  did  not  purport  to  lay  down 

21 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

any  rule  binding  on  any  Power,  or  on  the  United 
States  themselves,  as  part  of  the  law  of  nations; 
that  it  did  not  create  or  offer  any  conventional  obli- 
gation. 

As  a  measure  of  self  preservation,  however,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  not,  from  the  American  point 
of  view,  without  its  justification  by  appeal  to  inter- 
national law,  precisely  as  the  intentions  enunciated 
by  the  European  sovereigns  were  justified  in  their 
view  by  the  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  It  was 
in  fact  the  converse  of  that,  for,  since  the  law  of 
nations  concedes  to  every  sovereign  state  the  abso- 
lute right  to  provide  for  its  own  self-preservation 
and  self-defence,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  as  its 
object  the  integrity  of  free  government  and  liberal 
thought,  just  as  the  Holy  Alliance  was  formed  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying  liberalism  and  restoring 
absolutism  from  which  the  nations  of  the  world  were 
then  beginning  to  escape  but  in  which  the  allied  sov- 
ereigns believed  to  reside  all  their  rights  and  all  the 
elements  of  their  further  existence.  But  it  would 
seem,  by  the  same  reasoning,  that  they  themselves 
had  overstepped  the  limit  of  international  law  in 
their  efforts  to  force  upon  any  people  a  government 
without  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  Jefferson 

22 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

expressed  it  as  liis  opinion  that  the  occasion  offered 
itself  *'of  declaring  our  protest  against  the  atrocious 
violations  of  the  rights  of  nations  by  the  interference 
of  one  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another,  so  flagi- 
tiously beg-un  by  Bonaparte,  and  now  continued  by 
the  equally  lawless  Alliance  calling  itself  Holy." 

President  Monroe  had  won  a  complete  success, 
however,  through  the  announcement  of  the  policy  of 
his  administration ;  the  proposed  intervention  of  the 
allies  was  abandoned  and  Spain  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  South  American  Republics  by  sepa- 
rate treaties  not  long  afterwards.  The  United  States 
had  declared  to  the  world  that  'Hhe  American  Con- 
tinents, by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which 
they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not 
to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  European  powers," — and,  "it  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political 
system  to  any  portion  of  either  continent  without 
endangering  our  peace  and  happiness.  It  is  equally 
impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such 
interposition  with  indifference." 

So  much  has  been  written  upon  this  subject,  and 
the  arguments  to  which  it  has  given  rise  are  so  com- 
plex in  themselves  and  supported  frequently  by  dis- 

23 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

cussions  so  diffuse  as  to  make  it  tedious  even  to 
attempt  to  enumerate  the  many  volumes  in  Vv^hicli 
they  are  contained.  In  our  effort,  however,  to  ascer- 
tain the  sentiment  of  Europe  toward  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  general,  it  may  suffice  perhaps  to  take 
as  examples  the  conclusions  of  a  few  of  the  promi- 
nent jurists  who  have  expressed  their  opinions  of 
recent  years  in  regard  to  it  both  in  Great  Britain 
and  upon  the  continent. 

One  of  the  most  eminent  amongst  these,  for  in- 
stance, M.  de  Beaumarchais,  has  declared  that  the 
first  passage  of  the  Doctrine,  relating  to  coloniza- 
tion by  European  nations,  has  very  little  more  for  us 
to-day  than  a  historical  interest,  because  the  whole 
territory  of  America  is  actually  appropriated  and 
consequently  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  the  sub- 
ject of  European  colonization: — for,  if  the  delimi- 
tation of  the  territory  and  the  question  of  boundary 
lines  may  give  rise  to  international  complications, 
it  would  be  an  error  to  declare  that  European  states 
could  found,  at  any  future  time,  colonies  in  the  New 
World.^  He  recalls  the  conditions  agreed  to  by  all 
international  lawyers  upon  this  point,  namely:  that 

^  La  Doctrine  de  Monroe,  Maurice  de  Beaumarchais,  Paris,  1898, 
page  24. 
24 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

land  sought  to  be  appropriated  by  a  state  must  be 
territorium  nullkis — that  is  to  say,  susceptible  of 
occupation  but  not  actually  appropriated,  and  the 
taking  possession  of  it  shall  be  effective,  made  so  by 
the  occupant  animo  domini.  To  these  conditions, 
M.  Beaumarchais  points  out,  Monroe  added  another 
in  the  case  of  European  States  intending  to  found 
new  colonies  in  America,  namely,  '^  the  consent  of 
the  United  States." 

As  to  this,  another  French  author,  M.  Merignhac, 
asserts  decisively  that  the  interdiction  of  Monroe 
is  '* absolutely  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,"  for 
it  is  not  to  be  tolerated  that  one  nation  shall  close  an 
entire  continent  against  the  colonization  of  the  people 
of  other  hemispheres.^  So  also  M.  Charles  Salomon, 
attacking  this  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
affirms  that  it  is  either  "  useless  or  abusive," — use- 
less if  all  the  American  territory  is  really  occupied ; 
abusive  if  it  is  not;  because,  in  spite  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  which  is  not  a  rule  of  international  law 
and  has  never  bound  any  one,  the  taking  possession 
by  a  European  state  of  land  lying  in  the  American 
continent   would  be   a   legal   occupation,   provided 

■•La  Doctrine  de  IMonroi",  a,  fin  du  XIXc  Sii-cle.  Revue  dii 
Droit  Public  et  de  la  Science  Politique,  189G,  p.  206. 

25 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

that  such  land  should  be  what  is  usually  accepted 
as  res  nullius.^  Therefore,  concludes  M.  de  Beaumar- 
chais,  the  first  point  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  never 
was  of  great  importance,  and  such  interest  as  it  has 
for  us  now  is  purely  theoretical ;  it  is  contrary  to  the 
universally  accepted  principles  of  international  law, 
for  no  state  can  modify  the  situation  of  territories 
which  do  not  belong  to  it,  and  no  Power  has  ever 
recognized  the  principle  of  non-colonization  which 
the  United  States  have  sought  to  impose  upon  Europe 
on  the  American  Continent. 

The  European  jurists  are  almost  unanimous  in 
regarding  the  Doctrine  in  all  its  parts,  relating  not 
only  to  colonization  but  to  intervention  as  well,  as 
being  untenable  and  not  binding  by  the  accepted 
rules  of  law.  Mr.  Reddaway,  for  example,  says  in 
his  treatise  on  the  subject,  that  the  United  States 
could  not  by  a  declaration  affect  the  international 
status  of  lands  claimed,  ruled,  or  discovered  by  other 
Powers.  They  might  proclaim  in  advance  the  policy 
which  they  would  adopt  when  such  questions  should 
arise,  but  no  unilateral  act  could  change  the  law  of 
nations.  He  declares  further,  in  regard  to  the 
second  form  of  the  Doctrine  as  well  as  the  first,  that 

"  Ubi  supra.     L'Occupation  des  Territoires,  sans  Maltres,  p.  252. 
26 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

it  is  a  vague  declaration  of  policy,  and  in  no  way  a 
formulation  of  rules  prevailing  between  states.  No 
line  or  paragraph,  says  he,  represents  an  addition 
to  the  body  of  rules  prevailing  between  states. 
From  the  first  word  to  the  last,  it  is  a  declaration  of 
the  policy  of  a  single  Power.  To  derive  from  the 
whole  principles  which  are  essentially  absent  from 
all  the  parts,  would  be  contrary  to  reason.^ 

Thus,  the  opinions  of  European  lawyers  are  hos- 
tile to  the  Doctrine  of  Monroe  from  every  point  of 
law;  they  declare  that  it  has  never  bound  any  one 
nor  can  it  do  so,  because  it  does  not  carry  with  it  the 
least  legal  obligation  which  other  nations  are  called 
upon  to  take  notice  of  or  submit  to.  M.  Hector  Petin, 
in  his  exceedingly  careful  investigation  of  this  sub- 
ject, published  in  1900,  gave  it  as  his  judgment  that 
Monroe,  not  being  a  great  jurist,  was  not  impelled 
by  considerations  of  law  in  composing  his  message ; 
it  was  not  the  lawyer  but  the  politician  who  spoke, 
and  that  Monroe  kept  always  before  him  a  political 
notion  which  was  his  constant  guide ;  that  is  to  say, 
that  America,  forming  a  separate  continent  of  its 
own,  has  freed  itself  from  the  political  system  of 

«nie  Monroe  Doctrine,  W.  F.  Keddaway,  Cambridge,  1898, 
chapter  vii. 

27 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Europe,  and  the  measures  adopted  to  assure  peace 
and  public  order  in  Europe  are  without  effect  when 
applied  to  the  affairs  of  America.  ' '  Monroe  did  not 
resist  the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in 
America  because  the  principle  of  intervention  is 
wrong,  but  he  fought  it  solely  upon  the  ground  that 
whilst  the  European  Powers  had  a  right  to  establish 
the  equilibrium  in  Europe  to  suit  themselves  they 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  equilibrium  in  America. ' ' 
M.  Petin,  who  agrees  with  the  other  European 
writers,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  false  from  the 
point  of  view  of  law, — so  destructively  false,  in  his 
view,  that  if  accepted  it  would  tear  down  the  struc- 
ture of  international  law  from  top  to  bottom, — de- 
scribes it  as  a  mere  declaration  of  policy.'^ 

And  here  we  touch  the  ground  upon  which  our 
European  critics  meet,  the  point  at  which  their  judg- 
ments coincide — namely,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  merely  a  declaration  of  American  national  polit- 
ical faith;  it  points  out  the  course  of  action  which 
the  United  States  will  take  under  given  circum- 
stances and  defines  the  political  relations  of  the 
United    States    Government,    under    such    circum- 

*  Les  Etats-Unis  et  La  Doctrine  de  Monroe,  par  Hector  P6tin, 
Paris,  1900,  chapter  v. 
28 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

stances,  with  the  other  governments  of  the  world.  We 
may  fairly  conclude  that  this  is,  perhaps,  as  nearly 
as  we  can  present  it  with  any  distinctness  of  form, 
the  attitude  of  Europe  toward  the  declarations  of 
Monroe.  It  is  not  supported  by  law;  it  is  but  the 
political  system  of  the  United  States. 

Sir  Frederick  Pollock  clearly  expressed  the  gen- 
eral opinion  when  he  said : 

"The  message  did  not  purport  to  lay  down 
any  rule  binding  on  any  power,  or  on  the  United 
States  themselves,  as  part  of  the  law  of  nations. 
It  did  not  create  or  offer  any  conventional  obli- 
gation. The  United  States,  in  fact,  declined  not 
long  afterwards  to  take  any  steps  which  might 
be  construed  as  a  definite  promise  to  the  South 
American  republics.  The  declaration  was  an 
independent  policy  to  be  interpreted  and  exe- 
cuted by  the  sole  discretion  of  the  nation  whose 
chief  magistrate  had  declared  it ;  and  from  this 
attitude  the  United  States  have  not  departed. 
Not  that  Monroe's  dictum  could  have  of  itself 
any  binding  force  on  his  successors.  Its  present 
importance  is  derived,  on  the  contrary,  from 
their  continuous  and  deliberate  approval.  The 
Doctrine  is  a  living  power  because  it  has  been 
adopted  by  the  Government  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  with  little  or  no  regard  to 
party  divisions,  for  the  best  part  of  a  century. 
Since  it  is  not  a  formula  to  be  construed  accord- 

29 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ing  to  its  literal  terms  like  a  statute  or  a  conven- 
tion, there  is  no  reason  why  its  application 
should  be  limited  to  precisely  similar  facts. 
The  question  in  every  case  is  not  whether  the 
facts  fall  within  Monroe's  words,  or  the  words 
of  any  later  president  or  secretary  of  state,  but 
whether  they  are  within  the  spirit  and  the  gen- 
eral purpose  of  the  policy  to  which  Monroe's 
message  first  gave  an  authentic  shape.  "^ 

Solely  a  political  doctrine,  then,  proclaimed  as  the 
rule  of  conduct  which  the  United  States  have  adopted 
for  themselves,  and  pointing  out  the  line  of  action 
which  their  Government  may  be  expected  to  follow 
under  given  circumstances  for  the  maintenance  and 
defence  of  its  own  integrity  and  the  support  of  free 
institutions  throughout  America.  This  would  seem 
to  be  the  interpretation  in  Europe  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Its  importance  as  a  factor  in  the  inter- 
course between  nations,  as  estimated  by  foreign 
statesmen  in  so  far  as  it  enters  into  their  calcula- 
tions at  all,  depends  upon  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  support  it, — either  by  the  imposing  in- 
fluence of  their  national  prestige,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  Venezuela  boundary  dispute, — or  by  a  demonstra- 
tion of  force,  if  need  be,  as  in  regard  to  the  expedi- 

*  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  Frederick  Pollock,  The  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury, October,  1902. 

30 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tion  sent  by  the  Emperor  Napoleon  into  Mexico.  The 
latter  may  be  taken,  indeed,  as  a  complete  illustra- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  when  brought  into  action 
and  effectively  supported  by  the  United  States.  The 
Emperor  Napoleon  assured  his  subjects  and  the 
world,  in  his  address  to  the  Chamber,  in  January, 
1866,  with  reference  to  Mexico,  that  ''the  sole  object 
of  the  Powers  in  intervening  in  that  country  was  to 
secure  the  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  which  it  had 
already  undertaken."^  But  the  United  States  were 
engaged  at  the  time  in  a  struggle  for  life  at  home, 
which  was  generally  expected  throughout  Europe  to 
end  in  a  dissolution  of  the  Union;  the  moment  was 
favorable  and  the  opportunity  appeared  to  offer 
itself  to  the  development  of  the  ambitious  plans  of 
the  Emperor  quite  regardless  of  the  protests  of  the 
United  States  because,  evidently,  the  United  States 
had  not  then,  and,  as  he  thought,  probably  never 
would  have,  strength  enough  to  interfere  with  him. 
We  have  the  authority  of  M.  Petin  in  this  connection, 
who  declares  that  the  Government  of  France  in- 
tended to  prevent  the  United  States  from  extending 
toward  the  south  and  acquiring  an  uncontested  pre- 
dominance in  America.     The  Emperor  himself  de- 

'  Petin,  ut  supra,  page  185  et  seq. 

81 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

scribed  his  purposes  in  a  letter  to  General  Forey, 
explaining  to  him  that  ''France  is  extending  its 
beneficent  influence  into  the  centre  of  America,  she 
will  create  immense  outlets  for  our  commerce, — 
whilst  the  Prince  who  shall  mount  the  throne  of  Mex- 
ico will  always  be  obliged  to  consider  first  the  inter- 
ests of  France,  not  alone  out  of  gratitude,  but  because 
he  will  not  be  able  to  separate  himself  from  our  in- 
fluence. ' ' 

''Napoleon  had  observed,"  says  M.  Petin,  "how 
fully  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  anti-European;  he 
comprehended  that  the  proclamation  of  the  fifth 
President  of  the  United  States  was  nothing  less  than 
a  declaration  of  war  against  the  Old  World,  and  he 
decided  to  show  America  that  Europe  had  taken  up 
the  gauntlet. ' ' 

Mr.  Seward's  correspondence  of  that  time  dis- 
closes the  hand  of  a  man  who  perfectly  understood 
the  situation  which  confronted  him,  whose  mind  was 
firm  and  his  diplomatic  intercourse  entirely  correct ; 
it  gives  the  impression  that  he  felt  that  he  was  mak- 
ing all  that  was  possible  out  of  the  circumstances 
which  he  had  to  face.  He  could  neither  take  an 
aggressive  attitude  nor  would  he  retire  from  the  field. 

But  when  the  civil  war  at  home  had  ended  in  the 

32 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

restoration  of  the  Union  and  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment saw  itself  able  to  dispose  of  a  strong  army  of 
veterans  both  of  the  North  and  the  South,  Mr. 
Seward  wrote  his  dispatch  of  December  16,  1865, 
instructing  Mr.  Bigelow  to  inform  the  cabinet  in 
Paris  upon  two  points: 

First. — That  the  United  States  earnestly  desire 
to  continue  and  to  cultivate  sincere  friendship  with 
France. 

Second. — That  this  policy  would  be  brought  in 
immediate  jeopardy,  unless  France  could  deem  it  con- 
sistent with  her  interest  and  honor  to  desist  from 
the  prosecution  of  armed  intervention  in  Mexico. 

This  was  the  famous  dispatch  which  was  well 
understood  to  mean:  ''Withdraw  or  fight."  ^^ 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  from  anything  that  has 
occurred  since  that  time  that  any  foreign  nation  will 
feel  itself  more  bound  to-day  than  it  was  then  to 
respect  the  principles  declared  by  President  Monroe, 
unless  there  is  sufficient  power  in  this  Government 
to  enforce  them ;  all  European  writers  agree  that  no 
nation  has  recognized  his  doctrine.      Indeed,  Mr. 

"  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Bigelow,  Minister  to 
France,  No.  332.— Dec.  16,  18G5.  H.  Ex.  Doc.  73.  39  Cong.  Moore, 
Digest,  vi,  501. 

3  S3 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Eoosevelt  himself,  its  most  determined  advocate  in 
our  day,  evidently  had  this  in  mind  when  he  declared 
to  the  country  in  his  annual  message  of  1901:  ''The 
navy  offers  us  the  only  means  of  making  our  insis- 
tence upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  anything  but  a  sub- 
ject of  derision  to  whatever  nation  chooses  to  disre- 
gard it." 

One  of  the  latest  critics  upon  this  subject  whose 
profound  study  of  the  Doctrine  of  Monroe  in  its 
relation  to  the  precepts  of  international  law,  the  dis- 
tinguished German  jurist,  Dr.  Herbert  Kraus,  de- 
clares in  his  work  printed  within  a  year,  at  Berlin, 
that  there  has  not  been  a  single  instance  in  which  the 
interference  of  the  United  States  between  American 
and  non-American  states  upon  the  ground  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  can  be  traced  to  a  justified  purpose 
of  self -protection, — neither  has  there  ever  been  an 
instance  in  which  the  United  States  could  have  been 
justified  in  such  intervention,  because  in  no  case  has 
there  ever  been  an  actual  danger  which  threatened 
the  national  existence  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment. He  pronounces  illegal  the  employment  of  that 
Doctrine  to  obstruct  by  force  the  just  development 
of  the  political  power  of  non-American  states  in 
America,  unless  such  intervention  be  called  for  by 

S4 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

danger  arising  from  such  development  and  actually 
threatening  the  integrity  of  the  United  States.^  ^ 

Dr.  Kraus  contends  against  the  assertion  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  recognized,  either 
through  the  acquiescence  of  the  Powers  in  the 
declaration  made  by  the  United  States  and  spread 
upon  the  minutes  of  the  Hague  Conference  or  by  the 
reference  made  to  it  either  directly  or  indirectly  by 
any  of  the  European  Powers,  which  he  describes  as 
merely  a  small  number  of  expressions  of  friendly 
sentiment ;  for  he  gives  it  as  his  decided  opinion  that 
no  state  has  as  yet  recognized  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  part  of  the  law  of  nations. 

Taking  all  this  into  consideration  and  allowing 
all  these  arguments  to  exert  their  full  influence,  we 
must  observe,  however,  that  President  Monroe's 
declaration  has  not  been  and  is  not  likely  to  be  dis- 
regarded ;  for,  on  the  contrary,  we  have  the  example 
of  England  when  she  agreed  to  negotiate  with  us  in 
relation  to  a  question  of  her  boundary  line  with 
Venezuela  in  which  nothing  else  could  have  afforded 
the  United  States  even  a  shadow  of  authority  to 

"  Die  Monroedoktrin  in  ihren  Beziehungen  zur  amerikanischen 
Diplomatie.    Herbert  Kraus,  Berlin,  1913,  pp.  360-61. 

35 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

intervene.  We  have  also  the  pro  memoria  on  behalf 
of  the  German  Empire  delivered  to  the  Department 
of  State  by  Herr  von  Holleben,  the  German  Ambas- 
sador in  Washington,  in  1901,  in  relation  to  its  claims 
in  Venezuela,  in  which  document  his  Government 
announced  to  the  Secretary  of  State : 

''We  consider  it  important  at  the  outset  to 
inform  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
as  to  our  intentions,  in  order  that  we  may  show 
that  we  have  nothing  else  in  mind  than  to  aid 
those  of  our  citizens  who  have  suffered  damage. 

''We  declare  particularly  that  in  our  pro- 
ceeding we  do  not  contemplate,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, either  the  acquisition  or  the  per- 
manent occupation  of  Venezuelan  territory." 

And,  as  indicating  still  further  that  the  Doctrine  is 
at  least  taken  notice  of  in  connection  with  recent 
events,  we  have  the  statement  of  the  French  premier, 
M.  Dumergue,  who,  in  reporting  to  the  Parliament 
in  regard  to  foreign  affairs,  in  the  month  of  March, 
1914,  informed  the  Chamber  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment, whilst  taking  steps  to  protect  French  citi- 
zens in  Mexico  and  having  sent  French  men-of-war 
to  Vera  Cruz  for  that  purpose,  France  had  no  inten- 
tion of  taking  part  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  Mexico, 
in  order  not  to  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  action 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  the  United  States.  The  French  Government  hav- 
ing placed,  said  M.  Dumergue,  the  fullest  confidence 
in  the  Cabinet  of  Washington. 

Upon  the  whole,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  no  Euro- 
pean government  to-day  would  think  either  of  estab- 
lishing a  colony  or  attempting  to  occupy  territory  on 
the  American  continent  w^ithout  considering  in  that 
connection  the  attitude  of  the  United  States. 


37 


186429 


THE   TREATY   OBLIGATIONS   OF  THE 

UNITED  STATES  RELATING  TO 

THE   PANAMA   CANAL 

Read  Before  The  American  Philosophical  Society,  April  17,  1913 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  call  to  the  attention  of 
students  of  contemporaneous  foreign  politics  a 
subject  which  has  been  considerably  discussed  of  late, 
in  Congress  and  throughout  the  country,  and  cannot 
be  considered  in  any  sense  to  be  new;  but  which  in 
spite  of  this  fact,  and  of  a  certain  familiarity  which 
it  has  acquired  in  men's  minds  from  frequent  men- 
tion, is  still  of  such  paramount  importance  that  it  can 
scarcely  be  too  plainly  or  too  forcibly  brought  before 
the  sober  consideration  of  the  American  people, — 
the  international  obligations  undertaken  by  the 
United  States  in  the  treaties  relating  to  the  Panama 
Canal. 

The  subject  of  a  canal  across  the  narrow  strip  of 
land  that  joins  the  two  continents  is  one,  indeed,  that 
is  nearly  contemporaneous  with  the  discovery  of 
America;  for  its  advantages  made  themselves  evi- 
dent even  to  the  earliest  explorers  and  navigators, 
who,  upon  returning  to  Spain,  in  1528, — more  than 

38 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

150  years  before  William  Penu  entered  the  Dela- 
ware,— presented  to  the  Emperor  Charles  V  a  plan 
for  the  opening  of  a  waterway  through  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama ;  a  project  that  never  w^as  lost  sight  of  and 
which  acquired  greater  importance  to  us,  both  from 
our  political  and  commercial  point  of  view,  after  our 
separation  from  Great  Britain  and  the  establishment 
of  our  independent  nationality. 

In  1826,  Mr.  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  wrote, 
in  connection  with  a  Congress  at  Panama: 

''A  cut  or  canal  for  purposes  of  navigation 
somewhere  through  the  isthmus  that  connects 
the  two  Americas,  to  unite  the  Pacific  and  At- 
lantic Oceans,  will  form  a  proper  subject  of 
consideration.  That  vast  object,  if  it  should  be 
ever  accomplished,  will  be  interesting,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  to  all  parts  of  the 
world. '  * 

We  were  not  in  a  position  at  that  time  to  think  of 
undertaking  such  a  work  ourselves,  though  our  Gov- 
ernment was  alive  to  the  opportunity  and  wished  to 
participate  in  the  advantages  that  would  arise  from 
a  canal ;  and  Mr.  Clay  added : 

''If  the  work  should  ever  be  executed  so  as 
to  admit  of  the  passage  of  sea-vessels  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  the  benefit  of  it  ought  not  to  be 
exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one  nation,  but 

89 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  globe 
upon  the  payment  of  a  just  compensation  or 
reasonable  tolls." 

The  progress  of  events  and  the  growth  of  our  im- 
portance as  a  nation  enlarged  the  interest  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  in  the  passage  through 
the  isthmus,  which  was  taken  up  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives in  compliance  with  a  memorial  from  the 
merchants  of  New  York  and  Philadelphia  in  1839.  A 
resolution  was  adopted  by  the  House  that  the  Presi- 
dent should  be  requested: 

"To  consider  the  expediency  of  opening  or 
continuing  negotiations  with  the  Governments 
of  other  nations,  and  particularly  with  those 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  which  compre- 
hends the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  for  the  purpose 
of  ascertaining  the  practicability  of  effecting  a 
communication  between  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans,  by  the  construction  of  a  ship 
canal  across  the  isthmus,  and  of  securing  for- 
ever the  free  and  equal  right  of  navigating  such 
Canal  to  all  nations." 

A  treaty  was  entered  into,  seven  years  later,  in 

1846,  between  the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of 

New  Granada,  which  was  the  first  effective  step 

taken  by  our  Government  in  the  direction  of  the 

actual  transit  across  the  isthmus  and  of  our  partici- 

40 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

pation  in  its  construction  and  maintenance  of  way. 
This  was  a  treaty  of  peace,  amity,  navigation,  and 
commerce  with  New  Granada,  and  was  continued  in 
operation  by  the  Republic  of  Colombia  into  which 
that  state  was  subsequently  transformed,  and  it  is 
to  this  agreement,  entered  into  by  us  during  the  ad- 
ministration of  President  Polk,  through  an  immense 
amount  of  negotiation  and  correspondence  that  has 
taken  place  since  between  ourselves  and  other  Gov- 
ernments, particularly  those  of  the  Central  and 
South  American  republics  as  well  as  Great  Britain 
and  France,  that  may  be  traced  the  origin  of  the 
interests  and  claims  under  which  the  United  States 
have  constructed  the  canal  and  are  in  control  of  the 
territory  of  the  canal  zone  on  the  isthmus  to-day. 
The  treaty  extended  to  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  commerce 
and  navigation  in  the  ports  of  New  Granada  that  are 
enjoyed  by  the  Granadian  citizens  themselves,  and  the 
Government  of  New  Granada  guaranteed  to  the 
United  States,  "that  the  right  of  way  or  transit 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  upon  any  modes  of 
communication  that  now  exist  or  that  may  be  here- 
after constructed,  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the  Gov- 
ernment and  citizens  of  the  United  States."    In  re- 

•ti 


ESSAYS  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

turn  for  these  favors  the  United  States  guaranteed : 
"positively  and  efficaciously,  to  New  Granada,  the 
perfect  neutrality  of  the  isthmus,  with  the  view  that 
the  free  transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may 
not  be  interrupted  in  any  future  time  while  this 
treaty  exists";  and,  in  consequence,  the  United 
States  guaranteed,  "in  the  same  manner,  the  rights 
of  sovereignty  and  property  Avhich  New  Granada  has 
and  possesses  over  the  said  territory." 

Therefore  Ave  had  acquired  a  controlling  influence 
at  Panama  which  enabled  us  to  play  so  prominent 
a  part  that  we  might  begin  to  make  effective  plans  for 
the  construction  of  a  canal ;  whether  we  should  decide 
to  build  it  ourselves,  or  whether  the  Avork  should  be 
done  by  others,  it  Avas  quite  certain  that  no  canal 
could  be  made  Avithout  our  consent.  We  had  secured 
the  constant  enjoyment  to  ourseh^es  of  the  commer- 
cial privileges  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants  of  Ncav  Gra- 
nada, and  as  New  Granada  was  a  weak  power  we 
made  the  stipulation  in  return  for  the  favors  that 
she  had  shoAA^n  to  us  that  the  United  States  GoA^ern- 
ment  AA^th  its  superior  strength  Avould  protect  New 
Granada  in  her  rights  of  oAA-nership  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  and  Avould  guarantee  that  she  should  ahvays 
maintain  her  sovereignty  over  that  territory.    We 

42 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

failed  afterwards  to  carry  out  our  agreement  in  this 
respect ;  and  the  protest  of  Colombia,  taken  upon  its 
merits  as  a  matter  of  international  law,  is  very 
serious, — but  that  belongs  to  another  subject. 

Our  attitude  was  made  plain  at  that  time  by  the 
message  with  which  the  President  submitted  this 
treaty  to  the  Senate,  in  1847,  for  its  approval  and 
ratification,  in  which  he  announced  formally  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  develop  the  communi- 
cation through  the  isthmus  for  the  benefit  of  the 
commerce  of  the  world  at  large. 

Mr.  Polk  declared  that  the  treaty  did  not  "con- 
stitute an  alliance  for  any  political  object,  but  for  a 
purely  commercial  purpose,  in  which  all  the  navi- 
gating nations  of  the  world  have  a  common  interest. ' ' 

''The  ultimate  object  is  to  secure  to  all 
nations  the  free  and  equal  right  of  passage  over 
the  isthmus.  If  the  United  States  should  first 
become  a  party  to  this  guaranty,  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  similar  guarantees  will  be  given 
to  New  Granada  by  Great  Britain  and  France." 

If  the  proposition  should  be  rejected  by  the 
Senate,  the  President  said,  "  w^e  may  deprive  the 
United  States  of  the  just  influence  which  its  accept- 
ance might  secure  to  them,  and  confer  the  glory  and 
benefits  of  being  the  first  among  the  nations  in  con- 

43 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

eluding  sucli  an  arrangement  upon  the  Government 
either  of  Great  Britain  or  France." 

But,  at  the  time  that  this  treaty  was  made,  Great 
Britain  claimed  dominion  in  certain  parts  of  Central 
America  over  which  she  exerted  authority  and  of 
which  she  was  in  actual  possession;  these  were  the 
territory  extending  along  the  coast  of  Guatemala, 
called  Belize  or  British  Honduras,  including  an  island 
called  Ruatan  and  other  Bay  Islands,  and  she 
asserted  a  protectorate  over  a  long  stretch  of  Nica- 
ragua inhabited  by  the  Mosquito  Indians,  called  the 
Mosquito  Coast.  She  had  a  more  direct  claim  upon 
and  closer  personal  relation  with  the  people  of  Cen- 
tral America  than  we  had, — her  occupation  of  British 
Honduras  dating  back  at  least  to  a  treaty  which  she 
made  with  Spain  in  1786. 

In  pursuance  of  our  policy,  however,  of  creating  a 
neutral  territory  at  the  isthmus,  and  of  preventing 
the  establishment  there  by  any  single  foreign  nation 
of  exclusive  control,  we  proposed,  in  1850,  that 
Great  Britain  should  unite  her  interests  with  ours 
in  order  that  not  only  the  canal  should  be  built 
upon  fair  and  equitable  terms,  "but  that  its 
construction  should  inure  to  the  benefit  of  all 
nations  and  should  offer  equal  opportunity  to  the 

44 


M£XI 


MAP  OF  CKNTRAL  AMERICA 
IXDICATIXG  THK  BRITISH 
TKRRITORY  I\  HONDURAS 
AND  THE  MOSQUITO  RESERVE 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

commerce  of  the  world;  and  for  this  purpose  we 
invited  Great  Britain,  and  she  consented,  to  enter  into 
a  convention  with  us  with  the  intention  of  setting 
forth  and  fixing  the  views  and  intentions  of  both 
Governments,  with  reference  to  any  means  of  com- 
munication by  ship  canal  which  may  be  constructed 
between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans  by  way  of 
the  river  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  to  any  port  or 
place  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. ' '  This  was  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  which  was  signed  at  Washington  on 
the  nineteenth  of  April,  1850,  by  Mr.  John  M.  Clay- 
ton, then  Secretary  of  State,  and  Sir  Henry  Lytton 
Bulwer,  British  Minister  to  the  United  States.    By  it : 

''The  Governments  of  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  declare  that  neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  will  ever  obtain  or  maintain  for 
itself  any  exclusive  control  over  the  ship  canal, 
will  not  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  exercise  any 
dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America; 
also,  that  neither  Great  Britain  nor  the  United 
States  will  take  advantage  of  any  intimacy  or 
alliance  that  it  may  have  with  any  Govern- 
ment through  wdiose  territory  the  canal  shall 
pass,  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  or  holding 
any  rights  or  advantages  in  regard  to  commerce 
or  navigation  through  the  canal  which  shall 

45 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

not  be  offered  on  the  same  terms  to  the  citizens 
or  subjects  of  the  other." 

The  treaty  having  thus  provided  for  the  joint 
action  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  and 
having  agreed  that  the  two  Governments  should  give 
their  support  and  encouragement  to  any  persons  or 
company  who  might  first  offer  to  begin  the  canal  with 
the  necessary  concessions  and  capital,  the  two  con- 
tracting nations  included  in  it  the  following  state- 
ment : 

*  *  The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  having  not  only  desired,  in  enter- 
ing into  this  Convention,  to  accomplish  a  par- 
ticular object,  but  also  to  establish  a  general 
principle,  they  hereby  agree  to  extend  their 
protection,  by  treaty  stipulations,  to  any  other 
practicable  communications,  whether  by  canal 
or  railway,  across  the  isthmus  which  connects 
North  and  South  America,  and  especially  to  the 
interoceanic  communications,  should  the  same 
prove  to  be  practicable,  which  are  now  pro- 
posed to  be  established  by  tlie  way  of  Tehuan- 
tepec  or  Panama"; — it  being  understood — 
"that  the  parties  constructing  or  owning  the 
same  shall  impose  no  other  charges  or  condi- 
tions of  traffic  thereupon  than  the  aforesaid 
Governments  shall  approve  of, — and  that  the 
same  canals  or  railways,  being  open  to  the  citi- 
zens and  subjects  of  the  United  States  and 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Great  Britain  on  equal  terms,  shall  also  be 
open  on  like  terms  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of 
every  other  State  which  is  willing  to  grant 
thereto  such  protection  as  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  engage  to  afford." 

Thus,  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  became  the 
foundation  for  the  understanding  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  and  provided  for  an  abso- 
lute equality  between  them  in  regard,  not  only  to 
the  protection  which  they  united  to  give  to  any  inter- 
oceanic  communication  that  should  be  established, 
but  also  formally  declared  that  both  Governments 
should  approve  of  any  charges  or  conditions  of 
traffic, — that  is  to  say,  tolls, — which  might  be  im- 
posed, and  that  no  such  tolls  should  be  imposed,  in 
fact,  which  had  not  the  approval  and  consent  of  both 
Governments. 

The  United  States  Government  considered  that  it 
had  entered  into  an  agreement  that  was  both  just  and 
equitable  toward  both  parties,  as  a  definition  of  the 
rights  and  duties  of  each  and  a  basis  upon  which  the 
isthmian  canal  should  be  built  as  a  benefit  to  the 
commerce  of  the  world. 

And  further,  we  not  only  held  ourselves  to  be 
bound  by  the  stipulations  of  this  agreement,  but  we 

47 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

called  upon  Great  Britain  to  sustain  her  part  of  it 
by  a  very  strict  interpretation  of  the  law,  quite  be- 
yond what  the  British  Cabinet  had  expected  in  enter- 
ing into  the  engagement,  and  a  good  deal  more  than 
it  was  willing  at  first  to  concede;  for  we  contended 
that  by  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  both  nations  had 
promised  not:  ''to  make  use  of  any  protection  or 
alliance  which  either  has  or  may  have  with  any  state 
or  people  for  the  purpose  of  fortifying  or  colonizing 
Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or  any 
part  of  Central  America,  or  of  assuming  or  exercis- 
ing dominion  over  the  same."  And  we  called  upon 
the  British  Government,  under  this  provision,  not 
only  not  to  extend  its  political  influence  in  Central 
America  but  also  to  give  up  such  claims  as  it  might 
already  have  acquired  in  British  Honduras,  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  and  the  islands  of  the  sea. 

This  was  not  at  all  what  Great  Britain  had  under- 
stood to  be  her  position  under  the  treaty,  and  Lord 
Clarendon  declared  (1854)  that  the  contracting  par- 
ties did  not  intend  to  include  within  its  action  ' '  either 
the  British  settlement  in  Honduras  nor  the  islands 
known  as  its  dependencies,"  that  whatever  claims  or 
influence  Great  Britain  may  have  had  there  pre- 
viously should  remain  undisturbed, — that  the  only 

48 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

question  which  might  arise  in  regard  to  this  was 
one  relating  to  the  boundary  line  of  Honduras, — as 
to  what  was  British  Honduras  and  what  was  not. 

"To  this  settlement  and  these  islands  the 
treaty  we  negotiated  was  not  intended  by  either 
of  us  to  apply, — and  the  British  Government  is 
more  warranted  in  this  conclusion  from  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  sent  a  Consul  to  the 
settlement,  in  1847,  which  Consul  had  received 
his  exequatur  from  the  British  Government 
which  was  a  recognition  of  the  British  claim." 

But,  on  our  side,  Mr.  Marcy,  Secretary 
of  State,  declared  in  answer  to  this  (1856), 
"Great  Britain  had  not  any  rightful  posses- 
sions in  Central  America  and  at  the  same  time, 
if  she  had  any,  she  was  bound  by  the  express 
tenor  and  true  construction  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  to  evacuate  them,  so  as  to  stand 
on  precisely  the  same  footing  in  that  respect  as 
the  United  States." 

This  defines  our  position  in  regard  to  the  affairs 

of  the  isthmus;  it  insists  that  Great  Britain  shall 

place  herself  upon  an  exact  equality  with  us ;  that  she 

must  give  up  any  claims  or  privileges  in  which  we  did 

not  share,  in  order  that  we  may  be  precisely  alike ; 

but  it  marks  also  our  obligation  toward  Great  Britain, 

— for  whilst  we  insisted  that  she  should  be  on  an  equal 

footing  with  us,  we  promised  that  we  should  bo  upon 

4  49 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

an  equal  footing  with  her.  "VVe  won  our  case  and 
England,  giving  up  the  Mosquito  Coast  and  the 
islands,  came  ultimately  to  our  understanding,  be- 
cause of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty;  but  the  pro- 
vision of  the  treaty  was  that:  neither  the  United 
States  nor  Great  Britain  should  exert  any  influence 
that  either  may  possess,  ''for  the  purpose  of  acquir- 
ing directly  or  indirectly,  for  the  citizens  of  the  one 
any  rights  or  advantages  in  regard  to  commerce  or 
navigation  through  the  said  canal  which  shall  not 
be  otfered  on  the  same  terms  to  the  citizens  or  sub- 
jects of  the  other." 

General  Cass  said  (1858) : 

"What  the  United  States  want  in  Central 
America,  next  to  the  happiness  of  its  people, 
is  the  security  and  neutrality  of  the  inter- 
oceanic  routes  which  lead  through  it.  If  the 
principles  and  policy  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  are  carried  into  effect,  this  object  is 
accomplished." 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  there  are  two  distinct 

points  of  agreement  which  are  set  forth  in  this  treaty 

as  well  as  in  all  of  the  voluminous  correspondence 

that  had  taken  place  in  regard  to  it, — which  points  of 

agreement  have  never  been  lost  sight  of  as  the  basis 

of  the  negotiations  relating  to  the  canal  across  the 

50 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

isthmus ;  namely,  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  itself  and 
the  absolute  equality  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  in  connection  with  it.  We  demanded  it 
from  the  start  and  Great  Britain  has  acceded  to  our 
demand  with  that  principle  in  view,  which  has  never 
been  changed. 

She  was  willing  to  join  with  us  in  building  the 
canal,  or  she  was  willing  that  we  should  build  it  alone. 
And  when  after  a  good  many  years  of  delay  we  an- 
nounced to  her  that  we  were  in  a  position  to  under- 
take the  work,  and  w^e  made  suggestions  to  her  look- 
ing to  that  result,  she  agreed  to  make  a  new  treaty 
with  us,  to  supersede  the  old  one,  in  order  that  the 
intended  benefits  might  be  secured  and  the  work 
should  progress. 

The  new  treaty  was  signed  in  November,  1901,  by 
Mr.  John  Hay,  Secretary  of  State,  and  Lord  Paunce- 
fote,  the  British  Ambassador,  whence  it  has  since 
become  widely  known  as  the  ' '  Hay-Pauncef ote 
Treaty." 

By  this  contract  the  two  Powers — 

** Being  desirous  to  facilitate  the  construc- 
tion of  a  ship-canal  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans,  by  whatever  route  may  be  con- 
sidered expedient,  and  to  that  end  to  remove 
any  objection  which  may  arise  out  of  the  Con- 

^1 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

vention  of  the  nineteentli  April,  1850,  com- 
monly called  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  to 
the  construction  of  such  canal  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  without  impairing  the  'general  prin- 
ciple' of  neutralization  established  in  Article 
VIII  of  that  Convention,  agreed  that :  The  pres- 
ent Treaty  shall  supersede  that  of  April  19, 
1850.  That  the  canal  may  be  constructed  under 
the  auspices  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States, — and  that,  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
the  present  Treaty,  the  United  States  shall 
enjoy  all  the  rights  incident  to  its  construc- 
tion, as  well  as  the  exclusive  right  of  providing 
for  the  regulation  and  management  of  the 
canal. ' '  And,  in  order  to  make  plain  the  under- 
standing between  ourselves  and  the  British 
Government  with  whom  we  were  dealing,  we 
made  this  specific  stipulation  (Article  III) : 

*'The  United  States  adopts,  as  the  basis  of 
the  neutralization  of  such  ship-canal,  the  Rules, 
substantially  as  embodied  in  the  Convention  of 
Constantinople  (28  October,  1888),  for  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Suez  Canal,  that  is  to  say : 

* '  1.  The  Canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the 
vessels  of  commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations 
observing  these  Rules,  on  terms  of  entire  equal- 
ity, so  that  there  shall  be  no  discrimination 
against  any  such  nation,  or  its  citizens  or  sub- 
jects, in  respect  of  the  conditions  or  charges  of 
traffic,  or  otherwise." 

52 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Tliis  is  not  an  obscure  subject.  It  is  a  treaty  intc 
vvliicli  the  United  States  entered  openly  and  freely 
with  Great  Britain, — a  treaty  based  upon  all  that 
had  gone  before,  both  in  our  correspondence  and  our 
engagements  under  which  Great  Britain  placed  her- 
self and  her  interests  upon  an  equality  with  us  and 
with  our  interests  in  Central  America.  The  situation 
is  one  that  we  have  created  for  ourselves. 

It  is  not  a  question  as  to  whether  we  made  a  good 
bargain  or  a  bad  one,  but  it  is  a  matter  of  the  great- 
est importance  to  the  American  people  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  this  country  shall  fulfill  its  engagements 
and  carry  out  always  and  in  every  particular  its  inter- 
national obligations. 


5S 


DIPLOMACY  AS  A  PROFESSION 

If  we  consider  the  representation  of  the  Federal 
Government  in  foreign  countries  from  the  point  of 
view  of  a  professional  service  rendered  to  the  state 
and  the  nation,  there  will  be  a  certain  interest  for 
those  who  care  for  such  things  in  the  discussion  of 
some  of  the  details  of  diplomatic  procedure  and  the 
ordinary  rules  which  govern  the  practice  of  modern 
diplomacy,  as  well  as  the  incidents  which  characterize 
diplomatic  life,  in  order  to  obtain  a  glance  at  its 
official  relations  and  social  conditions  which,  while 
they  are  rather  far  removed  and  totally  different 
from  our  owai  experience  or  habit  of  daily  thought  at 
home,  are  yet  well  defined  and  very  carefully  pre- 
scribed. They  have  their  extensions,  limitations,  and 
adjustments  to  a  set  of  circumstances  under  which 
they  have  developed  through  several  centuries  into 
what  has  become  a  professional  career  for  a  great 
many  cultivated  and  scholarly  men  in  the  different 
countries  of  the  world. 

A  history  of  diplomacy,  pure  and  simple,  would 
probably  have  to  go  back  for  its  starting  point  to  the 
earliest  pages  of  recorded  intercourse  between  the 

54 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

men  of  one  country  and  those  adjoining  their  fron- 
tier ;  of  peoples  and  nations  with  others  with  whom 
they  come  into  contact  in  the  course  of  trade,  of  war, 
of  conquest,  or  discovery;  or  as  the  result  of  the 
hundred  incidents  that  might  carry  them  away  from 
their  native  soil  or  beyond  the  limits  of  the  territory 
upon  which  they  grew  up.  But  with  that  we  are  not 
now  especially  concerned.  Our  attention  is  directed 
toward  the  diplomatic  intercourse  of  our  own  day, — 
to  the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  period  in 
which  we  live  and  are  personally  interested, — what 
he  is,  why  he  exists,  how  he  obtains  his  authority, 
how  he  exerts  it,  what  his  duties  are,  and  what  service 
he  renders  to  the  country  to  which  he  belongs. 

In  the  broadest  sense,  the  diplomatist  always  has 
been,  and  is  now,  the  representative  of  one  country 
dealing  with  another  country, — the  agent  abroad  of 
his  own  government  in  the  transaction  of  its  public 
affairs  or  the  transmission  of  its  official  public  and 
private  correspondence  with  another  government; 
for  governments  like  individuals  and  corporations, 
have  dealings  with  each  other  upon  subjects  in  which 
they  are  mutually  interested, — the  adjustment  of  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  one  in  regard  to  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  other;  the  protection  of  the  citi- 

65 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

zens  or  subjects  of  one  within  the  territory  of  an- 
other ;  the  establishment  of  boundary  lines ;  the  nego- 
tiation of  treaties  and  conventions;  the  extradition 
of  criminals ;  the  arrangement  of  joint  action  in  the 
carrying  out  of  international  agreement ;  interchange 
of  views,  definitions  of  policy,  and,  in  general,  the 
exceedingly  varied  and  numerous  subjects  of  com- 
munication which  naturally  arise  in  the  course  of  the 
life  or  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  a  whole 
nation, — which  we  frequently  call  public  business. 

Diplomacy  is  in  fact  business ;  the  business  of  the 
Government,  it  is  true,  but  still  essentially  what  we 
know  in  this  country  as  business ;  therefore  it  can  be 
best  and  most  effectively  transacted  and  concluded 
by  men  dealing  with  each  other  on  either  side  who 
have  had  experience  in  business  methods  and  in  the 
treatment  of  large  questions.  It  has  been  the  habit 
to  look  upon  diplomacy  as  something  occult  or  mys- 
terious, beyond  the  reach  of  men  in  common  life,  that 
requires  in  some  way  an  unusual  talent  by  which  the 
possessors  of  it  are  singled  out  into  a  class  apart 
from  their  fellow  men.  There  is  nothing  of  the  sort, 
of  course.  What  is  true,  however,  is  that  an  able 
and  intelligent  man  will  find  his  way  in  the  diplo- 
matic service  of  the  Government  exactly  as  he  would 

56 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

do  in  any  other  profession  wliich  his  taste  or  disposi- 
tion might  lead  him  to  adopt.  But  it  is  beyond  doubt, 
also,  that  he  ought  to  have  a  certain  degree,  at  least, 
of  training  to  fit  him  for  his  duty,  as  he  would  find 
it  necessary  in  any  profession,  in  the  army  or  the 
navy,  in  a  responsible  position  at  the  head  of  a  bank 
or  a  great  trust  company  or  in  the  management  of  a 
railroad.  For  he  is  the  responsible  agent  of  his 
country,  and  it  is  through  him  as  such  that  nego- 
tiations are  made,  correspondence  is  carried  on,  and 
the  instructions  of  his  government  are  fulfilled 
abroad. 

Nations  and  great  powers  do  not  address  each 
other  directly  in  the  general  transaction  of  affairs 
in  which  either  one  or  both  of  them  may  be  inter- 
ested; but  they  have  come  in  such  matters  to  deal 
with  one  another  through  the  channels  which  have 
been  established  by  long  custom  as  suitable  to  the 
purpose,  and  by  methods  recognized  by  all  to  be  con- 
venient and  proper.  These  channels  are  their  own 
national  agents  selected  by  each  government ;  and  the 
methods  of  communication  are  what  we  know  in 
general  as  diplomacy. 

In  accordance  with  this  arrangement  each  coun- 
try sends  to  every  other  country  with  which  it  is  at 

67 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

peace  one  of  its  citizens  or  subjects  who  shall  reside 
in  that  country  and  near  to  its  sovereign  or  official 
head,  for  the  purpose  of  bearing  or  receiving  official 
communications ;  and  to  that  end  he  is  duly  author- 
ized and  accredited  with  power  to  act  under  the 
authority  which  his  own  government  has  delegated 
to  him  in  the  circumstances.  So  that  an  interchange 
of  these  national  agents  takes  place  now  between  all 
civilized  countries  of  the  world,  and  it  has  led  to  the 
foundation  of  what  we  know  as  the  diplomatic 
service. 

The  United  States,  for  instance,  have  their  repre- 
sentative to-day  at  every  important  capital  or  gov- 
ernment centre  in  the  world,  with  whom  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  at  Washington  is  in  immediate  com- 
munication and  who  is  ready  to  act  at  a  moment's 
notice  if  a  case  should  arise  in  which  the  interests 
of  the  Government  need  to  be  watched  or  cared  for 
or  the  rights  of  an  American  citizen  protected. 

This  defines  sufficiently,  perhaps,  the  essential 
character  and  general  usefulness  of  the  diplomatic 
representative  abroad.  And  if  the  question  presents 
itself  to  one's  mind  as  to  what  there  may  be  for  so 
many  people  in  so  many  different  parts  of  the  world 
to  do,  the  reply  is,  that  the  interests  of  America  as  a 

58 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

World  Power  are  enormous ;  that  with  the  growth  of 
facilities  of  communication  and  the  immense  develop- 
ment of  its  commerce  and  trade  its  influence  extends 
into  every  part  of  the  world  and  there  is  no  place 
where  its  citizens  are  unkno^Mi.  Their  rights  and 
privileges  create  business  that  requires  attention  at 
all  times,  and  they  may  give  rise  to  serious  cause  of 
action  at  any  moment.  Indeed,  it  is  very  true  of  the 
diplomatic  representative  and  of  the  responsibility 
which  he  holds  toward  his  own  government,  that  it 
is  not  only  the  things  that  are  happening  every  day, 
of  which  he  has  notice  and  for  which  he  is  prepared 
beforehand,  but  the  things  which  may  take  place  at 
any  moment  and  unexpectedly,  that  make  him  useful 
and  important  in  his  place.  He  may  be  compared  to 
the  sentry  on  duty;  whom  you  may  not  need  con- 
stantly or  even  every  day,  but  when  you  do  want 
his  services  you  want  them  very  much. 

Like  all  other  professions,  diplomacy  has  been 
enlarged  and  developed  in  accordance  with  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  times,  keeping  pace  with  the 
growth  of  intelligence  amongst  men  and  the  extension 
of  law  and  order,  as  well  as  with  the  vastly-increased 
means  of  intercommunication  in  modern  days 
upon  which  is  based  the  frequent  and  at  times  some- 

5i) 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

what  complex  intercourse  between  nations.  In  primi- 
tive times  its  manners  were  primitive,  of  course,  in 
accordance  with  the  habits  of  the  men  then  living 
in  the  world,  and  in  strong  contrast  with  the  methods 
of  the  highly-refined  and  formal  procedure  by  which 
the  negotiations  relating  to  international  affairs  are 
carried  on  in  our  day.  We  have  an  interesting  ex- 
ample of  this  in  the  fifteenth  century  in  an  account 
given  by  old  Phillipe  de  Commines,  who  wrote  about 
the  time  when  Columbus  came  to  America,  himself  a 
statesman  and  the  earliest  historian  of  European 
statesmen,  in  narrating  the  incidents  of  the  embassy 
sent  from  France  to  Germany.  The  King  of  France, 
who  wished  the  Emperor  Frederick  to  seize  and  hold 
possession  of  the  territory  belonging  to  the  Duke  of 
Burgundy,  dispatched  an  ambassador  across  the 
Ehine  to  communicate  this  suggestion  to  the  German 
sovereign.  Upon  which  the  Emperor,  after  hearing 
the  message,  replied  to  the  ambassador  as  follows: 
"There  was  at  one  time  in  the  neighborhood  of  a 
village  in  France  a  bear  which  preyed  upon  the  in- 
habitants and  for  a  long  period  did  much  damage  to 
the  farms  and  gardens  of  the  peasants  living  near. 
It  happened  also  that  one  of  the  villagers,  who  was  in 
debt  and  was  threatened  by  his  landlord  whom  he 

60 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

could  not  pay,  begged  the  landlord  for  a  little  longer 
delay,  saying  that  if  he  could  have  more  time  he 
would  go  out  and  kill  the  bear  and  so  not  only  be 
rewarded  by  the  thanks  of  everybody  in  the  village, 
but  be  able  to  sell  the  skin  of  the  bear  and  pay  in  that 
way  all  that  he  owed.    His  landlord  agreed,  and  he 
started  out  upon  the  hunt  accompanied  by  two  of 
his  companions  intent  like  himself  upon  a  famous  act 
of  daring.    Proceeding  in  the  right  direction,  they 
soon  came  upon  what  they  sought,  but  the  bear,  be- 
ing terribly  fierce  and  much  larger  than  they  ex- 
pected,   turned   upon    them    and   made    them    run 
for   their   lives;   one   of   the   companions   climbed 
a  tree   for   safety   and   the   other  made   the   best 
of  his  way  toward  the  houses  of  the  town,  whilst 
the  villager  himself,  having  stumbled  and  fallen,  was 
lying  upon  the  ground  when  the  bear  came  up.    Al- 
though he  was  in  great  peril  he  knew  that  it  is  the 
habit  of  bears  to  attack  their  prey  only  when  it  is 
alive,  therefore  he  lay  quite  still  and  pretended  to 
be  dead.    The  bear,  having  snuffed  him  and  nudged 
him  without  obtaining  any  response,  turned  finally 
and  went  away,  leaving  him  unharmed;  whereupon 
his  friend  who  had  been  looking  on  from  the  branches 
of  the  tree  came  down,  and,  running  to  the  villager. 

61 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

who  was  now  raising  himself  from  the  ground,  said 
to  him  with  wonder  and  admiration:  *I  saw  him  put 
his  nose  close  to  your  ear!  What  did  he  say  to 
you?'  To  which  the  other  answered,  'He  said: 
"Don't  dispose  of  the  bear's  skin  until  you  have  got 
the  bear ! "  '  Four  hundred  years  have  not,  perhaps, 
greatly  changed  the  play  of  human  feeling  as  re- 
flected in  the  narrative  of  Phillipe  de  Commines,  nor 
dulled  the  wisdom  of  the  Emperor's  reply.  But  the 
forms  are  different  now ;  so  that  if  we  were  to  under- 
take a  similar  negotiation  we  should  naturally  pro- 
ceed in  a  very  different  way. 

Originally  the  custom  of  receiving  and  sending 
envoys  from  one  country  to  another  made  no  distinc- 
tion between  the  different  classes  of  public  minis- 
ters, but  the  modern  law  of  nations  had  been  brought 
by  common  usage,  about  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  to  recognize  certain  privileges  and 
rights  of  precedence  amongst  diplomatic  representa- 
tives, and  this  gave  rise  to  such  a  continuation  of 
rivalries  and  disputes  for  want  of  a  sufficiently 
exact  definition  of  rank  that  it  was  decided  to  be 
necessary  to  establish  uniform  rules  by  which  the 
subject  should  be  governed  thenceforward.  Accord- 
ingly, it  was  agreed  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  in 

62 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  year  1815,  that  public  ministers  and  representa- 
tives abroad  sliould  be  divided  into  the  following 
four  classes:  Ambassadoes,  Envoys  Exteaokdinary 
or  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  Ministers  Resident, 
Charges  d'xAffaires;  and  these  distinctions  then 
adopted  are  recognized  and  acted  upon  to-day.  The 
most  important  diplomatic  representative  is,  there- 
fore, the  ambassador.  He  is  accredited  and  received 
as  clothed  not  only  with  the  authority  of  the  govern- 
ment which  sends  him  out,  but  as  representing  the 
person  of  his  sovereign;  and  is  entitled,  in  conse- 
quence, theoretically  at  least,  to  the  same  kind  of 
honors  that  would  be  accorded  to  his  sovereign  if  he 
were  himself  actually  present.  This  places  the  am- 
bassador upon  a  footing  of  equality,  at  the  court  to 
which  he  is  accredited,  with  the  family  of  the  king, 
and  establishes  his  rank  upon  all  public  occasions  as 
before  that  of  all  the  dignitaries  or  officers  of  the 
realm,  and  immediately  after  that  of  the  princes  of 
the  blood.  So,  for  instance,  an  ambassador  of  the 
United  States  at  his  post  outranks  every  other  citizen 
who  might  be  there,  except  the  President  himself; 
and  receives  in  fact  honors  similar  to  those  which 
are  due  to  a  Chief  of  State  when  he  is  present. 
It  is  this  exclusive  character  as  the  representative 

63 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  the  person  of  the  sovereign  which  gives  to  the 
ambassador  an  influence  and  an  importance  so  far 
beyond  the  other  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps ; 
for  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  him  and  the 
minister  plenipotentiary  who  is  duly  accredited  by 
the  sovereign  of  his  own  country  to  reside  near  the 
court  of  another  sovereign,  though  without  the  par- 
ticular dignity  attributed  to  the  ambassador  who 
stands  in  the  place  of  the  person  of  the  Chief  of 
State.  A  minister  plenipotentiary  is  understood 
technically  to  represent  his  sovereign  only  in  respect 
of  the  particular  business  committed  to  his  charge 
at  the  court  to  which  he  is  accredited;  though  it  is 
true  that  he  is  the  chief  of  mission  and  is  treated 
as  such  with  great  distinction. 

One  of  the  prerogatives  of  an  ambassador  is, 
that  he  has  the  right  to  demand  at  any  time  a  per- 
sonal audience  of  the  sovereign  to  whom  he  is  accred- 
ited ;  and  whilst  this  privilege  is  very  seldom  availed 
of  now-a-days, — for  all  general  questions  are  treated 
through  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
— yet,  if,  in  the  course  of  a  serious  or  complex  nego- 
tiation, the  ambassador,  not  satisfied  with  a  turn  of 
events,  should  express  formally  his  wish  to  have  a 
personal  interview  with  the  King,  his  wish  could  not 

64 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

well  be  refused,  because,  although  such  a  refusal, 
whilst  it  would  probably  not  lead  to  an  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  would  be  regarded  as  so  great  a  breach 
of  courtesy  that  it  might  be  resented  by  a  rupture  of 
diplomatic  intercourse  between  the  two  countries. 

In  common  practice,  however,  the  Chief  of  State 
takes  frequent  occasions  to  come  into  personal  con- 
tact with  the  foreign  ambassadors,  availing  himself 
of  public  celebrations  when  they  are  present,  or  tak- 
ing the  opportunity  of  the  ceremonies  at  court  to 
hold  conversations  with  them,  and  he  may  even  dine 
at  their  houses,  as  is  frequently  the  case  at  European 
capitals ;  though  the  President  of  the  United  States 
has  never  departed  as  yet  so  far  from  the  rules 
established  at  the  Wliite  House  as  to  dine  at  any 
foreign  embassy  in  Washington.  In  this  particular 
we  are  more  conservative  than  many  of  the  rulers  of 
Europe,  even  in  regard  to  so  distinguished  a  per- 
sonage as  an  ambassador. 

If  we  should  adhere  strictly  to  the  qualification  of 
the  ambassador, — namely,  that  he  represents  the 
person  of  his  sovereign, — we  should  find  that  only 
crowned  heads  could  send  such  agents  abroad,  and 
so  it  was  considered  under  the  old  conception  of  for- 
eign missions.    But  this  limitation  no  longer  con- 

6  65 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tinues  valid  as  between  the  powerful  nations  of  mod- 
ern times,  and  the  rank  of  ambassador  is  conceded 
at  present  rather  to  the  representatives  of  the  great 
Powers  without  regard  to  the  question  whether  they 
are  governed  by  monarchies  or  not ;  consequently  the 
diplomatic  agents  of  the  Republic  of  France  and  the 
United  States  are  accorded  ambassadorial  rank  at 
the  capitals  of  Europe  and  are  received  not  only  as 
the  personal  representatives  of  the  Chief  of  State  but 
of  the  nation, — the  sovereign  people, — as  well. 

It  will  be  observed,  therefore,  that  the  Govern- 
ment has  in  its  ambassador  a  representative  whose 
position  is  recognized  abroad  with  the  highest  dis- 
tinction; whose  communications  take  precedence  of 
all  others  in  international  affairs;  who  speaks  with 
authority;  who  must  be  heard  without  delay,  and 
through  v.^hom  the  interests  of  the  nation  may  be  im- 
mediately and  effectively  safeguarded  or  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  President  through  the  Department  of 
State  may  be  instantly  carried  out. 

The  United  States  are  represented  now  by  Am- 
bassadors in  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  Rus- 
sia, Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  Turkey,  Japan,  Mexico, 
and  Brazil, — and  each  of  these  countries  sends  in 
return  its  representative  of  similar  rank  who  is 

66 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

accredited  to  the  President  and  has  his  official  resi- 
dence in  Washington ;  the  seat  of  his  mission  being 
kno"\\Ti  as  an  embassy,  whilst  that  of  lower  diplo- 
matic rank  obtains  the  quality  of  a  legation.^- 

At  the  capitals  of  other  countries  of  Europe,  in 
the  Orient,  and  in  South  America  our  diplomatic 
agents  are  ministers  plenipotentiary,  who  are  duly 
accredited  to  the  respective  sovereigns  or  chiefs  of 
state  near  whom  they  reside,  and  who  represent  our 
government  interests  with  the  same  dignity  abroad, 
though  with  som.ewhat  less  official  authority  than 
that  of  the  ambassadors,  because  the  great  European 
Powers  have  never  been  willing  as  yet,  in  what  is 
known  as  the  concert  of  nations,  to  send  to  or  receive 
from  the  smaller  countries  diplomatic  agents  of  am- 
bassadorial rank.  Whilst  they  have  made  this  con- 
cession to  Japan,  as  we  have  also  since  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  we  are  the  only  country  which  has 
extended  this  international  courtesy  to  any  of  the 
South  American  republics.  It  was  provided,  how- 
ever, by  the  agreement  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
that  the  representative  of  the  Pope,  bearing  the  title 

^'  The  mission  of  the  United  States  to  Argentina  was  raised  to 
an  embassy  in   1914. 

67 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  legate  or  nuncio,  should  be  an  ambassador,  and, 
indeed,  he  takes  precedence  in  Austria-Hungary  to- 
day of  all  other  diplomatic  officers  accredited  to  the 
sovereign  of  that  country. 

Although  no  state  is  under  obligation  to  receive 
ministers  from  another,  it  results  in  common  inter- 
course that  an  agreement  is  reached  between  the 
states  as  to  the  interchange  which  shall  take  place, 
and  each  state  is  free  to  annex  such  conditions  to  the 
reception  of  a  foreign  minister  as  it  may  see  fit; 
though  when  he  has  been  received  he  is  entitled  in 
all  respects  to  the  privileges  annexed  by  the  law  of 
nations  to  his  public  character.  The  course  pursued 
in  our  own  case  is  this :  when  a  vacancy  occurs  at  the 
head  of  one  of  our  embassies  or  legations  abroad,  and 
the  President  has  selected  some  gentleman  whom  he 
considers  suitable  to  fill  the  place,  he  causes  an  in- 
quiry to  be  made  as  to  whether  the  person  so  had 
in  view  would  be  acceptable  to  the  government  of 
the  country  in  which  the  mission  is  situated  if  he 
were  appointed  to  the  vacant  post.  This  inquiry 
is  instituted  by  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington, 
who  instructs  the  officer  then  in  charge  of  the  affairs 
at  the  vacant  mission  to  ascertain  discreetly  the 
opinion  of  the  foreign  government  by  a  note  to,  or 

68 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

a  direct  communication  with,  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs.  Every  government  reserves  to  itself 
the  unquestioned  right  to  accept  or  reject  a  nomina- 
tion thus  proposed  to  it,  and  we  have  had  cases  our- 
selves in  recent  years  where  the  objection  of  a  for- 
eign cabinet  to  the  appointment  of  certain  individ- 
uals suggested  by  our  Department  of  State  has  been 
so  decisive  that  after  a  more  or  less  acrimonious  offi- 
cial correspondence  upon  the  subject  we  have  had 
to  give  way  and  another  man  has  ultimately  been 
appointed  to  the  place.  But  as  a  rule  this  prelim- 
inary inquiry,  being  carried  on  privately  and  confi- 
dentially as  it  is,  spares  the  feelings  of  all  the  parties 
in  interest  by  avoiding  the  embarrassments  arising 
from  publicity  and  leads  generally  to  a  satisfactory 
result.  It  is  not  likely  that  the  person  named  by  one 
government  would  be  objected  to  by  the  authorities 
of  the  other,  except  in  a  case  where  he  had  made 
himself  conspicuous  by  some  public  act  or  had  given 
rise  to  hostility  by  some  speech  or  wanting  especially 
offensive  to  the  sovereign  or  the  people  of  that  coun- 
try ;  and  generally,  therefore,  the  answer  is  returned 
to  the  Department  of  State  that  he  will  be  persona 
grata,  and  if  appointed  will  be  gladly  received  and 

69 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

made  welcome.  This  is  what  is  known  in  diplomatic 
language  as  the  agrcment,  which  is  usually  regarded 
as  tantamount  to  appointment  of  the  person  named. 
As  all  our  diplomatic  officers  of  every  grade  are 
appointed  by  the  President  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  the  President  sends  the 
name  to  the  Senate  in  the  usual  way,  and  upon  the 
approval  of  that  House  of  Congress  a  commission 
is  issued  from  the  Department  of  State  to  the  ap- 
pointee, which  is  signed  in  autograph  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  sealed  with  the  great  seal 
and  countersigned  by  the  Secretary  of  State.  It 
happens  occasionally  in  this  way  that  men  are 
selected  in  this  country  from  private  life  for  service 
abroad  who  have  never  had  any  experience  in  for- 
eign affairs  and  do  not  know  in  fact  what  diplomatic 
intercourse  relates  to  or  what  it  means;  they  are 
obliged  to  learn  the  business  for  which  they  have 
been  sent  out  by  the  government,  after  they  have 
arrived  at  their  posts  of  duty.  In  this  respect  we  can- 
not be  said  to  have  in  the  United  States,  as  yet,  a 
diplomatic  service,  properly  speaking ;  for  there  is  no 
provision  made  by  law  through  which  the  diplomatic 
officials  of  the  United  States  Government  may  enter 
a  career  as  men  do  in  the  army  and  navy  with  an 

70 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

assured  tenure  and  a  fixed  advancement  for  meri- 
torious conduct  or  length  of  service;  nor  is  there 
any  likelihood,  for  the  present  at  least,  that  the 
character  of  our  service  will  be  changed  from  that 
of  a  more  or  less  accidental  appointment  due  to  politi- 
cal obligations  or  personal  sympathies  which  suc- 
ceed in  making  themselves  felt  in  AYashington. 
Whilst  it  is  true  that  during  the  term  of  President 
McKinley  the  custom  was  followed  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  State, — and  this  was  continued  under  Presi- 
dent Eoosevelt, — of  promoting  young  men  who  have 
shown  diligence  and  merit,  and  of  keeping  in  the  ser- 
vice, as  far  as  possible,  such  as  have  had  experience 
enough  to  entitle  them  to  that  sort  of  recognition, 
there  is  nothing  to  prevent  an  overturning  of  the 
entire  diplomatic  corps  at  the  beginning  of  a  new 
presidential  administration;  though,  if  the  whole 
diplomatic  list  as  it  stands  at  the  end  of  Mr.  Taft's 
administration,  for  instance,  were  to  be  renewed,  the 
result  would  be  that  in  most  cases  the  business  of 
the  United  States  Government  would  be  taken  out  of 
the  hands  of  men  practised  in  it  and  matured  by  the 
results  of  four  or  eight  or  ten  years  of  experience,  to 
entrust  it  to  new  people  who  had  not  been  taught 
anything  and  did  not  know  anything  about  it. 

71 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Foreign  governments  differ  from  us  in  this,  that 
they  have  provided  measures  by  which  their  inter- 
national affairs  can  never  be  exposed  to  so  damaging 
an  occurrence.  They  have  made  a  career  of  their 
diplomatic  service  so  that  it  is  always  stable,  always 
filled  by  men  trained  to  its  requirements,  who  may 
devote  their  energies  and  abilities  to  that  department 
of  the  government  interests  and  may  make  the  prac- 
tice of  it  their  life-work.  In  England  and  France, 
for  instance,  or  in  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Russia, 
or  Japan,  one  might  say  also  in  all  other  countries, 
a  strict  preparation  is  required  before  a  candidate 
may  enter  the  service  at  all.  In  Germany,  for  exam- 
ple, he  cannot  obtain  an  appointment  before  he  has 
taken  his  degree  at  the  University,  and  then  he  is 
admitted  only  to  the  lowest  grade.  He  is  given  ser- 
vice usually  in  the  foreign  office  at  home,  in  the  be- 
ginning, and  then  sent  for  a  time  as  a  subordinate  to 
a  legation  or  an  embassy  of  his  country  abroad.  By 
this  method  he  advances  step  by  step  in  development 
and  experience  and  mounts  step  by  step  the  grades 
of  the  profession;  so  that  in  most  of  the  European 
countries,  if  you  meet  a  man  who  is  a  minister  or  an 
ambassador,  you  find  a  man  who  has  had  twenty  or 
thirty,  or  perhaps  forty  years  of  active  practice  in 

72 


I 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  service  of  his  country.  The  consequence  is  that 
diplomatic  officers  are,  generally  speaking,  all  trained 
by  the  same  habit  of  thought,  the  same  knowledge 
of  affairs,  and  will  proceed  in  the  treatment  of  a 
professional  question  in  very  much  the  same  manner, 
as  any  similar  group  of  men  would  do  in  any  of  the 
learned  professions, — each  being  guided  by  the 
accumulation  of  rules,  customs,  and  traditions  which 
have  come  to  be  the  standard  of  usage  or  of  profes- 
sional comity.  And  in  this  respect  the  intercourse 
between  the  diplomatic  colleagues  of  different 
nations  at  the  same  post  is  exceedingly  sensitive. 
For,  to  represent  his  country  well  abroad  a  diplo- 
matist must  use  the  same  unfailing  delicacy  of  touch 
in  the  contact  with  his  fellow-diplomatists  as  he  em- 
ploys in  his  relations  with  the  authorities  of  the 
government  to  which  he  is  accredited. 

The  life  of  a  foreign  minister  at  his  post  is  neces- 
sarily a  formal  one, — he  may  scarcely  be  said  to 
be  upon  terms  of  familiarity  even  with  his  intimate 
friends, — for,  as  chief  of  the  mission,  he  is  always 
the  impersonation  of  his  native  country,  and  it  is 
impossible  for  him  to  separate  himself  as  an  in- 
dividual from  the  influence  of  his  representative 
capacity.     A  great  part  of  his  relations  are  cere- 

73 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

monious,  and  sometimes  they  are  laborious,  though 
usually  exceedingly  interesting. 

According  to  the  usage  which  at  present  obtains, 
the  first  step  of  the  diplomatic  representative 
upon  his  arrival  at  his  post  is  to  inform  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  his  presence, 
requesting  him  to  appoint  a  time  to  receive  a 
visit  from  him;  which  is  usually  replied  to  without 
delay,  so  that  the  visit  to  the  foreign  office  is  made 
generally  upon  the  day  following  that  upon  which  the 
request  is  communicated.  At  this  interview  with  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  envoy  announces 
that  he  has  come  as  the  ambassador  or  minister  of 
his  country,  bearing  with  him  letters  of  credence 
addressed  to  the  sovereign  or  chief  of  state,  and 
he  inquires  when  it  will  be  agreeable  to  the  head  of 
the  nation  to  receive  him  in  formal  audience  for  the 
purpose  of  the  delivery  of  these  letters  and  the  mes- 
sages of  good  will  which  he  brings  w^ith  him  from  his 
native  land.  To  which  the  minister  usually  answers 
that  he  shall  not  fail  to  inform  his  master  of  the 
arrival  of  the  envoy,  promising  to  communicate  with 
him  in  reply  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  After 
a  very  short  interval  the  time  and  place  of  the  audi- 
ence are  announced  for  the  presentation  of  letters, 

74 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

which,  being  regarded  as  the  direct  communication 
from  one  sovereign  power  to  another,  takes  place 
amidst  a  display  of  the  most  formal  ceremony  and 
with  the  expression  of  every  international  courtesy 
that  can  add  to  the  solemnity  of  the  occasion.  In 
the  case  of  an  ambassador,  for  instance,  an  officer  of 
high  rank  at  the  court  is  sent  to  his  residence  in  a 
state  carriage  belonging  to  the  sovereign  to  conduct 
him  to  the  palace  where  the  audience  is  to  be  held,  and 
the  same  officer  accompanies  him  in  state  back  to  his 
residence  after  the  ceremony  is  over.  The  actual 
presentation  occurs  under  slightly  different  inci- 
dental circumstances  at  each  of  the  different  courts, 
though  in  every  case  the  envoy  is  brought  into  actual 
personal  contact  with  the  sovereign  himself. 

At  Vienna,  for  instance,  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  is  usually  awaiting  his  guest  in  one  of  tlie 
rooms  of  the  palace,  the  doors  of  which  are  closed 
upon  the  entry  of  the  stranger,  and  the  interview  is 
had  in  complete  privacy.  At  St.  Petersburg  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  has  upon  some  occasions  been 
accompanied  by  the  Empress  at  the  audience  of  a 
foreign  ambassador;  whilst  the  German  Emperor 
holds  his  audience  at  Potsdam  or  Berlin  with  great 
military  state,  surrounded  by  a  brilliant  staff  of 

75 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

officers.  It  may  be  said  that  each  of  the  European 
rulers  has  upon  occasions  of  ceremony  such  as  this 
his  own  peculiar  grace  of  manner  as  well  as  his  own 
characteristic  courtesy  in  the  expression  of  friend- 
ship and  good  will. 

The  Grerman  Emperor  usually  steps  forward  to 
greet  the  approaching  diplomatist,  who  pronounces 
a  few  words  of  international  greeting  from  his  own 
country  with  the  expression  of  the  hope,  as  he  hands 
him  his  letter,  that  the  cordial  relations  may  long 
continue  to  subsist  between  the  two  governments. 
Whereupon  the  Emperor  in  receiving  the  document 
makes  an  equally  formal  reply,  reciprocating  the 
wish  for  the  continuance  of  cordial  intercourse  and 
ending,  in  the  case  of  an  American  ambassador,  with 
the  request  that  his  good  wishes  and  friendly  greet- 
ings may  be  conveyed  to  the  President  and  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  That  having  been  accom- 
plished, his  serious  tone  changes,  and  with  an  engag- 
ing smile  he  enters  into  a  personal  conversation 
with  his  visitor,  in  a  manner  quite  his  own,  full  of 
manliness  and  high  feeling,  which  has  always  won 
the  cordial  sympathy  of  those  who  have  come  into 
personal  contact  with  him.  In  conversing  with  the 
American  and  British  diplomatic  representatives  in 

76 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Germany  he  speaks  English,  with  which  he  is  per- 
fectly familiar  and  shows  no  trace  of  a  foreign 
accent;  though  he  uses  French  generally  with  the 
envoys  of  other  countries. 

French  is  accepted,  indeed,  as  the  diplomatic  lan- 
guage of  the  world,  the  common  meeting  ground  of 
every  foreign  envoy  not  only  with  the  minister  of 
state  with  whom  he  transacts  the  business  of  his 
government,  but  in  his  daily  social  intercourse  or  in 
the  relations  with  his  colleagues  as  well.  Therefore, 
if  one  were  sitting  in  a  room  with  a  number  of  diplo- 
matic people  of  the  most  varied  nationalities,  for 
example,  a  Turk,  a  German,  a  South  American,  a 
Swede,  a  Persian,  an  Italian,  a  Russian,  and  a  Greek, 
the  conversation,  in  which  all  would  participate  with 
equal  facility  and  probably  would  relate  to  subjects 
of  general  interest,  political  or  otherwise,  would  be 
carried  on  always  in  French.  So  that  the  French 
language  is  absolutely  indispensable  in  the  intellec- 
tual equipment  of  the  diplomatist  abroad  if  he  ex- 
pects to  have  anything  like  the  same  footing  as  the 
people  with  whom  he  is  thrown  and  comes  into  daily 
social  contact.  It  is  true  that  our  own  government 
requires  its  official  instructions  to  be  communicated 
to  foreign  governments  in  the  English  language,  and 

77 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

whilst  this  is  done,  and  no  foreign  government  can 
well  object  to  our  procedure,  the  others  reserve  to 
themselves  the  right  to  employ  their  own  language 
also ;  thus,  whilst  we  address  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  at  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  in  English, 
the  replies  of  the  German  Grovernment  are  written  in 
German  and  those  of  Russia  in  Russian.  Though  it 
is  the  accepted  rule  in  Europe  that  if  a  note  is  re- 
ceived from  a  foreign  mission  composed  in  French, 
the  answer  to  it  is  returned  in  French. 

But  aside  from  the  question  of  the  official  written 
communications,  personal  interview's  at  the  foreigii 
office,  in  which  by  far  the  greater  part  of  an  envoy 's 
business  is  transacted,  are  most  frequently  had  in 
French,  which  every  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
speaks  fluently  and  expects  to  use  in  his  official  inter- 
course,— though  it  happens  not  infrequently  that  ho 
speaks  English  quite  imperfectly  or  not  at  all.  This 
matter  of  the  acquaintance  of  the  diplomatist  abroad 
with  languages  other  than  his  own,  especially  with 
the  ready  employment  of  French  in  ordinary  con- 
versation, is  of  so  great  importance  that  it  very  de- 
cidedly enlarges  or  curtails  the  field  of  his  influence 
and  the  consequent  ability  upon  his  part  to  represent 
his  country  efficiently  or  to  serve  his  government^ 

78 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

well ;  for  it  is  the  social  intercourse  with  bis  own  col- 
leagues in  the  diplomatic  corps,  with  the  people  at 
the  court  or  the  distinguished  citizens  and  states- 
men of  the  country  to  which  he  is  accredited  through 
which  he  obtains,  more  than  in  any  other  manner,  the 
information  that  is  useful  to  him  or  his  government 
as  to  the  political  news  of  the  day,  the  public  opinion 
upon  specific  questions,  the  policies  of  foreign  ad- 
ministrations, or  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  meas- 
ures which  interest,  affect,  or  possibly  even  control 
the  decisions  of  his  own  government  in  regard  to  the 
subjects  of  trade,  commerce,  or  international  rela- 
tions. 

So  also  the  rules  and  usages  as  between  mem- 
bers of  the  diplomatic  corps  stationed  at  the  same 
post  have  come  by  universal  consent  to  be  as  well 
defined  in  many  of  their  details  as  are  the  more  gen- 
eral and  more  ceremonious  relations  of  purely  offi- 
cial life.  It  is  always  understood  that  the  newly- 
arrived  representative  must  call  upon  his  colleagues 
personally  as  soon  as  he  has  presented  his  letters  of 
credence  to  the  chief  of  state,  and  if  he  is  a  chief 
of  mission  of  less  than  ambassadorial  rank  he  must 
make  a  request  in  writing,  addressed  to  each  ambas- 
sador, that  a  time  may  be  fixed  when  it  will  be  agree- 

79 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

able  for  him  to  make  his  visit  for  the  purpose  of 
presenting  himself  and  paying  officially  his  respects. 
At  many  courts  of  Europe  the  members  of  the  diplo- 
matic corps  resemble  in  some  respects  a  large  family 
with  community  of  interests  and  common  meeting 
grounds  that  frequently  bring  them  together,  each 
bent  upon  the  same  errand  in  the  service  of  his  own 
government.  The  celebration  of  the  name  days, 
birthdays,  and  public  anniversaries  of  the  various 
sovereigns  and  their  families  are  each  taken  careful 
notice  of  as  they  pass,  and  the  occurrence  of  a  mis- 
fortune or  public  disaster  in  any  country  w^ill  bring 
to  the  door  of  the  legation  or  embassy  of  that  nation 
the  representatives  of  all  the  civilized  countries  of 
the  world  to  communicate  sympathy  or  express 
sorrow. 

In  one  particular  the  general  character  of  a  diplo- 
matic officer's  responsibility  abroad  has  been  essen- 
tially changed,  from  what  it  was  in  former  times,  by 
the  modern  system  of  intercourse  and  the  greatly- 
increased  facilities  of  communication  by  which  he  is 
enabled  to  receive  and  carry  out  instructions  whilst 
remaining  in  uninterrupted  contact  with  his  official 
superiors  in  the  Department  of  State  at  home.  A 
century  ago  it  required  a  long  time  for  dispatches  to 

80 


I 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

reach  a  distant  post  even  when  they  were  sent  for- 
ward by  the  most  expeditious  route  through  the  hand 
of  a  special  messenger,  who,  travelling  night  and 
day,  could  still  go  no  faster  than  a  sailing  ship  or  a 
saddle  horse  or  a  canal  boat  or  stage  coach  could 
carry  him.  Even  as  late  as  1837  we  find  Mr.  Dallas 
making  a  memorandum  in  his  notebook  of  the  news 
which  he  had  just  received  in  St.  Petersburg,  where 
he  was  minister,  relating  to  events  which  had  taken 
place  in  America  a  month  before,  and  then  the  intelli- 
gence had  come  to  him  through  a  newspaper  printed 
in  France.  The  conditions  of  the  time  implied  a 
complete  isolation  in  which  a  minister  was  often 
forced,  for  lack  of  opportunities  to  consult  his  chief 
at  home,  to  assume  a  certain  degree  of  personal  re- 
sponsibility and  take  steps  upon  important  occasions 
from  his  o\^ti  initiative.  Sixty  years  later  a  tele- 
gram from  St.  Petersburg  to  Washington  making 
an  inquiry  or  asking  for  instructions  upon  a  specific 
subject  would  be  answered  by  a  telegram  in  reply  at 
latest  on  the  following  day.  Upon  one  occasion  dur- 
ing the  Spanish  war  a  telegram  from  Vienna  to 
Washington  upon  an  important  question,  which  was 
sent  one  day  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
was  followed  by  the  answer  of  the  Secretary  of  State 

6  81 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

received  the  same  evening  between  eight  o  'clock  and 
nine. 

It  has  been  said  at  times  that  this  change  has 
made  a  great  deal  of  difference  in  the  requirements 
by  which  one  is  to  judge  of  the  capacity  of  a  foreign 
envoy  to-day;  that,  whilst  his  ancestor  was  a  man 
upon  whom  the  grave  responsibility  often  rested 
of  determining  by  his  own  judgment  the  solution  of 
problems  in  regard  to  which  there  was  not  time  to 
consult  his  superiors,  the  modern  representative  may 
be  almost  said  to  be  never  beyond  the  earshot  of 
the  foreign  office  at  home.  To  some  extent  it  must 
be  admitted,  of  course,  that  this  is  true;  but  the 
cases  must  each  be  judged  by  the  circumstances 
which  surround  them.  Under  the  old  conditions  the 
burden  was  undoubtedly  upon  the  authorities  at 
home  to  keep  their  agent  abroad  as  fully  informed 
as  possible  upon  the  fixed  policy  of  the  Government, 
what  it  aimed  at  and  what  it  expected  to  accomplish, 
so  that  he  might  be  prepared  at  a  given  moment  to 
take  a  step  without  incurring  the  danger  of  running 
into  a  fault.  This  is  not  imperative  to  the  same 
degree  to-day,  because  if  your  agent  has  some  doubt 
as  to  your  policy  or  the  fulfilment  of  your  wishes  he 
can  ask  you  and  you  can  tell  him  at  once.    But  if  the 

82 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

representative  of  a  hundred  years  ago  was  subject  to 
the  delays  of  the  time  in  consulting  his  government, 
so  was  everybody  else  subject  to  them  in  the  things 
that  related  to  him.  The  business  of  the  world  moved 
slowly,  its  volume  was  much  smaller,  the  pace  of  its 
activity  was  gauged  by  that  of  the  stage  coach.  The 
old  diplomatist  had  immeasurably  less  to  do  than 
what  we  are  accustomed  to  see  now-a-days;  whilst 
he  was  forced  back  occasionally  to  his  own  judgment 
and  decision  in  regard  to  matters  in  which  he  had 
to  be  careful  about  committing  his  government,  yet 
as  a  rule  he  was  given  the  time  necessary  to  receive 
instructions  from  home,  and  even  if  that  caused  con- 
siderable delay  nobody  else  was  able  to  move  more 
quickly  than  he  did. 

He  was  almost  universally  a  man  of  cultivation 
and  scholarly  attainments,  informed  as  to  the  affairs 
of  the  world,  in  whom  his  own  country  reposed  suffi- 
cient confidence  to  entrust  him  with  the  management 
of  its  interests  abroad.  Quite  the  same  may  be  said 
of  the  diplomatic  representative  of  to-day.  He  must 
above  all  else  be  a  man  of  his  time.  The  change  in 
circumstances  has  not  essentially  changed  the  char- 
acter of  what  is  required  of  him ;  for  if  it  is  true  that 
he  has  far  greater  facility. in  conducting  his  business, 

83 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

he  has  also  a  greatly-increased  responsibility  be- 
cause of  the  larger  amount  of  business  that  there  is 
to  transact  and  the  privileges  which  modern  facility 
has  placed  at  his  hand.  In  this  respect  we  follow 
the  general  rule  of  life,  that  privileges  carry  with 
them  obligations,  and  the  more  one  is  capable  of  do- 
ing the  more  one  will  be  given  to  do.  The  field  of 
modern  diplomacy  has  taken  an  immensely  wider 
range,  it  has  stretched  far  beyond  the  smaller  sub- 
jects and  local  interests  of  early  days ;  in  the  scheme 
of  its  present  activity  are  questions  of  the  world's 
policy,  the  world's  commerce,  tlie  trade  of  the  Atlan- 
tic and  the  Pacific,  the  development  of  China,  and, 
in  our  own  service,  the  extension  of  American  indus- 
try by  the  opening  of  new  opportunities  to  our  grow- 
ing manufactures  in  the  remotest  parts  of  the  globe. 
As  the  old  subjects  of  predatory  war  and  land 
conquest  retire  from  the  foreground  of  history, — for 
people  are  not  engaged  now-a-days  in  taking  away 
each  other's  territory, — the  rivalry  of  nations  has 
transferred  itself  largely  to  the  acquirement  of  com- 
mercial outlets,  to  the  conquest  of  markets  for  the 
disposal  and  consumption  of  the  products  of  home 
industry  upon  which  is  built  up  the  wealth  of  the 
people.    America  has  more  interest  in  these  things 

84 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

than  ever  before;  her  relations  abroad  are  more 
extensive  than  they  ever  were,  and  her  rapidly- 
increasing  importance  as  a  "World  Power  gives  her 
each  year  a  greater  authority  in  foreign  affairs,  in 
aiding  to  form  the  policy  of  the  Far  East,  in  sus- 
taining the  provisions  of  international  law  every- 
where, in  composing  international  difficulties  by  arbi- 
tration, in  helping  to  maintain  the  peace  of  the  world. 

All  these  subjects  and  many  more  come  within 
the  activity  of  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the 
country  abroad.  Their  dispatches  and  their  miscel- 
laneous correspondence,  addressed  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  at  Washington,  inform  the  Government  as 
to  the  political  and  important  commercial  move- 
ments, or  the  trend  of  public  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
great  questions  of  the  moment  in  other  parts  of  the 
world;  and  it  may  be  upon  their  reports,  which  en- 
able the  Federal  authorities  at  home  to  see  through 
their  eyes  or  to  reach  decisions  based  upon  their 
judgment,  that  the  Secretary  of  State,  even  the 
President  himself,  may  rely  in  communicating  to 
Congress  the  recommendations  which  he  has  decided 
to  make  in  regard  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States  Government  in  the  interest  of  the  nation. 

It  is  evident  that  the  men  selected  to  fill  these 

85 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

posts  of  responsibility  should  be  of  the  ablest  whom 
the  country  affords,  the  best  available  citizens  who 
have  had  sufficient  experience  in  life  to  enable  them 
to  reach  conclusions  and  form  judgments  worth  con- 
sideration in  the  management  of  affairs  at  home; 
Americans  of  the  type  of  men  to  whom  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  look  in  all  our  communities  for  local  coun- 
sel or  advice,  whose  opinions  we  should  be  willing  to 
follow  and  who,  if  sent  abroad,  will  actually  repre- 
sent this  country  in  the  proper  sense  of  what  repre- 
sentation implies.  We  must  look  largely  to  the 
Universities  to  supply  them  in  the  future,  as  indeed 
they  have  done  heretofore ;  because  the  skilful  man- 
agement of  public  affairs  as  well  as  of  those  of  the 
learned  professions  demands  educated  men.  The 
ideal  representative  would  be  a  man  of  affairs  with 
a  broad  and  liberal  education.  Whilst  we  have  not 
advanced  as  yet  to  the  establishment  by  law  in  this 
country  of  a  diplomatic  career,  diplomacy  is  be- 
coming a  profession  which  offers  an  incentive  to 
young  men  to  prepare  themselves  even  now,  and  the 
time  will  probably  not  be  very  distant  when  the 
rapidly-growing  importance  of  the  foreign  relations 
of  the  American  people  will  require  that  sort  of  skill 

86 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ujDoii  the  part  of  those  to  whom  their  management 
is  entrusted  which  we  insist  upon  at  home  in  sub- 
mitting any  question  for  professional  advice.  It  is 
very  probable  that  this  will  come  to  be  so  much 
the  case  during  the  lifetime  of  many  who  are  now 
young  men  that  this  country  will  then  no  more 
consent  to  intrust  its  diplomatic  interests  to  the 
hands  of  those  who  have  not  the  requisite  qualifica- 
tions than  its  people  would  take  their  cases  to  be  tried 
before  a  judge  who  had  never  read  law. 

It  is  not  meant  by  this,  however,  that  a  public 
minister  abroad  shall  be  only  a  man  who  has  been 
trained  to  diplomacy  from  his  youth,  and  that  there 
shall  be  made  a  hard  and  fast  rule  by  which  other 
men  of  enlightenment  and  scholarship  must  neces- 
sarily be  excluded ;  for,  although  it  is  agreed  b}^  all 
those  who  have  had  experience  in  the  matter  that 
the  diplomatic  service  should  be  made  a  service, 
properly  speaking,  and  that  the  men  who  enter  it 
should  have  the  certainty  of  promotion  for  merit  and 
fulfilment  of  duty  so  as  to  make  it  an  inducement 
to  them  to  devote  their  best  years  to  it,  yet  cases 
are  sure  to  arise  when,  in  order  to  fulfil  an  excep- 
tional demand,  and  there  are  in  the  country  certain 

87 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

men  who  have  exceptional  qualifications  with  which 
to  meet  particular  international  situations,  it  may  be 
of  conspicuous  advantage  to  select  such  an  one  as 
chief  of  mission  and  send  him  abroad  although  he 
may  not  be  professionally  a  diplomatist.  In  order 
to  give  elasticity  and  flexibility  to  its  service  it 
seems  that  the  Government  should  reserve  to  itself 
the  right  to  make  such  exceptional  appointments 
when  in  the  judgment  of  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  the  public  interests  are  best  subserved 
by  them.  This  is  done  by  other  nations  which  have 
an  established  diplomatic  service  but  which  occa- 
sionally select  as  representatives  certain  of  their 
citizens  distinguished  in  public  or  private  life.  We 
have  notable  examples  of  that  kind  of  selection  in  the 
cases  of  our  own  Professor  James  Russell  Lowell, 
of  Mr.  Choate,  of  Mr.  Phelps,  and  of  the  very  dis- 
tinguished gentleman  who  represented  Great  Brit- 
ain in  Washington  but  lately  (Lord  Bryce), — two  of 
these  are  counted  amongst  the  foremost  lawyers,  and 
two  amongst  the  greatest  scholars  of  their  time. 

It  would  be  a  benefit  to  the  country  if  young 
men  should  turn  their  minds  to  the  cultivation  of  the 
class  of  studies  which  fit  them  for  the  service  of  the 

88 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Government  abroad,  especially  if  they  have  any  in- 
tention of  devoting  their  lives,  or  part  of  their  lives, 
to  that.  There  can  be  no  higher  ambition  than  that 
of  serving  the  State,  nothing  more  creditable  than  tp 
serve  it  ivell,  and  there  are  opportunities  opening 
for  those  who  choose  to  seize  them.  But  preparation 
and  fitness  are  the  most  important  conditions  prece- 
dent to  success  in  diplomacy  as  in  everything  else 
in  life. 


80 


SOME  MODERN  DEVELOPMENTS  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

Read  Before  the  Law  Academy  of  PiiiLADELpniA,  May,  1909 

It  is  of  interest  to  consider  International  Law 
in  its  modern  developments  if  we  have  in  mind  the 
effect  which  these  enlargements  and  modifications  of 
the  principles  which  regulate  intercourse  have  had 
upon  the  relations  now  existing  between  different 
peoples  and  men  of  different  race,  as  well  as  the 
results  produced  by  them  upon  the  general  progress 
of  the  world.  Let  us  observe,  at  the  outset,  that  what 
we  know  as  International  Law  is  not  latv  in  the 
proper  sense  in  which  we  accept  legal  enactment ;  for, 
at  most,  it  may  be  said  to  be  law  without  authority, 
since  there  is  no  legislative  or  judicial  authority 
recognized  by  all  nations,  which  enacts  or  prescribes 
the  fixed  rules  that  govern  the  international  relations 
between  states.  It  is  admitted  by  all  writers  that 
its  origin  is  to  be  sought  in  the  principles  of  justice 
wdiich  ought,  at  least,  to  control  those  relations.  It 
is  not  positive  law  in  the  conception  that  positive  law 
is  prescribed  by  a  recognized  superior  or  sovereign 
to  a  person  or  persons  w^ho  are  subject  to  his  control} 

90 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

but  the  authorities  tell  us  that  the  rule  coucerning 
the  conduct  of  sovereign  states  considered  as  related 
to  each  other  is  termed  law  by  its  analogy  to  positive 
law,  being  imposed  upon  nations  or  sovereigns,  not 
by  the  positive  command  of  a  superior  authority, 
but  by  opinions  generally  current  among  nations. 
The  duties  which  it  imposes  are  enforced  by  moral 
sanctions — by  fear  on  the  part  of  sovereigns  of  pro- 
voking general  hostility  and  incurring  its  probable 
evils  in  case  they  should  violate  maxims  generally 
received  and  respected. 

And  yet,  there  is  scarcely  any  standard  by  which 
one  may  so  accurately  measure  the  actual  progress 
of  modern  civilization,  in  the  high  ideals  of  equity 
and  justice  between  nations,  in  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  individuals  and  communities,  and  the  allevi- 
ation of  suffering  in  w^ar,  as  the  acceptance  of  these 
rules  of  conduct  and  the  immense  difference  between 
what  the  world  was  at  their  early  beginning  and 
what  it  is  now. 

Although  certain  ideas  of  fixed  international  re- 
lations may  be  traced  into  the  period  of  antiquity 
and  through  the  turmoil  of  the  Middle  Ages,  yet 
the  custom  remained  for  one  nation  habitually  to 
treat  another,  especially  a  conquered  nation,  with 

91 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

great  ferocity;  war  was  waged  with  merciless 
cruelty,  prisoners  were  mutilated  and  burned  alive, 
towns  sacked  and  their  population  subjected  to  the 
most  detestable  insults,  whilst,  even  during  the 
seventeenth  century,  in  the  progress  of  the  Thirty 
Years  War,  w^hole  districts  of  Europe  were  turned 
into  waste  by  being  overrun  with  wanton  devasta- 
tion from  which  some  of  them  have  scarcely  yet 
entirely  recovered.  When  a  place  was  taken  by 
storm  it  was  given  over  to  pillage  and  unbridled 
license  which  spared  no  one  and  knew  no  rights 
upon  the  part  of  those  whose  lives  and  property  fell 
under  the  domination  of  the  sword;  the  contempla- 
tion of  which  led  Ilobbes  to  declare  that  by  nature 
man  was  an  anti-social  animal,  who  fought  and  bit 
and  devoured  his  fellows. 

The  world  owes  it  to  a  single  man  that,  in  the 
midst  of  this  lawless  disorder,  human  thought  should 
have  been  turned  in  a  new  direction,  nations  should 
have  been  taught  to  recognize  and  consider  the  exist- 
ence of  other  nations,  and  lawyers,  soldiers,  and 
statesmen  suddenly  to  become  aware  that  an  end 
should  be  put  to  the  barbarity  of  warfare,  whilst  war 
itself  was  not  to  be  entered  upon  for  pretexts  that 
were  neither  worthy  nor  sincere.     This  man  was 

92 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Grotius.  Unlike  Hobbes,  he  declared:  "There  is  a 
law  to  govern  this";  when  he  looked  on,  he  said: 
"I  saw  prevailing  throughout  the  Christian  world 
a  license  in  making  war  of  which  even  barbarous 
nations  would  have  been  ashamed;  recourse  being 
made  to  arms  for  slight  reasons  or  no  reason;  and 
when  arms  were  once  taken  up,  all  reverence  for 
divine  and  human  law  was  thrown  away,  just  as  if 
men  were  henceforth  authorized  to  commit  all  crimes 
without  restraint." 

It  is  impossible  to  attempt  here  an  account  of  all 
the  theory  and  the  reasoning  of  this  famous  scholar, 
or  of  the  numerous  writers  of  his  time  as  well  as  the 
succeeding  authors  who  have  contributed  by  their 
reflections  to  elaborate  the  plan  of  what  we  know 
to-day  as  International  Law,  for  it  would  require 
many  volumes  to  do  that;  but  we  make  mention  of 
Grotius  because  he  was  the  leader  of  them  all, — 
he  may  fairly  be  called  the  father  of  International 
Law.  The  measure  of  progress  is  to  be  gauged,  as 
well  as  the  benefit  to  mankind,  by  the  changes  that 
have  taken  place  from  his  time  to  our  own.  Huig 
van  Groot,  or  Hugo  Grotius,  as  he  has  been  generally 
known,  was  a  Dutchman,  born  at  Delft  in  the  year 
1583.    He  was  the  son  of  a  lawyer  from  whom  he 

93 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

probably  inherited  some  of  Ms  reasoning  power  and 
his  devotion  especially  to  the  solution  of  legal  and 
philosophical  problems.  He  was  remarkable  as  a 
scholar  even  in  his  youth,  and,  having  already  dis- 
tinguished himself  whilst  still  a  very  young  man,  he 
was  given  a  position  in  the  public  service.  But  as 
the  early  part  of  his  life  was  spent  amidst  the  scenes 
of  the  struggle  between  the  Netherlands  and  Spain, 
and  he  having  taken  part  in  the  political  disputes  of 
the  day,  he  was  arrested  by  order  of  Prince  Maurice 
of  Nassau  and  the  States  General,  in  1618,  and  w^as 
condemned  to  imprisonment  for  life.  At  the  end  of 
three  years,  however,  he  was  able  to  escape  and  make 
his  way  to  France,  where  he  lived  in  comparative 
poverty,  devoting  himself  to  the  study  of  his  favorite 
subject  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  nations;  and  it 
was  in  the  year  1625,  whilst  he  was  in  exile  in  Paris, 
that  he  published  his  famous  book,  which  he  called : 
"De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacis."  Its  effect  was  instan- 
taneous upon  the  minds  of  his  contemporaries, 
amongst  whom  it  awakened  universal  attention.  It 
is  said  that  Gustavus  Adolphus  carried  a  copy  of  it 
with  him  in  his  campaigns.  It  has  been  named  the 
Magna  Charta  of  International  Law,  and  is  ad- 
piitted  by  scholars  to  be  one  of  the  few  books  which 

94 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

have  altered  the  history  of  the  world,  for  the  cruel 
customs  of  warfare  which  were  followed  at  the  time 
when  he  wrote  it  were  quickly  changed  to  meet  the 
humane  teaching  of  his  thought,  and  it  was  said  that 
the  difference  between  the  conduct  of  troops  and  com- 
manders in  the  Thirty  Years  War,  when  Grotius 
first  announced  his  doctrine,  and  in  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  Succession,  half  a  century  later,  was  like 
the  difference  between  darkness  and  light.  The  in- 
fluence of  Grotius  was  felt  as  the  motive  power  in  the 
peace  of  Westphalia,  which  brought  the  Thirty 
Years  War  to  an  end  in  1648,  and  has  been  de- 
scribed as  his  triumph  in  the  first  of  that  series  of 
great  public  instruments  which  have  regulated  the 
state-system  of  Europe  down  to  our  own  time. 

The  ground  principle  of  the  reasoning  of  Grotius 
was  that  there  is  a  law  of  nature  which  ought  to 
govern  the  acts  of  men,  and  to  which  men  ought  to 
pay  obedience  in  their  dealings  wath  one  another; 
that  man  is  a  being  possessed  of  a  social  and  rational 
nature,  and  consequently  able  to  discern  what  is  con- 
formable to  that  nature.  Natural  law  he  held  to  be 
a  rule  of  right  reason,  indicating  that  an  act  by  its 
complying  or  disagreeing  with  human  nature  had 
in  it  a  moral  deformity  or  moral  necessity,  and  was 

95 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

consequently  forbidden  or  commanded  by  God,  the 
author  of  nature.  This  law  was  immutable.  God 
himself  could  not  change  it,  any  more  than  He  could 
make  twice  two  to  be  anything  other  than  four. 
Human  law  might  go  beyond  it  to  deal  with  matters 
which  it  did  not  touch,  but  could  not  contravene  it. 
Owing  to  its  intrinsic  rightness  it  ruled  the  inter- 
course of  nations  as  well  as  individuals ;  but,  for  the 
guidance  of  states  in  their  relations  with  each  other, 
there  was,  in  addition  to  natural  law,  a  voluntary 
law  based  upon  the  consent  of  all  or  most  nations. 
This  part  of  the  international  code  could  vary  from 
time  to  time ;  but  the  other  portion  was  not  subject  to 
change,  since  it  was  founded  upon  human  nature 
itself.  It  was  by  calling  the  attention  of  the  world  to 
this  great  theory  of  the  law  of  nature, — that  things 
are  right  because  God  and  nature  have  made  them 
so, — that  Grotius  achieved  his  ultimate  triumph. 

''The  principles  of  natural  law,"  he  said,  ''if  you 
attend  to  them  rightly,  are  themselves  patent  and 
evident,  almost  in  the  same  way  as  things  which  are 
perceived  by  the  external  senses." 

This  led  him  by  a  very  plain  course  of  reasoning 
to  the  great  political  principle  which  he  developed, 
namely,  the  independence  of  sovereign  states.    He 

96 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

threw  over  the  old  and  no  longer  tenable  theory  of 
a  temporal  or  spiritual  head  of  Christendom.  There 
was  no  common  Superior,  either  Emperor  or  Pope, 
with  a  right  to  claim  obedience  from  the  nations. 
Each  state  was  absolutely  independent  of  any  exter- 
nal human  authority,  and  all  were  equal  before  the 
law  which  nature  and  common  consent  prescribed. 
This  is  the  foundation  upon  which  is  built  up  the 
whole  structure  of  modern  International  Law.  Wlien 
it  appeared  in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  that  treaty 
recognized  for  the  first  time  the  independence  of  each 
separate  state,  even  within  the  boundaries  of  the  em- 
pire; though  Grotius  had  not  the  satisfaction  of 
knowing  this,  for  ho  had  died  in  exile  three  years 
before,  in  1645.  The  original  theory  of  the  law  of 
nature  has  long  ago  disappeared  before  the  analysis 
and  searching  discussions  of  modern  jurists,  and  by 
the  well-seasoned  practice  of  modern  times,  but  the 
great  principles  of  national  independence  and  state 
sovereignty  still  remain  universally  accepted,  and  the 
teachings  of  Grotius  as  to  the  principles  of  rights 
and  duties  have  been  definitely  approved  by  general 
consent  of  the  nations. 

We  touch  but  lightly  upon  the  subject  so  full  of 
interest  with  which  we  are  occupying  ourselves  here, 

7  97 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

and  we  shall  be  obliged  to  content  ourselves  with  re- 
marking only  the  merest  outlines  of  its  development 
from  this  beginning,  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
Wars  have  taken  place  since  then,  plenty  of  them; 
nations  have  risen  and  fallen,  boundary  lines  have 
changed  or  disappeared,  alliances,  treaties,  and  in- 
terventions have  occurred,  and  what  is  called  the 
balance  of  power  has  been  established  in  Europe  to 
maintain,  in  so  far  as  possible,  the  equilibrium  upon 
that  continent ;  whilst  the  great  republic  of  the  West 
in  which  we  live  has  risen  up  with  enormous  strength 
to  protect  the  principles  of  individual  liberty  and 
equal  justice  to  all  throughout  its  own  domain,  and, 
by  its  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  assure 
to  millions  of  people  in  this  hemisphere  the  right  to 
make  their  own  laws,  to  govern  themselves  and  to 
seek  their  own  destiny  as  it  is  given  them  to  under- 
stand it.  In  all  this  International  Law  plays  its  part, 
regarding,  as  it  does,  each  state  as  a  political  unit 
possessing  proprietary  rights  over  definite  portions 
of  the  earth's  surface. 

And  we  see  that  this  principle  runs  through  all  the 
relations  subsisting  between  different  peoples  which 
involve  international  rights.  The  first  maxim  re- 
sulting from  it  is,  that  every  nation  possesses  and 

98 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

exercises  exclusive  sovereignty  and  jurisdiction 
throughout  the  full  extent  of  its  territory,  and  that 
every  independent  state  is  entitled  to  the  exclusive 
power  of  legislation  in  respect  to  the  personal  rights 
and  civil  condition  of  its  citizens,  and  in  respect  to  all 
real  and  personal  property  situated  within  its  terri- 
tory, whether  it  belong  to  citizens  or  aliens.  Conse- 
quently, every  state  possesses  the  power  of  regu- 
lating the  conditions  on  which  property  within  its 
territory  may  be  held  or  transmitted ;  also  of  deter- 
mining the  capacity  of  all  persons  therein,  as  well  as 
the  validity  of  the  contracts  and  other  acts  which 
arise  there,  and  the  rights  and  obligations  which 
result  from  them. 

And  the  second  is:  ''That  no  state  can,  by  its 
laws,  directly  affect,  bind  or  regulate  property  be- 
yond its  own  territory,  or  control  persons  who  do  not 
reside  within  it,  whether  they  be  native-born  subjects 
or  not." 

This  is  a  result  of  the  first  general  principle; 
for  a  system  which  would  recognize  in  any  state  the 
power  of  regulating  persons  or  things  beyond  its 
territory,  would  exclude  the  equality  of  rights  among 
different  states  and  the  exclusive  sovereignty  which 
belongs  to  each  of  them. 

99 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

From  the  principles  thus  announced,  it  follows 
that  all  the  effect  which  foreign  laws  can  have  in  the 
territory  of  a  state  depends  upon  the  express  con- 
sent of  that  state.  A  state  is  not  obliged  to  allow 
the  application  of  foreign  laws  within  its  territory, 
but  may  refuse  absolutely  to  give  them  effect.  But 
it  may  enforce  this  prohibition  with  regard  to  some 
of  them  only,  and  allow  others  to  be  operative  in 
whole  or  in  part. 

The  rules  which  were  laid  down  by  Huberus,  one 
of  the  early  authorities,  which  are  still  followed,  are 
these : 

I.  The  laws  of  every  state  have  force  within  the 
limits  of  that  state,  and  bind  all  its  subjects. 

II.  All  persons  within  the  limits  of  a  state  are  con- 
sidered as  subjects,  whether  their  residence  is 
permanent  or  temporary. 

III.  By  the  comity  of  nations,  whatever  laws  are 
carried  into  execution  within  the  limits  of  a 
state  are  considered  as  having  the  same  effect 
every^vhere,  so  far  as  they  do  not  occasion  a 
prejudice  to  the  rights  of  other  states  and  their 
citizens. 

In  these  we  have  the  principles  upon  which  all 
modern  international  intercourse  is  based.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  in  this  connection  all  indepen- 
dent states  are  equal,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  dif- 

100 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ference  in  the  extent  of  their  territory  or  the  weight 
of  their  actual  power.  Each  is  entitled  to  present 
its  case  with  absolute  confidence  that  its  national 
individuality  will  be  recognized  and  respected.  An 
enormous  advance  has  been  made  when  all  the  people 
of  the  earth  are  looked  upon  as  belonging  to  a  family 
of  nations,  each  upon  the  same  footing  with  the  rest, 
each  entitled  to  appeal  to  International  Law  for  the 
defence  of  its  rights,  the  small  states  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  great  Powers :  Switzerland,  Denmark, 
Portugal,  Norway,  or  the  smallest  South  American 
republic  standing  in  this  respect  alongside  of  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  Germany,  France,  and  the  United 
States  of  America.  Dealing  in  this  manner,  the 
nations  have  not  only  found  means  through  which 
concessions  may  be  made  to  the  demands  of  one  an- 
other, and  a  limited  effect  may  be  given  by  mutual 
agreement  to  the  statutes  of  the  one  wdthin  the  juris- 
diction of  another, — as  in  the  cases  of  extradition  and 
naturalization, — but  they  have  been  enabled  to  come 
together  in  conference,  and,  each  standing  on  its 
own  basis,  to  unite  by  universal  consent  in  certain 
binding  obligations,  as  was  done  in  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention of  the  Red  Cross  and  the  Conference  at  The 
Hague,  the  great  triumph  of  International  Law,  the 

101 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

nearest  approach  to  international  legislation  that 
the  world  has  ever  seen. 

The  perfect  equality  and  absolute  independence 
of  sovereigns,  and  this  common  interest  impelling 
them  to  intercourse,  has  given  rise  to  a  class  of  cases 
in  which  every  sovereign  is  understood  to  waive  the 
exercise  of  a  part  of  that  exclusive  jurisdiction  which 
is  the  attribute  of  every  nation;  for  instance,  the 
person  of  a  foreign  sovereign  going  into  the  terri- 
tory of  another  state,  is  by  general  usage  and  comity 
of  nations  exempt  from  the  ordinary  local  jurisdic- 
tion. Representing  the  power,  dignity,  and  all  the 
sovereign  attributes  of  his  own  nation,  and  going 
into  the  territory  of  another,  under  the  permission 
which  is  implied  from  the  absence  of  any  prohibition, 
he  is  not  amenable  to  the  civil  or  criminal  jurisdiction 
of  the  country  where  he  temporarily  resides. 

So,  also,  the  person  of  an  ambassador,  or  other 
public  minister,  whilst  within  the  territory  of  the 
state  to  which  he  is  accredited,  is  exempt  from  the 
local  jurisdiction.  His  residence  is  considered  as  a 
continued  residence  in  his  own  country,  and  he  retains 
his  national  character,  unmixed  with  that  of  the 
country  where  he  locally  resides. 

The  public  jurists  have  been  divided  in  their 

102 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

decisions  as  to  how  far  one  state  may  be  obliged  by 
International  Law  to  surrender  to  another  state  an 
individual  who  is  found  within  the  territory  of  the 
former,  and  is  accused  of  having  committed  a  crime 
within  the  territory  of  the  latter ;  and  while  it  is  still 
a  debated  question  whether  the  surrender  of  fugi- 
tives, except  under  a  treaty,  is  an  absolute  inter- 
national duty,  the  weight  of  modern  authority  in- 
clines toward  treating  this  matter  as  an  act  of  comity 
and  not  one  of  right.  There  is  no  rule  of  Interna- 
tional Law  commanding  governments  to  return  to 
one  another  fugitives  from  justice  on  demand  from 
the  country  where  the  crime  was  committed.  In  our 
own  country  we  have  held  that  in  the  absence  of  a 
treaty  there  is  no  law  which  authorizes  the  President 
to  deliver  up  any  one  charged  with  having  committed 
a  crime  in  the  territory  of  a  foreign  nation, — or  at 
least  that  there  are  grave  doubts  as  to  his  right  to  do 
so.  But  yet  our  own  course  has  not  been  uniform ; 
the  decisions  of  the  earlier  Secretaries  of  State  were 
strongly  against  it ;  Mr.  Monroe  having  declared,  in 
1814,  that:  ''Offenders,  even  conspirators,  cannot  be 
pursued  by  one  power  into  the  territory  of  another, 
nor  are  they  delivered  up  by  the  latter  except  in  com- 
pliance with  treaties,  or  by  favor,"  though  a  case 


103 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

occurred,  in  1864,  in  which  a  different  view  was 
taken  by  Mr.  Seward  in  relation  to  one  Arguelles, 
the  Governor  of  a  district  in  Cuba,  who  had  sold  into 
slavery  a  number  of  negroes  taken  from  a  captured 
slave-trader  and  liberated.  Arguelles  escaped  and 
fled  to  the  United  States  and  was  afterwards  surren- 
dered by  us  to  the  Sjianish  Government,  although  we 
had  no  extradition  trea,ty  wdth  Spain.  In  reply  to 
an  inquiry  made  into  this  case  by  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  which  was  submitted  to  the  Senate 
by  President  Lincoln,  Mr.  Seward  said: 

"There  being  no  treaty  of  extradition  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain,  nor  any  act 
of  Congress  directing  how  fugitives  from  jus- 
tice in  Spanish  dominions  shall  be  delivered  up, 
the  extradition  is  understood  by  this  Depart- 
ment to  have  been  made  in  virtue  of  the  law 
of  nations  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States." 

It  may  be  said  now,  however,  that  a  long  and 
almost  unbroken  course  of  decisions  has  established 
it  as  a  rule  of  executive  action  not  to  grant  the  sur- 
render of  fugitive  criminals  except  in  pursuance 
of  a  treaty. 

In  point  of  fact,  we  have  now  treaties  of  extra- 
dition with  almost  all  the  important  Powers,  in  which 

104 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

provision  is  made  for  the  due  surrender  of  a  fugitive 
criminal,  and  an  enumeration  is  made  of  tlie  crimes 
for  the  commission  of  which  such  surrender  shall  take 
place.  Reasonable  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  guilt 
of  the  accused  is  almost  invariably  insisted  upon, 
and  while  the  extraditing  state  does  not  claim  to  try 
the  accused  parties  and  find  them  guilty,  it  requires 
sufficient  evidence  to  satisfy  its  own  tribunals  that 
the  cases  are  genuine  and  ought  to  be  tried.  Almost 
all  the  extradition  treaties  between  the  United  States 
and  other  countries  contain  the  following  sentence : 
"Neither  of  the  contracting  parties  shall  be  bound 
to  deliver  up  its  own  citizens  under  the  stipulations 
of  this  treaty."  And  a  condition  introduced  into 
recent  treaties  is,  that  the  individual  demanded  shall 
not  be  tried  for  any  offence,  committed  prior  to  his 
surrender,  other  than  the  crime  for  which  he  is 
extradited,  until  he  has  been  liberated  and  has  had 
time  to  leave  the  country,  which  is  embodied  in  our 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  entered  into  in  1890. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  would  not 
under  any  circumstances  deliver  up  a  fugitive  who 
had  sought  asylum  in  our  country,  whose  extradition 
might  be  demanded  upon  the  ground  of  his  having 
committed  a  political  offence  abroad. 

105 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Another  class  of  cases  arising  out  of  the  precepts 
of  International  Law,  which  concern  the  relations  of 
independent  sovereign  states,  is  that  of  naturalized 
subjects  and  citizens,  involving  in  general  the  right 
of  expatriation  and  the  consequent  right  of  the  citi- 
zen of  one  country  to  leave  it  and  acquire  citizenship 
in  another  country  by  means  of  naturalization.  To 
the  development  of  this  right  and  to  its  general 
recognition,  the  United  States  have  contributed  more 
than  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

We  began  very  early  in  our  national  existence  to 
insist  that  an  alien  should  have  the  right  to  renounce 
his  allegiance  to  his  native  land  if  he  chose  to  do  so, 
and,  upon  coming  to  the  United  States,  to  acquire 
American  citizenship  in  conformity  with  the  pro- 
visions of  our  statutes.  We  came  into  conflict  at  once 
with  the  old  doctrine  of  inalienable  allegiance  which 
obtained  almost  universally,  that  a  man  was  bound 
throughout  his  life  to  maintain  allegiance  to  the  land 
in  which  he  was  born ;  no  act  of  his  could  ever  change 
it,  for  the  maxim  ran:  ''Nemo  potest  exuere  patriam, 
and  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  1812  lay  in  the 
tenacity  wdth  which  England  held  to  this  doctrine. 

106 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

British  cruisers  took  from  American  vessels  on  the 
high  seas  naturalized  American  citizens  and  im- 
pressed them  into  her  navy,  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  British  subjects  by  birth  and  that  no  forms 
gone  through  with  in  America  could  divest  them 
of  their  British  nationality. 

Lord  Granville  had  stated  this  doctrine  as  early 
as  1797,  as  follows : 

''No  British  subject  can,  by  such  a  form  of 
renunciation  as  that  which  is  prescribed  in  the 
American  law  of  naturalization,  divest  him- 
self of  his  allegiance  to  his  Sovereign.  Such 
a  declaration  of  renunciation  made  by  any  of 
the  King's  subjects  would,  instead  of  operating 
as  a  protection  to  them,  be  considered  an  act 
highly  criminal  on  their  part. ' ' 

But  Mr.  Monroe  wrote  to  the  British  Minister  in 

Washington,  in  1812: 

''It  is  impossible  for  the  United  States  to 
discriminate  between  their  native  and  natural- 
ized citizens. ' ' 

And  some  forty  years  later  Mr.  Seward  adhered 

to  the  principle  of  our  Government : 

' '  That  it  is  the  right  of  every  human  being, 
who  is  neither  convicted  nor  accused  of  crime, 
to  renounce  his  home  and  native  allegiance  and 
seek  a  new  home  and  transfer  his  allegiance  to 

107 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

any  other  nation  that  he  may  choose ;  and  that, 
having  made  and  perfected  that  choice  in  good 
faith,  and  still  adhering  to  it  in  good  faith,  he 
shall  be  entitled  from  his  new  Sovereign  to  the 
same  protection  under  the  laws  of  nations  that 
that  Sovereign  lawfully  extends  to  his  native 
subjects  or  citizens.*' 

A  famous  case  arose  during  the  administration 
of  President  Pierce  which  brought  us  into  momen- 
tary disagreement  with  Austria-Hungary,  and  is  in- 
teresting because  it  illustrates  the  development  of 
our  theory  to  the  utmost  limit  to  which  it  has  ever 
been  carried,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
individual  concerned,  whilst  he  had  declared  his  in- 
tention to  become  an  American  citizen,  had  not 
actually  completed  his  naturalization  under  the  terms 
of  the  statute. 

Martin  Koszta,  a  Hungarian  by  birth,  came  to  this 
country  in  1850,  and,  after  having  been  here  a  short 
time,  declared  his  intention  in  due  form  of  law  to 
become  an  American  citizen.  At  the  end  of  about 
two  years,  however,  he  left  the  United  States  and 
went  to  Turkey,  taking  up  his  residence  in  Smyrna. 
Whilst  he  was  there  his  presence  became  known  to 
the  Austrian  consul  at  that  port,  and  as  there 
chanced  to  be  an  Austrian  man-of-war  in  the  harbor, 

108 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Koszta  was  seized  by  order  of  her  captain,  to  whom 
the  consul  had  addressed  himself,  and  taken  aboard 
the  ship  where  he  was  confined  in  irons  with  the 
avowed  purpose  of  taking  him  back  to  Austrian  terri- 
tory. In  the  meantime  efforts  were  made  for  his  re- 
lease, both  by  the  United  States  consul  at  Smyrna 
and  the  American  legation  at  Constantinople,  but  to 
no  purpose,  for  the  Austrians  declared  that  they  had 
got  their  man  and  they  intended  to  keep  him. 

Just  at  this  moment  it  happened  that  Captain 
Ingraham,  of  the  United  States  navy,  came  into  the 
harbor  of  Smyrna  with  his  ship,  the  man-of-war  Saint 
Louis,  and  was  appealed  to  immediately  in  behalf 
of  the  prisoner  by  our  consul.  After  having  inquired 
into  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  captain  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  Koszta  was  entitled  to  the  pro- 
tection of  our  Government,  and  he  decided  to  give 
it  to  him.  He  asked  the  Austrian  commander  to 
release  him,  but  was  met  by  the  same  answer  that  had 
been  given  to  our  diplomatic  and  consular  represen- 
tatives, a  denial  of  our  right  to  make  such  a  demand, 
and  a  determined  refusal  to  give  up  one  of  their  pris- 
oners at  our  request.  Thereupon  Ingraham  cleared 
his  decks  for  action  and  sent  word  to  the  Austrian 
that  if  he  did  not  set  Koszta  at  liberty  he  would  blow 

109 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

up  his  ship.  The  Austrian  captain  yielded  to  this 
summons,  and  an  agreement  was  reached  under 
which  Koszta  was  transferred  to  the  custody  of  the 
consul-general  of  France  at  Smyrna,  to  remain 
there  until  he  should  be  disposed  of  by  the  mutual 
agreement  of  the  consuls  of  the  respective  govern- 
ments at  that  place.  He  was  ultimately  released  and 
came  back  to  the  United  States. 

In  his  annual  Message  to  Congress,  in  1853,  the 
President  referred  to  the  case  as  follows : 

"Regarding  Koszta  as  still  his  subject,  and 
claiming  a  right  to  seize  him  within  the  limits 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
has  made  the  conduct  of  our  officers  who  took 
part  in  this  transaction  a  subject  of  grave  com- 
plaint, he  has  demanded  of  this  Government  its 
consent  to  the  surrender  of  the  prisoner,  a  dis- 
avowal of  the  acts  of  its  agents,  and  satisfac- 
tion for  the  alleged  outrage.  After  a  careful 
consideration  of  the  case,  I  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  Koszta  was  seized  without  legal 
authority  at  Smyrna;  that  he  was  wrongfully 
detained  on  board  the  Austrian  brig-of-war; 
that  at  the  time  of  his  seizure  he  was  clothed 
with  the  nationality  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  the  acts  of  our  officers  were  justifiable,  and 
their  conduct  has  been  fully  approved  by  me, 
and  a  compliance  with  the  several  demands  of 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  has  been  declined.'* 

110 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

This  case  illustrates  the  extreme  jealousy  with 
which  the  United  States  Government  has  always  pro- 
tected, and  still  protects,  the  privileges  conferred  by 
American  citizenship,  whether  it  be  acquired  by  birth 
or  through  the  form  of  naturalization.  It  is  now  the 
accepted  rule  of  the  Department  of  State  that  a  mere 
declaration  of  intention  does  not  carry  with  it  the 
rights  of  citizenship  or  so  clothe  the  individual  with 
the  nationality  of  this  country  as  to  enable  him  to 
return  to  his  native  land  without  being  subject  to 
the  laws  thereof ;  though  Koszta  was  seized  and  im- 
prisoned in  a  foreign  country,  not  that  of  his  origin, 
and  it  is  held  that  when  the  party  making  the  declara- 
tion has  acquired  a  domicile  in  this  country  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  will  protect  him  in 
all  the  rights  which  the  law  of  nations  attaches  to 
domicile.^^ 

It  is  probable  that  it  is  in  connection  with  this 

"  Mr.  Bayard,  Secretary  of  State,  in  commenting  upon  this  case, 
in  1S85,  said:  "The  criterion  by  which  Koszta's  case  is  to  be  meas- 
ured in  examining  questions  arising  with  respect  to  aliens  who  have 
declared,  but  not  lawfully  perfected,  their  intention  to  become  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  is  very  simple. 

"  When  the  party,  after  such  declaration,  evidences  his  intent  to 
perfect  the  process  of  naturalization  by  continued  residence  in  the 
United  States  as  required  by  law,  this  Government  holds  that  it  has 
a  right  to  remonstrate  against  any  act  of  the  Government  of  original 

111 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

question  of  naturalization  and  the  right  of  expatria- 
tion, that  the  influence  of  the  United  States  has  made 
itself  more  strongly  felt  abroad,  and  has  done  more 
to  mould  public  opinion,  than  in  any  other  matter  of 
legal  discussion  with  other  governments,  or  in  the 
general  development  of  the  principles  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  in  which  we  have  taken  part. 

The  correspondence  of  the  Department  of  State 
relating  to  it  fills  many  volumes,  in  the  course  of 
which  an  elaborate  system  of  procedure  has  been 
constructed,  under  which  the  official  representatives 
of  our  Government  in  every  country  of  the  world  are 
to-day  safeguarding  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
American  citizens,  not  only  those  who  are  natural- 
born,  but  those  also  who  have  come  to  us  and  have 
adopted  our  country  as  theirs.  Usage  has  tempered 
everywhere  the  old  doctrine  of  inalienable  allegiance, 
so  that  even  England  recognized,  by  her  Naturaliza- 

allegiance  whereby  the  perfection  of  his  American  citizenship  may 
be  prevented  by  force,  and  original  jurisdiction  over  the  individual 
reasserted.  Koszta  was  resident  in  the  United  States,  and  his  absence 
,wa8  that  of  temporary  character,  amino  revertendi,  which  does  not 
conflict  with  the  continuity  of  residence  required  by  the  statute. 
Koszta  was  arrested  by  the  authorities  of  Austria  in  the  dominions  of 
a  third  state." 

Mr.  Bayard,  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Mackey,  August  5,  1885. 
\^Tiarton'3  Int.  Law  Digest,  ii,  359. 
112 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tion  Act  of  1870,  the  right  of  British  subjects  to  be- 
come naturalized  and  to  acquire  citizenship  abroad ; 
whilst  upon  our  part  we  have  entered  into  treaties 
with  her  and  with  most  of  the  countries  of  Europe, 
by  which  this  right  is  reciprocally  extended  to  their 
nationals  and  ours. 

It  is  curious  to  note,  however,  as  a  matter  of 
history,  that  in  our  eagerness  to  assert  and  enforce 
our  theories  upon  the  subject  of  the  right  of  alien- 
able allegiance  in  connection  with  foreigners  from 
all  countries  of  the  globe,  it  did  not  occur  to  us  to 
inquire  whether  we  accorded  this  right  to  our  own 
citizens  or  not ;  indeed,  when  the  question  presented 
itself  to  the  Supreme  Court,  not  one  of  the  judges 
affirmed,  while  several  denied,  the  right  as  applicable 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States.  It  was  found  that 
in  point  of  law,  we  ourselves  were  living  under  the 
old  maxim, — nemo  potest  exuere  patriam.  There- 
fore Congress  enacted  a  law,  in  the  year  1868,  which 
declares  that: 

' '  The  right  of  expatriation  is  a  natural  and 
inherent  right  of  all  people,  indispensable  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  right  of  life,  liberty,  and 
the  pursuit  of  happiness'*;  and  it  prescribes 
that:  "any  declaration,  instruction,  opinion, 
order,  or  decision  of  anv  officer  of  this  Govern- 

8  113 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ment  wliieli  denies,  restricts,  impairs,  or  ques- 
tions the  right  of  expatriation,  is  hereby  de- 
clared inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  this  Government. ' ' 

The  foremost  service  which  International  Law 
has  rendered  to  mankind  in  general,  and  its  most 
important  contribution  to  civilization  as  well  as  to 
the  peace  of  the  world,  which  is  properly  to  be  men- 
tioned in  our  theme  as  its  modern  development,  is  the 
impulse  which  it  has  given  to  the  different  nations 
of  the  world  to  consult  each  other  upon  questions 
which  have  an  import  touching  the  interests  of  all ; 
as  also  the  manner  in  which  it  has  pointed  out  the 
way  for  them  to  reach  agreements,  and  to  lay  down 
for  themselves  rules  of  conduct  tending  toward  the 
preservation  of  right  and  the  maintenance  of  reason 
in  their  international  dealings;  and  since,  in  the 
nature  of  man  and  through  his  innate  cupidity,  his 
ceaseless  jealousy,  his  unconquerable  ambition,  war 
has  thus  far  been  found  to  be  inevitable  in  the  world, 
it  has  taught  that  at  least  human  misery  may  be 
avoided  and,  in  so  far  as  the  case  admits,  the  horrors 
of  war  may  be  attenuated,  the  rights  of  belligerents 
and  neutrals  defined  and  their  property  saved  from 
unrighteous  seizure  or  wanton  destruction.     This 

114 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

achievement  is  exemplified  in  the  International  Con- 
ferences that  have  taken  place  with  considerable  fre- 
quency, as  necessity  arose,  in  the  various  capitals  of 
Europe,  and  which  one  may  look  upon  as  the  chief 
ornament  of  an  enlightened  civilization  during  the 
last  hundred  years. 

We  are  not  concerned  here  to  discuss  them  or 
even  to  refer  to  them  all,  but  merely  make  mention 
of  one  or  two  which  have  left  a  lasting  impress  upon 
the  conduct  of  men  and  changed  the  current  of 
thought  throughout  the  world  by  the  voluntary  action 
of  the  nations  themselves. 

The  progress  of  civilization  has  tended  slowly 
to  mitigate  the  severity  of  war  on  land,  but  it  still 
remained,  at  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
unrestricted  in  regard  to  war  at  sea.  The  difference 
in  the  effect  of  the  laws  of  war  on  land  and  on  sea 
was  currently  justified  by  people  up  to  that  time  by 
alleging  the  usage  Vv^hich  considered  private  prop- 
erty, w^hen  captured  in  cities  taken  by  storm,  as 
booty ;  and  the  well-known  fact  that  contributions  are 
levied  upon  territories  occupied  by  a  hostile  army, 
and  that  as  the  object  of  w^ar  by  land  is  conquest 
or  the  acquisition  of  territory,  the  victor  naturally 
restrains  himself  from  the  exercise  of  his  extreme 

115 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

right,  nor  would  he  destroy  property  which  had 
come  into  his  possession  or  over  which  he  was  subse- 
quently to  have  control.  But  it  was  held  that  the 
object  of  maritime  war  is  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  commerce,  of  the  merchandise  embarked  in 
his  ships  at  sea,  which  is  a  part  of  his  strength,  the 
sources  and  sinews  of  his  naval  power.  In  the  midst 
of  this  condition  of  things,  the  Great  Powers  of 
Europe  called  together  a  congress  of  nations,  which 
met  at  Paris  in  1856,  in  which  it  was  decided  that 
as  the  Maritime  Law,  in  time  of  war,  had  long  been 
the  subject  of  deplorable  dispute,  and  the  uncertainty 
of  the  law  and  the  duties  in  such  matters  gave  rise  to 
differences  of  opinion  between  neutrals  and  bellig- 
erents which  might  lead  to  conflicts,  it  would  be  ad- 
vantageous consequently  to  establish  a  uniform  doc- 
trine in  regard  to  it  and  to  introduce  into  interna- 
tional relations  fixed  principles  in  this  respect.  The 
nations  represented  at  this  Conference  were  Great 
Britain,  Austria,  France,  Prussia,  Russia,  Sardinia, 
and  Turkey,  whose  plenipotentiaries  issued,  on  the 
fifteenth  of  April,  1856,  what  is  known  as  the  Declara- 
tion of  Paris,  as  follows : 

1.  Privateering  is,  and  remains,  abolished. 

2.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with 
the  exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

116 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contra- 
band of  war,  are  not  liable  to  capture  under 
enemy's  flag. 

4.  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be 
effective,  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force 
sufficient  really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of 
the  enemy. 

This  formulation  of  principles  has  become  the 
rule  of  the  sea,  which  now-a-days  is  generally 
accepted  as  a  law  by  the  civilized  nations.  The 
United  States  have  never  formally  adhered  to  it; 
though  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  Government 
accepts  its  principles,  for,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the 
Spanish  war,  President  McKinley  addressed  to  the 
Great  Powers  of  the  world  an  official  announcement 
that  this  country  adhered  to  the  principles  of  the 
Declaration  of  Paris  during  the  continuance  of  the 
war  with  Spain. 

With  the  same  general  end  in  view,  though  with 
a  somewhat  more  humane  immediate  purpose,  the 
nations  of  the  world  assembled  by  their  duly-accred- 
ited representatives,  at  Geneva,  in  Switzerland,  in 
the  year  18G4,  to  formulate  a  plan  by  which  to  temper, 
in  so  far  as  it  might  be  possible  to  do  so,  the  evils  that 
are  inseparable  from  war,  to  prevent  unnecessary 
suffering  and  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  wounded 

117 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

soldiers  lying  on  the  field  of  battle.  Up  to  that  time 
no  fixed,  concerted  international  action  in  this  respect 
had  been  agreed  upon ;  and  the  deliberations  of  the 
conference,  which  were  ultimately  adhered  to  by 
all  the  important  governments  in  the  world,  among 
them  our  own,  w^ere  followed  with  the  deepest  inter- 
est ;  the  conclusions  reached  by  it  were  hailed  as  an 
extraordinary  indication  of  the  growing  sentiment 
amongst  all  peoples,  of  the  noblest  human  sympathy 
and  of  their  respect  for  international  agreements. 
At  the  end  of  its  session,  the  conference  announced 
the  results  of  its  deliberations  by  a  declaration  con- 
sisting of  ten  Articles,  which  has  since  become  famous 
under  the  name  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

With  the  lapse  of  years  it  was  discovered  by 
experience,  however,  that  whilst  this  initial  agree- 
ment had  proved  itself  to  be  a  great  benefit  to  man- 
kind, and  had  served  to  a  notable  degree  to  relieve 
the  sufferings  of  war,  proving  its  usefulness  beyond 
a  question,  yet  there  were  certain  defects  in  it  which 
ought  to  be  corrected,  as  well  as  certain  modifications 
to  be  made,  which  had  suggested  themselves  in  the 
course  of  its  practical  application  to  war. 

Therefore,  the  President  of  Switzerland,  acting 
in  the  name  of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  invited  the 

118 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Governments  of  the  world  to  send  their  representa- 
tives to  Geneva  again  to  a  conference  that  should  be 
held  for  the  purpose  of  revising  the  Convention  of 
1864. 

This  second  conference  assembled  at  Geneva  in 
June,  1906,  and  was  composed  of  the  delegations  from 
thirty-six  different  Governments,  in  all  parts  of  the 
globe.  Its  deliberations,  which  were  carried  on  with 
great  earnestness  and  with  a  complete  devotion  to 
the  subject  which  had  brought  all  these  people  of  such 
varied  nationalities  together,  extended  over  a  period 
of  about  four  weeks,  and  in  the  end  were  produc- 
tive of  a  new  Geneva  Convention  for  the  alleviation 
of  the  sufferings  of  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  during 
the  course  of  active  military  operations  in  the  field. 
In  this  Agreement,  signed  by  all  the  delegations, 
amongst  whom  were  included  those  of  the  United 
States  Government,  the  ten  Articles  of  the  old  Con- 
vention of  1864  were  enlarged  and  extended  into  a 
series  of  33  new  Articles,  which  have  now  been 
accepted  as  the  rules  of  war  in  so  far  as  the  sick  and 
wounded  are  concerned,  and  they  may  be  said  to  be 
clothed  with  the  authority  of  universal  law.  It  pro- 
vides that  the  sick  and  wounded  are  to  be  respected 
and  cared  for,  without  regard  to  nationality,  by  the 

119 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

belligerent  in  whose  hands  they  may  happen  to  be; 
that  all  persons  attached  to  the  service  of  the  sick 
and  wounded,  as  well  as  all  their  materials,  buildings, 
and  equipment,  shall  be  exempt  from  capture,  and 
that  they  themselves  shall  not  be  made  prisoners  of 
war.  Provision  is  made  in  minute  detail  for  the 
relief  and  the  prevention  of  suffering;  and,  as  a 
compliment  to  Switzerland,  the  emblem  adopted  for 
this  great  work  of  humanity  was  taken  from  the 
Swiss  national  colors,  made  into  a  red  cross  on  a 
white  ground, — whence  comes  the  designation  so 
generally  known  as  the  service  of  the  Red  Cross. 

But  no  concerted  action  of  the  nations  has  ever 
equalled,  indeed  it  might  be  said  has  ever  approached, 
in  its  momentous  importance  or  its  far-reaching  effect 
upon  the  destiny  of  mankind,  that  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference at  The  Hague.  We  may  not  discuss  it  here 
in  detail,  or  do  more  than  mention  in  passing  some 
of  its  principal  achievements ;  for  it  is  a  subject  so 
large  that,  in  order  to  consider  it  seriously,  it  must 
be  taken  up  quite  by  itself. 

It  was  the  Emperor  of  Russia  who  conceived  this 
great  plan  intended  to  lead  the  nations  into  the  paths 
of  peace,  and  it  was  with  unfeigned  surprise  that 
the  Cabinets  of  Europe  and  America  received,  in 

120 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

1898,  from  the  most  powerful  military  autocrat  of 
the  time,  a  communication  which  announced  that : 

"The  maintenance  of  general  peace,  and  a 
possible  reduction  of  the  excessive  armaments 
which  weigh  upon  all  nations,  present  them- 
selves in  the  existing  condition  of  the  whole 
world,  as  the  ideal  toward  which  the  endeavors 
of  all  Governments  should  be  directed;"  also 
that:  *'In  the  conviction  that  this  lofty  aim  is 
in  conformity  with  the  most  essential  interests 
and  the  legitimate  views  of  all  Powers,  the  Im- 
perial Government  thinks  that  the  present  mo- 
ment would  be  very  favorable  for  seeking,  by 
means  of  international  discussion,  the  most 
effectual  method  of  insuring  to  all  peoples  the 
benefits  of  a  real  and  durable  peace,  and,  above 
all,  of  putting  an  end  to  the  progressive  develop- 
ment of  the  present  armaments." 
This  letter  was  addressed  to  all  the  governments 
which  had  representatives  accredited  in  St.  Peters- 
burg to  the  Russian  Court,  with  the  proposal  that 
they  should  agree  to  a  conference  which   should 
occupy  itself  with  this  grave  problem. 

It  was  considered  advisable  that  the  conference 
should  not  sit  in  the  capital  of  one  of  the  Great 
Powers,  where  so  many  political  interests  are  cen- 
tred, which  might  impede  the  progress  of  the  work ; 
but,  as  the  Queen  of  Holland  had  expressed  her 

121 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

assent  that  the  conference  should  be  held  in  her 
residential  city,  the  invitations  were  sent  out  by  the 
Dutch  Minister  of  State  from  a  list  furnished  by 
the  Eussian  foreign  office,  requesting  the  delegates  to 
assemble  at  The  Hague.  The  invitation  was  re- 
sponded to  by  twenty-six  Governments,  including  our 
own,  whose  representatives  met  at  The  Hague  in 
May,  1899,  and  continued  in  session  until  the  end  of 
the  month  of  July;  the  delegates  from  the  United 
States  being:  Hon.  Andrew  D.  White;  Hon.  Seth 
Low;  Hon.  Stanford  Newel;  Captain  Mahan,  of  the 
United  States  Navy;  Captain  William  Crozier,  of 
the  United  States  Army,  and  Mr.  Frederick  H.  Holls, 
of  New  York.  The  discussions  were  chiefly  concerned 
with  a  programme  prepared  beforehand  and  sub- 
mitted by  the  Russian  Government,  which  covered  a 
wdde  range  of  subjects,  all  more  or  less  directly  bear- 
ing upon  the  proposal  of  the  Emperor  for  securing 
the  most  effectual  means  of  insuring  to  all  peoples  the 
benefits  of  peace. 

The  conference  did  not  find  its  way  free  from  ob- 
stacles, nor  that  all  stumbling  blocks  could  be  re- 
moved at  once.  It  did  not  accomplish  all  that  was 
hoped  for;  it  did  not  succeed  even  in  reducing  the 
excessive  armaments  that  weigh  upon  all  nations, 

122 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

which  was  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  the  Emperor's 
first  announcement  to  the  nations;  but  it  did  much 
that  benefits  mankind.  It  established  the  right  of 
nations  to  offer  their  good  offices  and  their  mediation, 
without  having  such  an  offer  or  such  mediation  con- 
sidered as  an  unfriendly  act ;  it  provided  for  a  com- 
mission of  inquiry,  to  ascertain  the  facts  of  an  inter- 
national dispute  in  order  that  the  facts  may  be  im- 
partially ascertained  by  a  commission  made  up  of 
neutrals  as  well  as  nationals. 

It  provided  for  a  court  of  international  arbitra- 
tion, to  which  nations  might  appeal  as  litigants, 
where  their  causes  might  be  heard  and  adjudicated 
by  the  ripe  intelligence  of  men  learned  in  the  law, 
instead  of  turning  in  the  heat  of  passion  immediately 
to  the  arbitrament  of  war ;  it  drew  up  a  code  of  regu- 
lations respecting  the  law  and  customs  of  war  on 
land ;  it  extended  the  rule  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
to  warfare  at  sea,  so  that  aid  might  be  given  to 
wounded  and  shipwrecked  sailors,  and  hospital  ships 
be  exempt  from  capture  in  the  same  way  that  the 
ambulance  service  of  the  armies  is  exempted  on  land. 
The  contracting  Powers  agreed  to  prohibit,  for  a 
term  of  five  years,  the  launching  of  projectiles  and 
explosives  from  balloons,  and  to  abstain  from  the 

123 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

use  of  projectiles  the  object  of  which  is  the  diffusion 
of  asphyxiating  gases.  They  agreed  also  to  abstain 
from  the  use  of  bullets  which  expand  or  flatten  easily 
in  the  human  body,  such  as  bullets  with  a  hard  enve- 
lope which  does  not  entirely  cover  the  core,  or  is 
pierced  with  incisions. 

This  notable  concert  of  nations  made  an  epoch 
in  the  history  of  the  world ;  for  it  opened  the  way  to 
relations  of  amity  between  peoples  of  different  race 
whose  differences  of  self-interest  and  ambition  might 
lead  them  into  conflict;  it  taught  men  that  the  pre- 
cepts of  reason  and  justice  and  equity,  if  appealed  to, 
may  often  lead  them  into  paths  away  from  the  cruelty, 
suffering,  devastation  and  horrors  of  war  which  had 
inflicted  themselves  upon  humanity  for  ages. 

It  did  not  abolish  war,  indeed,  for,  by  a  strange 
move  of  destiny,  it  was  Russia  herself  who  was 
forced  into  a  deadly  struggle  when  the  conflict  broke 
out  a  short  time  later  between  her  and  Japan. 

Yet  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  far  from  abandoning 
the  magnanimous  spirit  with  which  he  had  first  ad- 
dressed the  nations  in  1898,  issued  another  invitation 
in  1906,  requesting  them  to  meet  a  second  time  at  The 
Hague,  in  order  that  certain  improvements  should 
be  made  in  the  Convention  relative  to  the  peaceful 

121 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

adjustment  of  international  disputes,  by  which  the 
labors  of  the  first  conference  might  be  perfected 
through  the  effect  of  the  regular  progress  of  enlight- 
enment among  the  nations  and  in  accord  with  the 
results  acquired  from  experience. 

The  second  conference,  which  met  at  The  Hague 
in  1907,  whose  deliberations  extended  over  a  period 
of  four  months,  in  which  a  very  distinguished  delega- 
tion from  the  United  States,  headed  by  Mr.  Choate, 
General  Horace  Porter,  and  Judge  Uriah  M.  Eose, 
took  a  foremost  part  and  contributed  decisively  to 
the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  it,  was  one  of  far  wider 
influence  as  a  national  congress  than  its  predecessor ; 
for,  whilst  the  invitations  had  been  received  and 
accepted,  in  1899,  by  the  twenty-six  governments 
having  diplomatic  representatives  accredited  to  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg,  delegates  were  present  upon 
this  occasion  from  forty-four  independent  sovereign 
states,  among  which  were  the  Republics  of  South 
and  Central  America,  who  had  not  been  present  be- 
fore. So,  also,  the  work  of  this  conference  was 
broader  and  more  extensive  in  the  results  attained  by 
it.  They  were  built  up  on  the  foundation  which  had 
then  been  laid,  and  they  were  fortified  by  the  assur- 
ance now  definitely  won,  that  nations  may  unite  in 

125 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

legislation  which  affects  them  all,  and  by  the  results 
of  the  practical  application  of  those  principles 
already  established. 

The  conference  enlarged  the  commission  of  in- 
quiry into  international  disputes;  it  agreed  upon  a 
convention  restricting  the  use  of  military  and  naval 
force  for  the  recovery  of  contract  debts ;  it  fixed  the 
principle  that  hostilities  shall  not  commence  without 
notice,  either  a  formal  declaration  of  war  or  an  ulti- 
matum in  the  nature  of  a  declaration  of  conditional 
war,  in  order  that  belligerents  may  be  protected  from 
surprise  or  bad  faith;  it  regulated  the  placing  of 
submarine  automatic  mines ;  it  forbade  the  bombard- 
ment by  naval  forces  of  undefended  harbors,  villages 
and  towns;  it  laid  the  ground  work  for  an  inter- 
national court  of  prize,  and  while  providing  for  a 
third  conference  at  the  end  of  eight  years,  it  ex- 
tended until  the  close  of  the  third  conference  the 
prohibition  of  the  launching  from  balloons  of  projec- 
tiles and  explosives. ^^ 

Its  foremost  achievement,  however,  was  to  estab- 
lish, without  altering  the  status  of  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration,  a  new  tribunal  to  be  called 
a  Judicial  Arbitration  Court,  of  easy  access,  com- 

"  This  convention  was  not  signed  by  France,  Germany  or  Russia. 
126 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

posed  of  judges  representing  the  various  judicial 
systems  of  the  world,  and  capable  of  ensuring  contin- 
uity in  jurisprudence  of  arbitration.  This  Court  is 
composed  of  judges  chosen  from  persons  of  high 
moral  reputation,  and  all  fulfilling  conditions  that 
qualify  them  in  their  respective  countries  to  occupy 
high  legal  posts,  or  jurists  of  recognized  competence 
in  matters  of  International  Law. 

These  are  some  of  the  benefits  conferred  by  the 
development  of  International  Law  upon  mankind. 
AVhen  we  contemplate  its  immediate  effects  upon 
human  society,  when  we  recall  the  condition  of  the 
world  that  Grotius  looked  upon  in  his  century,  the 
spectacle  of  pillage  and  vengeance,  and  brutality 
and  rage,  we  shall  accept  it,  indeed,  as  one  of  the 
foundation  stones  of  modern  civilization. 

The  world  can  now  never  go  back — it  must  neces- 
sarily go  forward ;  and  if  its  progress  is  not  always 
rapid  or  its  highway  smooth,  yet  we  all  push  on  with 
our  tasks.  It  was  said  by  M.  Nelidoff,  the  veteran  of 
Russian  diplomacy,  at  the  Conference  at  The  Hague : 

*'Let  us  not  be  too  ambitious.  Let  us  not 
forget  that  our  means  of  action  are  limited; 
that  nations  are  living  beings  as  truly  as  are 
the  individuals  who  compose  them;  that  they 

127 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

have  the  same  passions,  the  same  aspirations, 
the  same  defects,  the  same  illusions.  But  let 
not  that  discourage  us  from  dreaming  of  the 
ideal  of  a  universal  peace  and  brotherhood  of 
peoples,  which  are  after  all  only  the  natural 
and  higher  aspirations  of  the  human  soul.  Is 
not  the  essential  condition  of  all  progress  the 
pursuit  of  an  ideal  toward  which  one  always 
strives  without  ever  being  able  to  attain  it? 
Excelsior  is  the  motto  of  progress.  Let  us  then 
take  up  bravely  the  work  before  us,  having  as 
the  light  of  our  path  the  luminous  star  of 
peace  and  justice,  to  which  we  shall  never 
attain,  but  which  will  lead  us  always  toward  the 
welfare  of  humanity.'* 


128 


LORD  CORNWALLIS  IN  AMERICA 

We  shall  call  attention  in  this  paper  to  some  de- 
tails in  the  career  of  a  distinguished  soldier  and 
statesman,  the  early  friend  of  America,  the  most 
earnest  and  the  ablest  of  the  British  generals  who 
supported  the  cause  of  the  King  during  the  American 
Revolution;  the  man  whose  name  more  than  any 
other  of  his  time  is  linked  with  British  defeat  and 
the  downfall  of  British  authority  in  this  country, 
whose  capture  by  General  Washington  at  Yorktown 
will  always  stand  forth  in  the  annals  of  our  people 
as  the  brilliant  achievement  by  which  liberty  was 
definitively  established  in  the  United  States:  Lieu- 
tenant General  the  Earl  Cornwallis. 

This  man,  who  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  Ameri- 
can war  was  about  thirty-seven  years  of  age,  was 
already  a  soldier  of  experience,  having  seen  service 
on  the  European  Continent  during  the  Seven  Years 
War,  and  one  for  whom  the  profession  of  arms  had 
an  attraction  which  amounted  to  enthusiasm.  He 
was  devoted  to  it  from  his  earliest  youth ;  his  volu- 
minous writings  which  are  still  preserved  show  that 
at  several  periods  of  his  life  he  readily  sacrificed  to 

9  129 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

it  the  personal  comfort  which  his  rank  and  station 
would  have  enabled  him  to  enjoy  in  England,  he  fol- 
lowed it  in  the  fulfilment  of  a  duty  when  he  came  to 
fight  in  America,  evidently  against  his  inclination,  for 
his  political  convictions  were  strongly  opposed  to 
the  ministry  in  its  treatment  of  the  Colonies.  In 
spite  of  this,  however,  he  performed  his  duty  as  a 
soldier  with  zeal  and  determination,  and  he  was 
undoubtedly  the  most  dangerous  antagonist  with 
whom  our  forefathers  had  to  contend  throughout 
the  War  of  Independence, — for  there  is  no  doubt 
whatever  that  he  tried  to  win.  He  met  with  humilia- 
tion and  defeat  in  this  country,  though  afterwards, 
in  the  course  of  a  long  and  active  life,  he  was  able 
to  win  honor  and  glory  for  himself  in  other  fields,  and 
by  the  uprightness  of  his  personal  character  he  ever 
retained  the  respect  of  his  countrymen. 

The  family  of  Cornwallis  was  of  very  ancient 
origin  and  had  acquired  considerable  importance  in 
Ireland,  whence  the  founder  of  the  English  branch 
of  the  house  went  to  London  about  a  hundred  years 
before  the  discovery  of  America.  From  him  de- 
scended a  long  line  represented  by  men  distinguished 
in  every  profession  and  in  the  service  of  the  State : 
clergymen,  lawyers,  soldiers,  sailors,  who  won  honors 

130 


\EUTAW 

SPRINGS   \^  %       ^^  ,,. 


^  .MAP  SHOWING  THE  ROUT 

^  OK    LORD   CORNWALLIS    1 

y  178(»  AM)  1781 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

and  titles  for  the  family  and  who  were  connected  by 
intermarriage  with  many  of  the  most  influential 
houses  in  the  Kingdom,  until  we  reach  the  father 
of  the  general  of  whom  we  are  treating  here.  He 
was  Charles,  fifth  Lord  and  first  Earl  Cornwallis, 
who  married  Elizabeth,  daughter  of  Viscount  Town- 
send,  by  whom  he  had  four  sons  and  five  daughters. 
Of  these  the  Earl  Cornwallis  of  Yorktown  fame  was 
the  sixth  child,  but  the  oldest  son ;  and  therefore  in- 
herited the  family  estates  and  titles.  He  was  born 
in  Grosvenor  Square,  in  London,  on  the  31st  of  De- 
cember, 1738,  and  as  soon  as  he  w^as  old  enough 
to  go  to  school  he  was  sent  to  Eton  to  begin  his 
education.  "Whilst  he  was  there  he  received  a  blow 
in  playing  hockey  which  injured  one  eye,  not  suffi- 
ciently to  destroy  the  vision  but  to  leave  a  slight 
permanent  obliquity.  The  boy  who  accidentally 
caused  this  injury  was  Shute  Barrington,  afterwards 
the  highly-esteemed  Bishop  of  Durham.  Young 
Cornwallis,  who  at  this  time  was  called  Viscount 
Brome  (a  courtesy  title  borne  by  the  eldest  son  in 
the  family  of  the  Earls  Cornwallis),  after  a  short 
period  spent  in  the  University  of  Cambridge  chose 
the  army  as  his  profession  before  he  was  eighteen 
years  of  age,  and  received  his  commission  as  Ensign 

131 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

in  the  First  Eegiment  of  the  Guards,  later  the  Grena- 
diers. Anxious  to  prepare  himself  for  a  career  in 
which  his  heart  was  now  enlisted,  Lord  Brome  asked 
permission  of  the  King  to  go  abroad  to  study  at  some 
foreign  military  academy;  for  the  science  of  arms 
was  not  as  thoroughly  taught  at  that  period  in 
England  as  in  other  European  countries,  and  it  was 
customary  for  young  Englishmen  to  prepare  them- 
selves for  the  army  by  spending  a  year  or  two  at  a 
school  upon  the  Continent.  Having  obtained  the 
requisite  leave,  young  Brome  was  sent  by  his  father, 
under  the  charge  of  an  older  man,  a  Prussian  officer, 
to  the  military  academy  of  Turin,  which  was  then 
held  in  high  estimation.  The  letters  which  passed 
between  the  young  man  and  his  father  show  the  ten- 
der solicitude  with  which  the  latter  watched  over 
the  progress  of  his  boy  and  the  affectionate  interest 
which  he  gave  to  the  details  of  his  health  and  educa- 
tion. The  Prussian  captain  wrote  from  Turin  to 
Lord  Cornwallis  immediately  upon  their  arrival  at 
that  Court,  and  a  few  days  later  he  added  an  account 
of  the  school  with  the  daily  routine  of  the  young 
men  being  educated  there  which,  after  the  lapse  of 
more  than  a  hundred  and  fifty  years,  is  interesting 
to  read  as  an  example  of  the  customs  and  manners  of 

132 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  times.  ''I  had  the  honor  to  write  you  at  the  same 
time  with  Lord  Brome,"  he  says,  "to  tell  you  of  our 
safe  arrival  and  of  his  intention  to  enter  the  academy, 
which  we  were  not  able,  however,  to  carry  out  until 
after  having  been  presented  to  the  King  and  the 
royal  family,  an  incident  Avliich  always  requires  a  cer- 
tain time,  by  reason  of  the  ceremonial.  Lord  Brome, 
as  the  son  of  an  English  Peer,  was  kindly  received 
by  the  King  as  well  as  by  the  Princes  and  Princesses. 
We  then  made  our  entrance  to  the  academy,  which 
is  in  an  excellent  state  of  discipline.  The  King  will 
not  allow  the  least  disorder  to  take  place,  and  the 
students  are  required  to  attend  all  the  exercises.  The 
rooms  are  fairly  good  and  the  table  is  excellent ;  the 
students  all  dine  together,  with  the  Governor  and 
the  Lieutenant  Governor,  with  great  order  and  de- 
cency. The  dinner  is  at  a  quarter  past  twelve,  when 
each  one  comes  to  the  table  with  a  good  appetite 
on  account  of  the  exercises  which  he  has  performed 
during  the  morning."  He  gives  us  also  a  curious 
account  of  the  daily  life  of  a  student  at  the  academy, 
as  follows:  At  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  there 
was  a  public  dancing  lesson ;  at  eight  Lord  Brome  had 
an  hour  v/ith  his  German  teacher ;  from  nine  to  eleven 
the  riding  school,  every  day  except  Thursday;  at 

133 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

eleven  o'clock  a  private  fencing  lesson;  at  three  a 
private  lesson  in  mathematics  and  fortification ;  and 
at  five  a  private  dancing  lesson.  After  that  came 
visits,  the  opera,  and  last  of  all  the  supper.  It  may 
fairly  be  doubted  whether  this  curriculum  would 
meet  very  many  of  the  requirements  of  the  war  col- 
lege as  we  understand  that  term  to-day;  but  as  the 
academy  at  Turin  was  one  of  the  foremost  in  Europe 
it  probably  fulfilled  the  demands  made  of  it  at  the 
time. 

After  having  finished  his  course  at  Turin,  Lord 
Brome  and  his  companion  visited  several  of  the  Ger- 
man Courts  in  order  that  he  might  have  the  advan- 
tage of  travel  and  of  observation  among  people 
whose  customs  were  new  to  him,  and  we  find  him 
shortly  afterwards  serving  upon  the  staff  of  the 
British  commander,  Lord  Granby,  in  the  operations 
carried  on  in  Germany  during  the  Seven  Years  War. 
He  took  part  as  a  staff  officer  in  the  battle  of  Minden 
and  in  the  other  actions  in  which  his  commander  was 
engaged,  and  during  the  year  1761,  when  he  had  been 
promoted  to  the  Lieutenant-Colonelcy  of  the  Twelfth 
Regiment,  he  fought  repeatedly  at  the  head  of  his 
men  with  a  courage  which  won  him  distinction. 

In  the  meantime,  Lord  Brome  having  come  of 

134, 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

age  was  elected,  in  1760,  to  Parliament  from  Eye  in 
the  County  of  Suffolk,  for  which  borough  members 
of  his  family  had  sat  at  various  times  for  four  hun- 
dred years.  Two  years  later,  at  the  death  of  his 
father,  in  June,  1762,  he  succeeded  to  the  title  of 
Earl  Cornwallis  and  took  his  seat  in  the  House  of 
Lords.  It  does  not  appear  that  Lord  Cornwallis  re- 
turned to  Germany,  where  the  war  was  still  being 
carried  on,  though  the  British  army  was  not  then 
engaged  in  active  operations.  He  retained  command 
of  the  Twelfth  Regiment  until  1765,  w^hen  he  was 
made  Colonel  of  the  Thirty-third,  and  he  continued 
his  practice  of  accompanying  his  regiment  to  their 
country  quarters  every  year.  On  the  14th  of  July, 
1768,  he  married  Miss  Jemima  Tuleken  Jones, 
daughter  of  Colonel  James  Jones  of  the  Third  Foot 
Guards,  by  whom  he  had  two  children :  Charles,  who 
succeeded  to  the  title  but  died  without  male  issue  in 
1823;  and  Mary,  who  married  Mark  Singleton,  Es- 
quire, and  survived  until  the  year  1857.  He  had  no 
grandson,  but  his  descendants  through  his  grand- 
daughters have  continued  to  follow  the  military 
career  in  England,  and  four  of  his  great-grandsons 
gave  up  their  lives  in  the  Crimea ;  two  were  killed  at 
Inkerman, — one  died  of  wounds  received  at  Bala- 

135 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

klava, — and  the  fourtli  was  killed  in  the  trenches  be- 
fore Sebastopol. 

During  the  time  when  Lord  Cornwallis  sat  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  in  which  he  was  exceedingly  atten- 
tive to  his  duties  and  was  always  present  upon  the 
discussion  of  questions  of  public  importance,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  he  was  strongly  opposed  to 
the  scheme  of  taxing  the  American  Colonies,  indeed 
that  he  invariably  voted  against  all  these  measures 
and  exerted  his  influence  so  forcibly  in  opposition 
to  the  Ministry  and  against  the  known  wishes  of  the 
King  that  it  became  a  subject  of  comment,  especially 
as  he  held  office  under  the  Government ;  being  Chief 
Justice  in  Eye,  South  of  Trent,  and  also  Vice- 
Treasurer  for  Ireland.  In  spite  of  this-  fact,  how- 
ever, it  is  evident  that  his  firm  integrity  and  his  per- 
sonal worth  won  for  him  the  esteem  not  only  of  the 
Ministry  but  of  the  King  as  well,  for  he  was  ap- 
pointed, in  1770,  Constable  of  the  Tower,  a  military 
office  of  considerable  lucrative  importance  (and  of 
value  to  him  because  Cornwallis  was  not  a^ich  man), 
but  one  to  which  at  that  time  neither  his  rank  in 
the  army  nor  his  services  in  the  field  gave  him  strong 
claim.  He  retained  this  position  during  the  whole 
of  the  time  whilst  he  was  employed  in  active  service 
in  America. 

136 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

When  the  War  of  American  Independence  broke 
out  and  it  was  decided  in  England  to  take  vigorous 
steps  to  reduce  the  Colonies  to  subjection,  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  ordered  to  take  command  of  one 
division  of  the  British  army ;  and  although  he  sympa- 
thized with  America,  and  notwithstanding  his  opin- 
ions as  to  the  injustice  of  that  war  upon  the  part  of 
the  mother  country,  he  felt  that  as  a  soldier  he 
could  not  refuse  to  obey  the  commands  of  the  King. 
Lady  Cornwallis,  whose  grief  at  the  separation  from 
her  husband  was  so  intense  that  it  appears  to  have 
been  the  cause  of  her  death  shortly  afterward,  so 
strongly  opposed  his  entrance  now  into  active  service 
that  she  appealed  to  Cornwallis'  uncle,  who  was 
Archbishop  of  Canterbury,  to  intercede  with  the 
King  in  order  that  he  might  be  released  from  duty 
in  America.  And  indeed  as  the  result  of  this  step 
permission  was  given  him  to  relinquish  his  appoint- 
ment and  remain  in  England ;  an  attitude,  however, 
which  must  have  been  intolerable  to  any  military 
man  with  a  sense  of  pride  in  his  profession, — and 
Cornwallis  peremptorily  refused  the  offer. 

He  was  commissioned  with  the  local  rank  of 
Lieutenant  General  in  America  and  sailed  from 
Portsmouth  on  the  10th  of  February,  ]  776,  on  board 

137 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  ship-of-the-line  "Bristol,"  one  of  the  fleet  com- 
manded by  Sir  Peter  Parker,  a  heavy  and  sluggish 
craft  which,  after  a  voyage  of  eighty-two  days, 
arrived  off  the  coast  of  North  Carolina. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  follow  closely  the  career 
of  Lord  Cornwallis  in  America  prior  to  the  Southern 
campaign,  which  we  shall  have  especially  to  con- 
sider, because,  from  the  time  of  his  landing  in  this 
country,  he  was  actively  engaged  in  the  field.  He 
took  part  in  most  of  the  military  operations  of  im- 
portance, and  to  narrate  his  movements  in  detail 
would  require  a  discussion  of  the  whole  Eevolu- 
tionary  War,  quite  out  of  place  upon  an  occasion  of 
this  kind.  He  was  present  at  the  attack  upon  New 
York,  in  August,  1776,  and  during  the  operations  in 
which  Brooklyn  and  New  York  were  captured,  the 
Continental  army  w^as  gradually  forced  back  and,  in 
spite  of  their  heroic  efforts  to  maintain  their  ground, 
the  American  patriots  were  driven  by  the  over- 
weighing  superiority  of  arms  and  military  equipment 
of  the  British  army  under  General  Howe,  first  to 
Harlem,  thence  to  White  Plains,  and  finally  across 
the  Hudson  and  through  the  country  of  New  Jersey 
to  the  Delaware  Eiver. 

One  passes  with  regret  thus  lightly  over  the  inci- 

138 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

dents  of  the  New  Jersey  campaign,  whicli,  sad  as 
they  frequently  were,  and  filled  with  sacrifice,  with 
suffering  and  disappointment,  were  illumined  by  ex- 
amples of  exalted  patriotism  and  American  courage, 
and  culminated  in  the  attack  made  by  General  Wash- 
ington upon  Trenton  and  Princeton;  the  former  of 
which,  in  particular,  was  one  of  the  boldest  and  most 
brilliant  military  exploits  recorded  in  the  history  of 
any  nation.  It  was  Lord  Cornwallis  to  whom  was 
entrusted  by  Sir  William  Howe  the  command  of  the 
division  that  operated  against  the  Continental  army 
in  this  famous  retreat  which  General  Washington 
conducted  through  New  Jersey  and  left  the  British 
in  the  end  with  nothing  but  a  foothold  within  the 
limits  of  the  state  which  they  had  approached  with 
all  conceivable  advantages  in  numbers,  in  equip- 
ment and  in  arms ;  and  there  was  at  that  time  every 
reason  to  expect  that  they  would  take  possession  of 
and  hold  it  after  the  manner  of  the  strong  against 
the  weak.  There  is  .no  doubt  that  the  British  were 
completely  outgeneralled  by  Washington  in  this 
whole  campaign;  for  their  manoeuvres  constantly 
failed  to  produce  any  definite  result  in  their  favor. 
But  there  is  nothing  to  explain  Cornwallis'  neglect 
to  take  advantage  of  several  opportunities  Avhicli  the 

139 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

weight  of  circumstances  had  thrown  into  his  way, 
except  possibly  the  initial  instructions  of  his  com- 
mander, Sir  William  Howe.  It  is  very  likely  that  he 
disapproved  of  the  sluggish  movements  of  General 
Howe,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  he  consid- 
ered himself  hampered  by  orders  which  he  received 
in  the  conduct  of  the  campaign ;  though  he  declined  to 
make  this  accusation  specifically  against  his  superior 
officer.  Somewhat  more  than  two  years  later,  in  the 
year  1779,  a  committee  of  the  whole  was  obtained  in 
the  House  of  Commons  to  investigate  the  conduct  by 
Lord  Howe  and  Sir  William  Howe  of  the  war  in 
America,  and  Lord  Cornwallis  was  called  as  a  mate- 
rial witness.  He  appeared  and  declared  his  willing- 
ness to  testify  as  to  questions  of  fact,  but  declined  giv- 
ing any  answers  upon  matters  of  opinion.  He  there- 
fore refused  to  say  whether  he  thought  the  move- 
ments of  the  troops  under  Sir  William  Howe  judi- 
cious or  not,  and  would  only  state  generally  that  he 
had  a  high  respect  for  Sir  William's  military  talents. 
At  all  events,  the  position  of  Cornwallis  in  America 
was  for  some  reason  an  uncomfortable  one;  for, 
although  he  had  been  here  less  than  a  year,  he  had 
already  obtained  leave,  in  December,  1776,  to  return 
to  England;  and  he  had  gone  from  his  command  in 

140 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

New  Jersey  preparatory  to  sailing  for  home,  opera- 
tions having  been  concluded,  as  he  supposed,  for  the 
winter.  But  the  attack  upon  Trenton  and  the  capt- 
ure of  the  British  garrison  there,  which  was  re- 
ceived with  consternation  by  General  Howe,  obliged 
him  to  postpone  his  departure  and  brought  him  hur- 
riedly back  to  his  troops,  to  re-open  the  campaign  in 
order  to  prevent  the  whole  British  force  from  being 
driven  headlong  out  of  New  Jersey  by  the  people 
whom  but  a  few  weeks  before  they  had  considered 
too  much  enfeebled  to  stir.  Indeed,  this  is  one  of 
the  striking  features  of  the  Eevolutionary  War, 
which  we  see  recurring  again  and  again  throughout 
the  struggle, — the  remarkable  recuperative  power 
of  the  American  people,  their  courage  in  facing 
obstacles  w^hich  it  seemed  impossible  to  overcome, 
their  refusal  to  acknowledge  defeat  in  the  reverses 
which  overtook  them  but  never  broke  their  spirit. 

Lord  Cornwallis  was  obliged,  then,  by  the  un- 
favorable turn  which  British  affairs  had  taken,  to 
abandon  his  project  of  returning  home  and  to  remain 
in  America  not  only  during  that  winter  but  through- 
out the  entire  year  of  1777.  He  continued  in  active 
service  and  took  part  especially  in  the  expedition 
which  General  Howe  decided  to  make  by  way  of  the 

141 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Chesapeake  against  Pennsylvania,  in  1777,  which 
gave  rise  to  the  battle  of  Brandywine,  in  September 
of  that  year,  and  the  occupation  of  Philadelphia  by 
the  British  immediately  afterward.  About  the  time 
when  the  Continental  army  went  into  winter  quarters 
at  Valley  Forge,  Lord  Cornwallis  finally  sailed  for 
England  where  he  arrived  on  the  18th  of  January, 
1778.  It  does  not  appear  that  he  intended  upon  this 
occasion  to  remain  away  from  the  seat  of  war, 
although  he  resumed  during  his  stay  in  England  his 
accustomed  duties  there  and  attended  regularly  at 
the  sittings  of  the  House  of  Lords,  where  it  happened 
that  at  that  period  several  exceedingly  important 
questions  were  debated,  upon  which  he,  better  per- 
haps than  any  one  then  present,  had  practical  knowl- 
edge,— for  example,  the  question  of  sending  more 
troops  to  America,  the  treaty  concluded  between  the 
United  States  and  France,  the  resolution  offered 
by  the  Duke  of  Richmond  to  withdraw  the  army  from 
America. 

We  find  him  returning  to  America  in  April,  1778, 
after  an  absence  of  four  months,  and  this  time  not 
only  with  the  rank  of  Lieutenant  General  and  second 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  who 
succeeded  General  Howe,  but  with  authority  also  to 

142 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

assume  command  in  America  in  the  event  of  the 
death  or  retirement  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton.  The 
British  Colonial  Secretary  transmitted  this  commis- 
sion to  him  with  the  following  letter:  ''It  having 
been  thought  fit,  to  guard  against  inconveniences  that 
would  arise  if  any  unforeseen  accident  should  happen 
to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  that  you  should  have  a  dormant 
commission  giving  you  the  rank  of  General  in  Amer- 
ica only,  I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you,  by 
his  Majesty's  command,  the  inclosed  conunission, 
which,  as  it  is  not  to  take  place  but  in  case  of  a  con- 
tingency, in  order  to  secure  you  in  such  case  the 
chief  command  over  the  foreign  Generals,  is  not  to 
be  made  public  if  the  contingency  does  not  happen. ' ' 
It  is  very  probable  that  this  dormant  commission 
played  an  important  part  in  the  events  which  fol- 
lowed, by  increasing  the  rivalry  which  already  ex- 
isted between  Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  who,  never 
having  been  upon  terms  of  cordiality  before  this  time, 
appear  henceforth  to  have  regarded  each  other  with 
a  bitter  dislike  which  became  plainly  evident  in  the 
controversy  which  took  place  between  them  in  later 
years,  though  it  was  concealed  under  the  formal  ex- 
terior of  their  official  communications  during  the 
war.    Although  these  two  men  were  of  the  same  age, 

143 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

having  been  born  in  the  same  year,  Clinton  outranked 
Cornwallis  by  seniority  of  commission,  and  it  seems 
as  if,  whether  for  fear  of  his  gaining  credit  and 
attracting  public  attention  to  himself  by  his  services 
in  the  field  or  on  account  of  the  favor  with  which 
Cornwallis  was  held  at  Court,  Clinton  was  jealous 
of  him.  Besides  this,  Cornwallis  was  a  British  Peer, 
which  Clinton  was  not,  and  naturally  enough  the  com- 
mander saw  a  dangerous  rival  in  such  a  lieutenant, 
especially  w^hen  the  latter  was  an  earnest  soldier, 
quite  willing  to  sacrifice  himself  in  the  performance 
of  his  duty.  This  dormant  commission  intensified 
his  resentment  and  caused  him  to  look  upon  Corn- 
wallis as  a  subordinate  who  was  waiting  to  occupy 
his  place.  His  official  treatment  of  him  was  ex- 
tremely harsh  upon  several  occasions,  and  the  rude- 
ness of  his  criticism  of  Cornwallis,  even  when  the 
latter  was  carrying  out  his  orders,  speaks  the  lan- 
guage of  a  man  actuated  by  personal  feeling.  This 
is  especially  true  in  relation  to  the  incidents  of  the 
Yorktown  campaign,  in  which,  as  we  shall  see,  Corn- 
wallis was  forced,  against  his  own  military  judgment 
and  by  the  express  direction  of  his  commanding 
officer,  into  the  disastrous  situation  which  led  to  his 
capture. 

144 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

In  the  meantime,  when  Lord  Cornwallis  arrived 
in  America  upon  his  return  from  England  he  found 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  upon  the  point  of  evacuating 
Philadelphia,  which  the  British  had  held  less  than  a 
year,  and  of  withdrawing  all  his  forces  to  New  York. 
As  this  was  substantially  the  abandonment  of  all  the 
territory  which  they  had  won  and  the  concession  of 
the  whole  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  without 
even  striking  a  blow,  the  proposition  was  met  by 
Cornwallis  with  the  strongest  expressions  of  dis- 
approval. Bitter  discussions  upon  it  followed,  which 
so  strained  their  relations  that  Lord  Cornwallis  im- 
mediately asked  to  be  recalled.  Although  he  had 
joined  the  army  but  a  few  weeks  before,  he  wrote 
to  the  Colonial  Secretary,  from  Philadelphia,  on  the 
17th  of  June:  "As  there  is  great  reason  to  appre- 
hend, from  the  large  detachments  which  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  is  going  to  make,  that  no  offensive  measures 
can  be  undertaken  against  the  enemy  in  this  part 
of  the  world,  I  must  beg  that  your  Lordship  will  be  so 
kind  as  to  lay  my  most  humble  request  before  his 
Majesty,  tliat  he  will  be  graciously  pleased  to  permit 
me  to  return  to  England."  To  which,  in  due  time, 
Lord  George  Germain  replied:  ''I  immediately  laid 
your  Lordship's  request  before  his  Majesty,  who 

10  145 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

onlered  me  to  acquaint  you  that  at  present  lie  can- 
not dispense  with  your  service  in  North  America, 
especially  as  your  Lordship  has  a  dormant  commis- 
sion to  command  all  the  forces  there  in  case  of  the 
death  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton." 

It  was  the  occupation  and  abandonment  of  Phila- 
delphia which  illustrated  the  difference  between  the 
American  soldiers  and  the  British,  as  well,  perhaps, 
as  any  point  of  contrast  in  the  history  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary War.  The  one  set  of  men,  idle,  sport- 
loving,  negligent  of  duty  and  of  the  cause  which 
brought  them  to  America,  passed  the  winter  in  the 
comfortable  houses  of  Philadelphia,  attending  enter- 
tainments, paying  compliments,  playing  at  theatri- 
cals, drinking,  gambling,  and  carousing,  as  if  the 
principal  object  in  life  w^ere  to  be  amused;  trifling 
away  their  time  with  a  silly  performance  called 
"the  Meschianza,"  in  honor  of  Sir  William  Howe, 
who  was  returning  to  England  with  nothing  to  show 
but  failure  during  the  time  in  which  he  had  held 
supreme  command.  Indeed,  it  is  hard  for  an  Amer- 
ican to  describe  this  scene  without  appearing  biased 
in  his  judgment  of  an  enemy;  but  let  us  hear  what 
an  Englishman  who  has  no  sympathy  with  us  has  to 
say  ^  of   his    countrymen   in    this    connection.     Mr* 

146 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Charles  Eoss,  who  is  strongly  a  British  partisan, 

writes  that : 

"Washington  withdrew  to  Valley  Forge, 
twenty-six  miles  from  Philadelphia,  where  his 
troops,  hardly  exceeding  4000  men,  remained  in 
huts,  or  under  canvas,  during  the  whole  winter, 
unmolested  by  the  English,  though  the  weak- 
ness of  the  position  and  the  wretched  state  of 
the  army  invited  an  attack,  which  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  must  have  been  successful. 
Nor  was  this  the  only,  or  perhaps  the  most 
serious  error  committed.  Philadelphia  became 
the  Capua  of  the  British  army.  Discipline  was 
totally  relaxed.  Gaming,  if  not  encouraged, 
was  permitted  to  a  most  ruinous  extent,  and 
the  gross  misconduct  of  very  many  officers  dis- 
gusted to  such  a  degree  the  inhabitants  of  a 
to^yn  in  which,  perhaps  more  than  in  any  other, 
profligacy  was  offensive,  that  feelings  very  ad- 
verse to  British  authority  were  engendered  or 
increased  among  a  people  originally  loyal. 
These  bad  impressions  were  never  removed  or 
overcome." 

We  know  well  the  history  of  the  other  set  of  men. 
They  were  passing  the  winter  in  huts;  they  kept 
their  muskets  loaded  and  protected  the  liberty  of 
their  country,  walking  barefooted,  many  of  them, 
upon  the  snow  at  Valley  Forge. 

It  was  not  merely  a  capricious  change  of  purpose 

147 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

that  induced  Lord  Cornwallis  to  ask  thus  suddenly  to 
be  relieved  of  his  command;  for  his  writings  show 
him  to  have  been  a  man  of  such  self-control  as  to  be 
far  beyond  the  reach  of  impulses  of  that  character. 
The  truth  probably  is,  that  he  was  disgusted  with  the 
state  of  degeneracy  in  which  he  found  the  British 
army,  which,  added  to  his  disapproval  of  the  plan 
then  about  to  be  put  into  execution,  that  was  tanta- 
mount to  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat,  led  him  to 
decide  that  under  the  circumstances  he  did  not  care 
to  serve  longer  in  America.  At  all  events,  he  con- 
tinued in  the  meantime  to  perform  his  duty,  and, 
as  the  evacuation  of  Philadelphia  was  then  inevitable, 
he  assisted  in  that  movement,  commanding  a  division 
of  the  retreating  army  upon  its  march  through  New 
Jersey.  It  was  during  this  retreat  that  General 
Washington  fell  upon  the  British  at  Monmouth ;  and, 
but  for  the  treacherous  conduct  of  Charles  Lee,  would 
probably  have  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  them. 
As  it  was,  the  Americans  remained  in  possession  of 
the  field,  and  the  British  moved  off  under  cover  of 
the  night  to  pursue  their  retrograde  movement  to 
New  York. 

The  summer  passed  without  having  produced  any 
important  result  in  the  affairs  of  the  army  under 

148 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Sir  Henry  Clinton,  who  did  not  take  the  field  except 
in  some  slight  skirmishes  chiefly  carried  on  by  parties 
sent  out  for  the  purpose  of  foraging  for  the  garrison ; 
and  at  the  end  of  the  year  we  find  Lord  Cornwallis 
again  returning  to  England,  this  time,  however,  with- 
out the  intention  of  coming  back  to  America.  Having 
received  news  of  the  serious  illness  of  Lady  Corn- 
wallis, he  resigned  his  command.  He  arrived  in 
England  in  the  month  of  December,  1778.  If  he  had 
carried  out  his  intention  at  this  time  Lord  Corn- 
wallis would  have  had  a  very  different  position  in 
American  history  from  the  one  with  which  we  are  all 
familiar ;  indeed,  the  whole  subsequent  history  of  the 
war  would  have  been  other  than  it  is,  for  there  would 
probably  have  been  no  campaign  at  Yorktown.  Up  to 
this  time  he  had  the  reputation  of  a  conscientious, 
painstaking  division  commander,  whose  performance 
of  duty  could  always  be  relied  upon,  but  whose  mili- 
tary skill  had  not  been  tested  by  independent  action 
beyond  the  control  of  the  central  authority  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  He  must  then  have  carried 
with  him  a  reputation  that  would  have  been,  as  far  as 
it  went,  thoroughly  substantial,  and  no  doubt  he 
would  have  been  looked  upon  with  consideration  in 
England.    He  would  have  escaped  the  mortification 

149 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

from  which  his  personal  feelings  never  recovered 
during  his  life,  and,  singularly  enough,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  in  that  event  he  would  have  attained  to  the 
position  of  high  honor  or  acquired  the  military  glory 
which  brightened  the  declining  years  of  his  life  in 
India.  For  it  is  altogether  likely  that  it  was  due  to 
his  services  in  Virginia  and  to  his  defence  of  York- 
town,  for  the  surrender  of  which  he  was  never  dis- 
graced in  England,  that  he  received  the  favor  of  the 
King  and  filled  out  a  career  which  otherwise  might 
not  have  been  opened  to  him. 

Lord  Cornwallis  arrived  only  in  time  to  pass  with 
his  wife  the  closing  hours  of  her  life,  for  Lady  Corn- 
wallis died  on  the  11th  of  February,  1779.  Ever  since 
her  husband  had  decided  to  accept  his  appointment 
in  the  American  war,  she  appears  to  have  withdrawn 
herself  from  the  society  of  her  friends  and  to  have 
lived  in  almost  complete  retirement  at  Culford,  the 
family  estate,  near  Bury  St.  Edmunds,  where  she 
repined  to  such  a  degree  that  her  health  gave  way; 
and  she  is  said  to  have  declared  repeatedly  to  a  confi- 
dential friend  who  attended  her  there,  that  she  felt 
herself  to  be  dying  of  a  broken  heart.  There  is  some- 
thing touching  in  her  grief,  thus  slowly  consuming 
the  life  of  this  lady  whose  very  being  seems  to  have 

150 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

depended  upon  the  presence  of  the  man  in  whom 
centred  the  brightness  and  happiness  of  her  home; 
and  it  indicates  the  tenderness  of  Lord  Cornwallis' 
domestic  relations,  of  which,  indeed,  his  letters  to  his 
children,  so  full  of  alfection,  give  ample  testimony. 
She  was  unwilling  to  be  consoled  for  the  burden  of 
suffering  that  had  been  hers  to  bear,  and  she  sought 
even  in  death  to  perpetuate  the  memory  of  her  sor- 
rows, for  by  a  strange  tenacity  of  purpose  in  this 
respect  Lady  Cornwallis  directed  that  a  thorn  tree 
should  be  planted  upon  her  grave,  as  nearly  as  possi- 
ble upon  the  spot  to  mark  her  heart.  Her  wish  was 
complied  with,  and  the  thorn  grew  until  the  year 
1855,  when,  by  reason  of  some  alterations  to  the 
Church,  it  was  necessarily  removed,  and  though  it 
was  piously  replanted,  it  then  died. 

After  the  loss  which  he  had  sustained  by  the  death 
of  his  wife,  Lord  Cornwallis  decided  to  re-enter  the 
army,  and  thereupon  he  was  ordered  again  at  his  own 
request  to  sail  for  America.  Lord  George  Germain, 
the  Colonial  Secretary,  announced  this  appointment 
by  a  letter  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  April,  1779,  as 
f  oUow^s : 

"After  I  had  closed  my  despatches,  Lord 
Cornwallis  went  to  Court,  and  made  an  offer 

151 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  liis  services  to  the  King,  which  you  will  not 
doubt  his  Majesty  was  graciously  pleased  to 
accept;  and  I  have  received  his  Majesty's  com- 
mands, in  consequence  thereof,  to  recall  and 
cancel  the  dormant  commission  of  General 
which  I  told  you  was  signed  by  the  King  for 
Major-General  Vaughan,  and  Lord  Cornwallis 
is  to  return  to  his  former  situation  of  second 
in  command  to  you. 

"As  you  are  well  acquainted  with  his  Lord- 
ship's military  merit,"  he  continued,  ''his  re- 
turn to  America  cannot  but  be  highly  pleasing 
to  you,  and  your  having  so  able  an  officer  to 
second  you  in  your  operations,  and  share  with 
you  the  cares  and  fatigues  of  so  extensive  a 
command,  will,  I  hope,  be  an  additional  motive 
for  your  remaining  in  it  if  any  motive  could  be 
wanting  to  induce  you  to  continue  with  satis- 
faction in  a  command  your  exercise  of  which 
has  already  redounded  so  much  to  your 
honour." 

This  announcement  which  promised  to  revive  an 
intercourse  that  had  always  been  unpleasant  and  was 
likely  now,  from  Cornwallis'  strengthened  influence 
at  Court,  to  become  intolerable,  could  not  have  been 
pleasant  news  from  home  for  Sir  Henry  Clinton.  It 
is  even  a  question  worthy  of  very  serious  considera- 
tion whether  the  action  of  the  Ministry  was  not  an 
unwise  one,  in  keeping  thus  in  contact  with  each  other 

152 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

two  officers  whose  known  differences  of  opinion 
threatened  at  any  moment  to  injure  the  public  cause. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Lord  George  Germain 
understood  the  situation,  or,  indeed,  that  he  sympa- 
thized personally  with  Cornwallis.  At  all  events, 
almost  immediately  upon  the  return  of  the  latter, 
Clinton  in  his  turn  asked  to  be  recalled.  Writing 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  in  August,  and  after  hav- 
ing begun  his  "letter  v/ith  a  reference  of  formal  polite- 
ness to  Cornwallis '  presence,  in  which  he  said : 

''I  must  beg  leave  to  express  how  happy  I 
am  made  by  the  return  of  Lord  Cornwallis  to 
this  country,"  he  exclaimed : ' ' To  say  the  truth, 
my  Lord,  my  spirits  are  w^orn  out  by  struggling 
against  the  consequence  of  many  adverse  inci- 
dents, which,  without  appearing  publicly  to 
account  for  my  situation,  have  effectually  op- 
pressed me;  to  enumerate  them  would  be  a 
painful  and  unnecessary,  perhaps  an  improper 
task.  At  the  same  time  let  me  add,  my  Lord, 
that  my  zeal  is  unimpaired;  and  were  I  con- 
scious that  my  particular  efforts  Avere  necessary 
for  his  Majesty's  service,  no  circumstance  of 
private  feeling  would  raise  within  me  a  single 
wish  of  retiring  from  the  Command.  That, 
however,  is  not  the  case;  for  I  do  seriously 
give  it  as  my  opinion  that,  if  the  endeavors  of 
any  man  are  likely,  under  our  present  pros- 

153 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

pects,  to  be  attended  with  success,  Lord  Corn- 
wallis,  for  many  reasons,  stands  among  the 
first." 
It  is  true  that  General  Clinton's  position  was  un- 
satisfactory to  him,  largely  because  he  believed  that 
he  should  have  been  supported  from  England  by  a 
greater  force,  which  the  Ministry  refused  to  send 
him ;  but  we  are  justified  in  concluding  that  he  was 
irritated  by  the  presence  of  Cornwallis,  whom  he 
attacked  in  print,  after  the  war,  with  great  recrimina- 
tion and  bitterness. 

Neither  Clinton  nor  Cornwallis  was  relieved  at 
this  time  from  his  duty,  however;  and  during  the 
next  two  years,  in  which  they  were  engaged  in  very 
serious  military  operations,  each  had  a  part  to  per- 
form which  taxed  his  energies  to  the  utmost.  The 
period  had  now  been  reached  when  the  British  Gov- 
ernment completely  changed  its  plan  of  military  oper- 
ations in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  |The  theory  of  the 
Ministry  had  been,  at  the  outset,  that  the  rebellion 
could  be  suppressed  without  great  difficulty  by  isolat- 
ing from  each  other  the  more  important  divisions  of 
the  territory  which  were  mutually  dependent;  and 
that  by  weakening  the  Colonies  in  this  manner  they 
could  be  separately  dealt  with  and  brought  to  sub- 

154 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

jection.  Upon  this  theory,  the  chief  purpose  of  the 
movements  hitherto  had  been  to  cut  off  New  England 
from  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  New  Jersey,  and 
to  prevent  communication  between  them  by  taking 
and  holding  possession  of  the  Hudson  River,  across 
which  the  stream  of  traffic  flowed  from  each  of  these 
two  great  districts  to  the  other.b'he  attack  upon 
New  York  and  Brooklyn,  the  campaign  in  New  Jer- 
sey, the  expedition  of  Burgoyne  which  was  intended 
to  gain  the  Hudson  from  Canada  and  the  North,  the 
occupation  of  Philadelphia,  were  all  undertaken  with 
a  view  to  this  intention,  and  all  had  failed.  At  the 
end  of  the  year  1778,  therefore,  after  three  years  or 
warj  the  British  may  be  said  to  have  gained  substan- 
tially nothing.  The  country  was  not  conquered  andy 
they  had  withdrawn  their  forces  to  their  base  of 
operations  at  New  York.  Now,  however,  a  new  plan 
was  agreed  upon  as  likely  to  be  more  effective ;  this) 
was,  to  leave  sufficient  force  at  New  York  to  occupy  the 
attention  of  the  Continental  army  whilst  a  strong 
detaclunent  should  be  sent  to  open  hostilities  in  the 
South.  It  was  hoped  by  this  means  to  recover  the 
States  of  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and 
Georgia;  and  that,  once  having  firmly  established  th^ 
King's  authority  in  those  productive  districts,  where 

155 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

it  would  be  easy  to  support  an  army,  the  British^ 
commander  might  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Xorth 
from  thence  with  great  advantages ;  and  that,  in  any 
event,  Great  Britain  could  not  then  be  forced  to  give 
up  all  her  colonies  if  a  peace  were  ultimately  made 
which  should  involve  the  cession  of  territory.  J 

The  theory  was  a  good  one  and  would  no  doubt 
have  realized  to  the  British  many  of  the  promised 
advantages  if  the  people  of  the  Southern  States  had 
been  found  as  willing  to  accept  British  rule  as  it  was 
expected  they  would.  But  herein  lay  a  serious  mis- 
calculation, for  they  were  counted  upon  to  welcome 
the  approach  of  the  English,  to  yield  possession  of 
their  homes,  to  swear  allegiance  to  the  King,  and, 
not  only  that,  but  to  take  up  arms  and  to  fight  against 
their  brothers  in  America.  The  result  proved 
that  there  were  no  patriots  more  tenacious  of  their 
national  liberty  than  these  men  who  fought  the  in- 
vaders for  nearly  three  years  through  Xorth  Caro- 
lina, South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Virginia ;  and  al- 
though the  British  were  victorious  upon  some  occa- 
sions, yet  their  victories  cost  them  so  dearly  that 
they  resulted  in  no  substantial  gain;  once  at  least,  at 
the  battle  of  Guilford  Court  House,  victory  crippled 
them  so  that  it  differed  very  little  from  defeat.    Corn- 

156 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

wallis  himself  declared  that  no  dispassionate  person 
could  believe  "that  I  did  not  give  every  encourage- 
ment to  people  of  all  descriptions  to  join  and  assist 
us,  when  my  own  reputation,  the  safety  of  the  army, 
and  the  interests  of  my  country  were  so  deeply  con- 
cerned in  that  junction  and  assistance.  All  induce- 
ments in  my  power  were  made  use  of  without  mate- 
rial effect;  and  every  man  in  the  army  must  have 
been  convinced  that  the  accounts  of  our  emissaries 
had  greatly  exaggerated  the  number  of  those  who 
professed  friendship  for  us,  as  they  must  have  ob- 
served that  a  very  inconsiderable  part  of  them  could 
be  prevailed  upon  to  remain  with  us,  or  to  exert 
themselves  in  any  form  whatever. ' ' 

The  first  move  in  the  new  plan  of  conquest  was 
made  in  the  autumn  of  1778,  when  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
sent  out  from  New  York  an  expedition  made  up  of 
some  three  thousand  men  under  Colonel  Camj^bell, 
escorted  by  a  squadron  commanded  by  Commodore 
Hyde  Parker,  against  the  State  of  Georgia.  It  landed 
late  in  December,  and,  at  the  opening  of  the  year 
1779,  Colonel  Campbell  had  taken  Savannah,  the 
British  occupied  the  territory  of  Georgia  and  had 
opened  the  campaign  with  what  seemed  to  their 
Commander-in-Chief  like  the  brightest  promise  of 

157 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

\success.  The  purpose  of  the  campaign,  as  it  had 
been  declared  by  the  Ministry  in  England,  was  to 
establish  a  line  of  communication  across  South  Caro- 
lina and  North  Carolina;  five  thousand  additional 
troops  were  subsequently  to  be  detached  to  capture 
Charleston,  and  the  Colonial  Secretary  believed  that 
if  effective  movements  were  made  in  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  ' '  it  would  not  be  too  much  to  expect  that 
all  America  south  of  the  Susquehanna  River  would 
return  to  its  allegiance." 

So  greatly  was  Sir  Henry  Clinton  encouraged  by 
the  results  obtained  by  his  forces  thus  far  employed 
in  the  undertaking,  that  he  determined,  toward  the 
end  of  the  year,  to  go  out  himself  and  take  an  active 
part  in  the  operations  which  now,  more  than  at  any 
former  period  of  the  war,  appeared  to  offer  glory  to 
the  British  arms.  He  left  New  York  in  the  month  of 
December,  1779,  with  a  detachment  which,  when 
joined  with  the  forces  already  in  the  field  at  the 
South,  gave  him  a  formidable  army  of  ten  thousand 
men;  this  was  still  considerably  increased  by  other 
detachments  ordered  by  him  to  come  out  from  New 
York  for  that  purpose  under  Lord  Rawdon  and  Lord 
Cornwallis.  He  advanced  upon  Charleston,  which  he 
captured  and  obliged  brave  old  General  Benjamin 

158 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Lincoln  to  surrender  himself  and  tlie  garrison  as  pris- 
oners of  war ;  and,  after  having  called  upon  the  people 
by  proclamation  to  come  forward  and  sustain  the 
authority  of  King  George,  feeling  exceedingly  confi- 
dent that  at  least  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  were 
now  permanently  re-conquered,  and  after  having 
spent  six  months  in  forwarding  this  work  for  which 
he  expected  to  receive  great  credit  in  England,  he  em- 
barked the  larger  part  of  his  forces  and  returned  to 
his  headquarters  at  New  York,  in  June,  1780. 

When  Sir  Henry  Clinton  withdrew  to  the  North  \ 
he  left  behind  him  a  detachment  consisting  of  about 
four  thousand  men  to  hold  the  conquered  territory  as 
well  as  to  extend  as  much  as  possible  the  sphere  of 
British  influence;  and  the  command  of  this  detach- 
ment he  assigned  to  Lord  Cornwallis.    Thus,  about  a] 
year  and  four  months  before  his  capture,  we  find 
Lord  Cornwallis  exercising  an  independent  command 
in  South  Carolina,  and  this  was  the  starting  point  of 
the   road  which   led   him   to   Yorkto^vn.     General 
Clinton's  orders  to  him  were  that  he  should  take 
command  of  the  troops  which,  as  Clinton  said,  "are' 
now  here  or  may  arrive  in  my  absence.    Your  Lord- 
ship will  make  such  changes  in  the  position  of  them 
as  you  may  judge  most  conducive  to  his  Majesty's 

150 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

service,  for  the  defence  of  this  most  important  post 
and  its  dependencies.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  by  no 
means  my  intention  to  prevent  your  acting  offen- 
sively, in  case  an  opportunity  should  offer,  consistent 
with  the  security  of  this  place  (Charleston),  which 
is  always  to  be  regarded  as  a  primary  object." 
\  The  protection  of  Charleston,  then,  was  the  im- 
portant object  of  the  duty  assigned  by  Clinton  to 
Lord  Cornwallis,  and  this  is  a  subject  which  acquired 
very  serious  weight  in  connection  with  his  subse- 
quent movement  into  Virginia ;  and  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered by  any  one  who  studies  the  exceedingly  acrimo- 
nious controversy  which  took  place  between  them 
afterwards  when  each  sought  to  fasten  upon  the  other 
the  responsibility  for  the  defeat  inflicted  upon  the 
British  arms  at  Yorktown.  General  Clinton  did  not 
prohibit  Cornwallis  from  undertaking  new  enter- 
prises in  the  British  interest,  it  is  true ;  but  we  have 
just  seen  that  he  made  the  security  of  Charleston 
always  a  primary  object.  This  would  have  been  a 
complete  justification  upon  the  part  of  Cornwallis 
for  not  having  gone  to  Virginia,  if  he  never  had 
gone  there,  but  it  makes  the  question  an  extremely 
difficult  one  to  decide,  how  far  he  is  to  be  blamed 
for  having  gone  there  and  having  been  defeated. 

160 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

His  movements,  however,  upon  having  assumed 
command  were  most  carefully  made,  looking  first  to 
the  strengthening  of  his  position  in  South  Carolina ; 
and  as  a  natural  consequence  of  this,  his  judgment  led 
him  to  decide  upon  an  operation  against  North  Caro- 
lina in  order  the  better  to  consolidate  the  British 
interests  at  the  South,  and  to  place  a  barrier  between 
that  district  and  the  influences  from  the  North  which 
he  now  began  to  fear.  For,  said  he,  ''It  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  invasion  of  North  Carolina  may 
be  a  prudent  measure;  but  I  am  convinced  it  is  a 
necessary  one,  and  that  if  we  do  not  attack  that  prov- 
ince, w^e  must  give  up  South  Carolina  and  Georgia 
and  retire  within  the  walls  of  Charleston. ' '  He  was 
still  more  thoroughly  convinced  of  this  by  the  intelli- 
gence as  to  the  movements  of  the  Continental  army 
which  he  received  from  the  North.  General  Wash- 
ington, who  had  been  carefully  studying  the  situa- 
tion, had  persuaded  Congress  to  turn  its  attention 
toward  the  defence  of  the  South ;  and,  in  consequence 
of  this,  an  army  under  General  Gates  was  then 
marching  through  North  Carolina  to  oppose  the 
British.  Lord  Cornwallis  set  out  from  Charleston, 
therefore,  and,  moving  in  a  northwesterly  direction, 
met  Gates  at  Camden,  where  he  fought  the  memorable 

11  161 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

battle  with  liim  on  the  16th  of  August.  In  this  action 
Gates  was  disastrously  beaten,  the  Baron  de  Kalb 
was  killed,  and  the  American  army  was  thrown  into 
confusion  and  dispersed.  Cornwallis  was  very 
greatly  encouraged  to  believe  that  this  victory  would 
prepare  the  way  for  him  into  North  Carolina  and 
that  the  Tories  of  that  country  would  now  declare 
themselves  openly  in  his  favor ;  and  he  thought  that 
it  would  be  useful  for  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  send  a  force  into  the  Chesapeake  in  order  to 
create  a  diversion  and  prevent  the  troops  of  Vir- 
ginia from  being  sent  against  him.  He  wrote  shortly 
after  the  battle  of  Camden  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton : 

"I  have  not  yet  heard  any  accounts  from 
North  Carolina ;  but  I  hope  that  our  friends  will 
immediately  take  arms  as  I  have  directed  them 
to  do.  The  diversion  in  the  Chesapeake  will 
be  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  troops  here 
have  gained  reputation  but  they  have  lost  num- 
bers, and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  enemy 
will  use  every  effort  to  repel  an  attack,  which,  if 
successful,  must  end  in  their  losing  all  the 
Southern  Colonies." 
It  looked,  indeed,  at  that  moment  as  if  the  British 
had  secured  a  very  dangerous  hold  upon  the  Southern 

162 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Colonies  already;  though  Cornwallis  was  evidently 
in  doubt  as  to  how  he  would  better  proceed  from 
where  he  then  was,  for  he  added  in  his  letter  to  Sir 
Henry  Clinton: 

*'It  is  difficult  to  form  a  plan  of  operations, 
which  must  depend  so  much  on  circumstances, 
but  it  appears  to  me  that  I  should  endeavor  to 
get  as  soon  as  possible  to  Hillsborough;  and 
there  assemble  and  try  to  arrange  the  friends 
who  are  inclined  to  arm  in  our  favor,  and  en- 
deavor to  form  a  very  large  magazine  for  the 
winter.  .  .  .  But  all  this  will  depend  on  the 
operations  which  your  Excellency  may  think 
proper  to  pursue  in  the  Chesapeake,  which 
appears  to  me,  next  to  the  security  of  New 
York,  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  objects 
of  the  war.*' 

As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  British  victory  at 
Camden,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  decided  to  turn  his  atten- 
tion toward  Chesapeake  Bay  as  Cornwallis  had 
urged  him  to  do ;  he  sent  a  detachment  under  General 
Leslie,  in  October,  1780,  with  instructions  to  estab- 
lish a  post  near  Portsmouth,  in  Virginia,  and  to  oper- 
ate on  the  Jam^es  River.  Leslie  was  placed  under 
the  orders  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  but  was  not  to  pass  the 
Roanoke  without  specific  instructions  from  that  offi- 
cer. This  was  the  situation,  then,  in  October,  1780, 
just  about  a  year  before  Yorktown :  Cornwallis  was 

163 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

triumpliantly  heading  toward  the  North ;  Gates  had 
been  defeated ;  Leslie  was  guarding  the  Chesapeake 
and  threatening  Virginia.    The  outlook  was  in  some 
respects  more  promising  for  the  British  than  at  any 
time  previously  during  the  war.    It  never  was  so 
favorable  again.    Cornwallis  had  advanced  as  far  as 
Charlotte,  in  North  Carolina,  when  he  received  his 
first  severe  check  in  the  total  destruction  of  one  part 
of  his  command  under  Major  Ferguson,  who  was 
gallantly  attacked  and  killed  at  King's  Mountain  by 
a  force  of  the  American  militia.    This  blow  weakened 
Cornwallis  so  much  that  he  decided  not  to  advance 
further  upon  his  expedition,  but  to  go  into  winter 
quarters  and  try  to  prepare  himself  for  active  opera- 
tions by  obtaining  reinforcements  from  the  North. 
He  retreated,  therefore,  to  South  Carolina,  estab- 
lished himself  at  Winnsborough,  and  ordered  General 
Leslie  to  leave  the  Chesapeake  and  come  by  sea  to  join 
him.    In  the  meantime.  Congress,  growing  alarmed 
at  the  progress  of  events,  decided  to  replace  Gates 
and  to  strengthen  as  much  as  possible  the  army  oper- 
ating in  the  Carolinas;  therefore,  when  Cornwallis 
was  ready  to  take  the  field  again  he  found  himself 
opposed  to  General  Nathaniel  Greene,  who  in  the 

164 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

operations  which  followed  proved  easily  a  match  for 
him. 

We  are  not  concerned  here  to  follow  in  detail  the 
campaign  of  General  Greene,  interesting  as  it  is,  or 
to  recount  the  gallant  resistance  which  he  offered 
to  the  enemies  of  his  country  throughout  the  years 
1780  and  1781,  because  our  main  purpose  is  to  con- 
sider the  operations  immediately  comiected  with 
Yorktown,  to  which  Greene's  campaign  was  but  the 
preliminary  step.  After  Cornwallis  had  been  rein- 
forced by  General  Leslie,  therefore,  and  when  his 
command  had  been  increased  to  something  more  than 
three  thousand  men,  he  set  out  again  toward  the 
North  Carolina  country  in  hope  of  counteracting  the 
influence  which  Greene 's  courage  was  rapidly  spread- 
ing amongst  the  people  of  the  State  in  opposition  to 
British  rule.  Cornwallis  was  really  afraid  to  lie  still 
longer,  lest  the  results  of  his  former  work  should 
thus  be  completely  lost.  He  says  that  the  march 
into  North  Carolina  **w^as  thought  expedient  not 
only  by  me,  but  by  the  Commander-in-Chief.  I  was 
principally  induced  to  decide  in  favor  of  its  expe- 
diency from  a  clear  conviction  that  the  men  and 
treasures  of  Britain  would  be  lavished  in  vain  upon 
the  American  war,  without  the  most  active  exertions 

165 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  the  troops  allotted  for  that  service ;  and  that,  while 
the  enemy  could  draw  their  supplies  from  North 
Carolina  and  Virginia,  the  defence  of  the  frontier  of 
South  Carolina,  even  against  an  inferior  army,  would 
be,  from  its  extent,  the  nature  of  the  climate,  and  the 
disposition  of  its  inhabitants,  utterly  impracticable. ' ' 
He  had  left  a  force  sufficient  to  protect  Charleston 
from  sudden  attack  under  Lord  Eawdon,  to  whom 
he  confided  the  task  of  holding  possession  of  South 
Carolina,  whilst  he  himself  was  operating  toward  the 
North.  Cornwallis  hoped  now  to  deal  General  Greene 
such  a  blow  as  he  had  dealt  to  Gates  at  Camden,  and 
thus  not  only  to  win  victory  by  the  force  of  arms,  but 
also  to  encourage,  by  American  defeat,  the  Tories 
and  British  sympathizers  to  rise  up  and  help  him 
hold  the  country,  which  he  always  regarded  as  an 
object  of  prime  importance.  He  thought  that  if  he 
could  get  behind  Greene,  so  as  to  cut  him  off  from 
Virginia,  he  could  surround  him  by  his  own  troops 
to  the  northward  and  by  those  of  Eawdon  to  the 
south,  so  that  he  might  easily  be  dealt  with.  ''I 
hoped,*'  he  said,  "by  rapid  march  to  get  between 
General  Greene  and  Virginia,  and  by  that  means 
force  him  to  fight  without  receiving  any  reinforce- 
ment from  that  province ;  or,  failing  of  that,  to  oblige 

IGG 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

him  to  quit  North  Carolina  with  precipitation,  and 
thereby  encourage  our  friends  to  make  good  their 
promises  of  a  general  rising  to  assist  me  in  re-estab- 
lishing his  Majesty's  Government."  Greene  was, 
however,  altogether  too  good  a  soldier  to  be  thus 
easily  caught  in  a  trap.  His  force  was  greatly  in- 
ferior to  that  of  his  opponent,  so  that  he  was  unable 
to  face  his  enemy  in  the  open  field ;  but,  whilst  care- 
fully retreating,  he  drew  Cornwallis  after  him  and 
dealt  him  a  blow  on  the  17th  of  January,  when 
General  Morgan  won  his  victory  at  Cowpens  over 
the  well-known  cavalry  leader,  Colonel  Tarleton, 
which  staggered  Cornwallis  in  the  same  manner  that 
the  action  at  King's  Mountain  had  done  in  the  pre- 
vious campaign.  ''The  unfortunate  affair  of  the 
17th  of  January,"  he  said  in  his  official  report,  "was 
a  very  unexpected  and  severe  blow ;  for,  besides  repu- 
tation, our  loss  did  not  fall  short  of  six  hundred  men. 
However,  being  thoroughly  sensible  that  defensive 
measures  would  be  certain  ruin  to  the  affairs  of 
Britain  in  the  Southern  Colonies,  this  event  did  not 
deter  me  from  prosecuting  the  original  plan."  Re- 
covering himself,  therefore,  he  continued  in  pursuit 
of  Greene  who  was  now  retiring,  and  whom  for  two 
months  he  drove  before  him,  across  the  river  Dan  and 

167 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

beyond  the  boundary  line  of  Virginia;  completing 
thus  by  the  early  part  of  March  the  task  he  had  set 
for  himself  of  extending  British  authority  through- 
out the  State  of  North  Carolina. 

But  his  triumph  at  this  point  was  of  exceedingly 
short  duration ;  for  the  valiant  Greene,  having  some- 
what strengthened  his  numbers,  recrossed  the  Dan 
and  offered  battle,  which  Cornwallis  eagerly 
accepted,  on  the  15th  of  March,  at  Guilford  Court 
House.  This  battle  of  Guilford  is  a  very  curious  and 
interesting  one  in  its  results;  for,  oddly  enough,  it 
left  the  victor  powerless  to  avail  himself  of  the  ad- 
vantage he  had  gained,  and  crippled  him  to  such  an 
extent  that  his  triumi^h  did  not  differ  greatly  in  its 
consequences  from  those  of  actual  defeat.  Lord 
Cornwallis  had  unquestionably  gained  a  victory  at 
Guilford,  but  at  such  a  cost  in  the  loss  of  ofiicers 
and  men  and  such  a  disorganization  of  his  whole 
force  that  he  left  the  field  of  operations  open  to 
General  Greene;  and,  to  the  surprise  of  the  Conti- 
nental army,  he  hurriedly  withdrew  with  his  troops 
to  the  sea  coast  and  established  a  post  at  Wilmington, 
early  in  April. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  course  of  reasoning 
by  which  Cornwallis  arrived  at  the  decision  to  take 

168 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

this  extraordinary  step ;  for  the  road  to  South  Caro- 
lina lay  open  behind  him  and  he  might  readily  have 
retired  upon  Lord  Eawdon  who,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, was  acting  under  his  orders  in  that  State.  It 
is  true,  that  to  have  done  so  would  have  been  to 
acknowledge  that  his  expedition  had  been  checked; 
but  his  retirement  to  Wilmington  was  certainly  an 
open  admission  that  he  had  failed  in  North  Carolina, 
the  moral  effect  of  which  was  equally  great.  The 
causes,  however,  which  actuated  him  appear  to  be 
these :  that  he  was  intensely  anxious  to  keep  behind 
Greene  and  to  cut  him  off  from  his  base  in  Virginia ; 
that  he  was  alarmed  at  finding  himself  thus  weakened 
in  the  enemy's  country;  and  that  he  hoped  to  receive 
reinforcements  by  sea  at  Wilmington.  He  tells  us 
in  his  official  statement  that  the  disappointment  at 
not  receiving  the  aid  which  he  looked  for  from  the 
Tories,  ''and  the  wants  and  distresses  of  the  army 
compelled  me  to  move  to  Cross  Creek;  but  meeting 
there  with  no  material  part  of  the  promised  assist- 
ance and  supplies,  I  was  obliged  to  continue  my 
march  to  Wilmington,  where  hospitals  and  stores 
were  ready  for  us.  .  .  .  My  intention  then  was, 
as  soon  as  I  should  have  equipped  my  own  corps,  and 
received  a  part  of  the  expected  reinforcement  from 

169 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Ireland,  to  return  to  the  upper  country,  in  hopes  of 
giving  some  protection  to  South  Carolina,  and  of 
preserving  the  health  of  the  troops  until  new  meas- 
ures could  be  concerted  with  the  Commander-in- 
Chief." 

This  was  the  crisis  of  Lord  Cornwallis'  military- 
career  in  America ;  and  the  many  questions  relating 
to  it,  which  have  been  discussed  over  and  over  by 
the  critics  as  well  as  by  the  principal  actors  in  the 
undertaking,  are  of  great  importance  in  American 
history.  For  it  was  at  this  point  that  he  adopted 
the  resolution  which  led  him,  before  the  year  was  out, 
to  desperation,  to  total  defeat,  and  to  capture  in  his 
entrenchments  at  Yorktown.  Persisting  in  his  fixed 
determination  to  cut  off  General  Greene,  who,  now 
left  unmolested,  was  progressing  tow^ard  South  Caro- 
lina, Cornwallis  decided  to  push  directly  northward 
into  Virginia,  in  order  to  unite  there  with  a  force 
under  General  Phillips  and  Benedict  Arnold,  whom 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  had  sent  out  to  replace  General 
Leslie  when  the  latter  had  left  the  Chesapeake  to  go 
to  South  Carolina  as  we  have  seen.  ''The  march  of 
General  Greene  into  South  Carolina,"  says  Corn- 
wallis, ''and  Lord  Rawdon's  danger,  made  my  situa- 
tion very  critical.    Having  heard  of  the  arrival  of 

170 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

a  packet  from  Europe  without  any  certain  accounts 
of  the  sailing  of  the  reinforcement,  I  thought  it  too 
hazardous  to  remain  inactive,  and  as  it  was  impossi- 
ble to  receive  in  time  any  orders  from  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  to  direct  me,  it  became  my  duty  to  act  from 
my  own  judgment  and  experience :  I,  therefore,  upon 
mature  deliberation,  decided  to  march  into  Virginia, 
as  the  safest  and  most  effectual  means  of  employing 
the  small  corps  under  my  command  in  contributing 
towards  the  general  success  of  the  war." 

Setting  out  from  Wilmington,  therefore,  Corn- 
wallis,  who  now  began  to  fear  that,  instead  of  his 
cutting  off  General  Greene,  Greene  might  beat 
Rawdon  and  return  to  cut  him  off,  marched  his  de- 
tachment into  Virginia,  where  he  united  with  the 
command  of  General  Phillips  on  the  20th  of  May, 
at  Petersburg.  Evidently  this  was  the  result  of  his 
own  deliberate  judgment,  in  carrying  out  a  plan  of 
operations  upon  which  depended  the  security  of  the 
district  confided  to  his  care ;  but  it  carried  him  defi- 
nitely beyond  the  limits  of  instructions  given  to  him 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  British  forces,  and 
the  responsibility  for  what  followed  must  fall,  largely 
at  all  events,  upon  him.  Sir  Henry  Clinton  said  to 
him  upon  hearing  of  his  move  to  Virginia : 

171 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 


<r 


'I  cannot  conceal  from  your  Lordship  the 
apprehension  I  felt  on  reading  your  letter  to 
me  of  the  24th  ult.,  wherein  you  inform  me  of 
the  critical  situation  which  you  supposed  the 
Carolinas  to  be  in,  and  that  you  should  probably 
attempt  to  affect  a  junction  with  Major-General 
Phillips.  .  .  .  Had  it  been  possible  for 
your  Lordship  in  your  letter  to  me  of  the  10th 
ult.,  to  have  intimated  the  probability  of  your 
intention  to  form  a  junction  with  General 
Phillips,  I  should  certainly  have  endeavored  to 
have  stopped  you ;  as  I  did  then,  as  well  as  now, 
consider  such  a  move  as  likely  to  be  dangerous 
to  our  interests  in  the  Southern  Colonies.  And 
this,  my  Lord,  was  not  my  only  fear ;  for  I  will 
be  free  to  own  that  I  was  apprehensive  for  the 
corps  under  your  Lordship's  immediate  orders, 
as  well  as  for  that  under  Lord  Eawdon;  and  I 
should  not  have  thought  even  the  one  under 
Major-General  Phillips  in  safety  at  Petersburg, 
at  least  for  so  long  a  time,  had  I  not  fortunately 
on  hearing  of  your  being  at  Wilmington  sent 
another  detachment  from  this  army  to  reinforce 
him." 

At  this  point  we  approach  the  great  dramatic 
event  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  which  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  an  American  to  study  without  something  of 
the  enthusiasm  which  it  aroused  in  the  breasts  of 
our  forefathers  in  that  moment  of  triumph  when  they 
realized  that  their  patience  and  courage  had  estab- 

172 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

lislied  liberty  throughout  this  Continent  and  Ameri- 
can nationality  throughout  the  world.  Three  months 
passed  by  during  which  Cornwallis  continued  his 
efforts  to  take  possession  of  the  State  of  Virginia, 
in  which  he  was  gallantly  opposed  and  held  in  check 
by  the  Continental  detachment  sent  there  for  that 
purpose,  under  the  Marquis  de  LaFayette.  We  find 
that  by  the  end  of  August  he  had  evidently  abandoned 
his  purpose  of  conquering  the  State  and  was  occupied 
in  carrying  out  the  orders  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  who 
directed  him  to  select  a  point  in  Chesapeake  Bay 
where  a  permanent  British  post  might  be  established 
to  protect  ships  of  war  and  become  in  that  connection 
a  naval  station  for  future  movements.  Lord  Corn- 
wallis had  accomplished  nothing  for  Great  Britain 
by  his  expedition  to  Virginia ;  he  had  but  aroused  the 
patriotic  spirit  of  the  people  against  the  British ;  he 
was  thinking  of  a  return  to  South  Carolina,  and,  it 
is  altogether  likely  that  he  would  ultimately  have 
moved  back  again  in  that  direction  if  the  hurrying 
events  had  not  closed  him  in  so  that  it  became  im- 
possible for  him  to  make  that  move,  or  any  other, 
in  his  own  defence. 

In  the  meantime,  the  events  which  were  to  come 
were  preparing  themselves  at  the  North  with  won- 

173 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

derful  celerity.  The  opening  of  the  campaign  of 
1781  had  found  General  Washington  and  the  Con- 
tinental army  watching  the  movements  of  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  at  New  York  and  guarding  the  Hudson  River, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  it  was  the  constant  effort 
of  the  British  to  recover,  and  which  was  throughout 
the  war  the  greatest  cause  of  solicitude  to  the  Ameri- 
can Commander-in-Chief.  The  strength  of  America 
was  fast  waning  in  the  struggle  which  exhausted  its 
available  resources ;  the  Continental  army  consisted 
of  but  a  few  thousand  men;  it  was  difficult,  almost 
impossible,  to  increase  its  numbers.  General  Wash- 
ington was  anxious  to  assist  General  Greene  for 
whose  position  at  the  South,  between  Cornwallis  and 
Rawdon,  he  felt  serious  alarm.  LaFayette  was  hold- 
ing his  ground  with  skill  in  Virginia ;  but  the  outcome 
was  extremely  doubtful.  In  this  critical  situation, 
the  only  means  left  to  General  Washington  by  which 
to  relieve  the  pressure  upon  Greene, — for  he  had 
neither  effective  force  nor  munitions  of  war  to  send 
to  him, — was  to  create  a  diversion  by  making  an 
attack  upon  New  York,  and  thus  oblige  Clinton  to 
recall  a  part  or  all  of  his  forces  for  the  defence  of  his 
own  base  of  operations.  A  movement  against  New 
York  became,  therefore,  the  objective  of  the  cam- 

174 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

paign,  and  Washington  liad  concentrated  all  his 
forces  near  Dobbs'  Ferry,  having  previously  united 
to  his  own  American  troops  about  four  thousand 
French  EegTilars,  well-disciplined  and  splendidly- 
equipped  soldiers  who  had  been  encamped  the  pre- 
vious winter  at  Newport  under  the  command  of 
General  the  Comte  de  Rochambeau. 

The  situation,  then,  in  August,  1781,  was  this: 
Clinton  in  New  York,  Cornwallis  in  Virginia  opposed 
by  LaFayette,  Washington  on  the  Hudson  planning  to 
threaten  New  York  in  order  to  help  Greene;  when 
suddenly  the  whole  scene  changed,  as  if  by  magic, 
and  the  attention  of  the  actors  was  fastened  upon  a 
new  object.  The  Continental  army  left  the  banks 
of  the  Hudson;  the  diversion  against  New  York  was 
forgotten;  Washington  and  Rochambeau  were  with 
LaFayette  along  the  James  River,  in  Virginia.  The 
cause  of  this  extraordinary  change  of  conditions  was, 
the  news  received  from  the  French  West  Indies.  In 
the  desperate  attitude  of  their  affairs.  Congress  had 
sent  to  France,  the  year  before,  to  implore  more  aid 
than  had  already  been  supplied  to  us  from  there,  to 
beg  King  Louis  XVI  to  strengthen  our  resources 
by  the  detachment  into  American  waters  of  a  new 
fleet  to  give  us  naval  support,  and  the  advancement 

175 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  further  sums  of  money  to  enable  us  to  maintain  and 
equip  the  Continental  army ;  and  General  de  Rocham- 
beau  had  asked  also  for  more  men.  The  reply  had 
been  made  that  the  French  Government  would  not 
increase  its  military  force  in  America,  because  that 
seemed  extravagant,  for  it  would  only  induce  the 
British  to  do  the  same.  But  money  was  supplied  in 
very  large  sums,  and,  what  was  of  great  importance 
in  connection  with  the  operations  of  that  campaign, 
the  announcement  was  made,  under  the  promise  of 
absolute  secrecy,  that  Admiral  de  Grasse,  who  was 
upon  the  point  of  leaving  France  to  protect  her  inter- 
ests in  the  West  Indies,  would  come  into  the  waters 
of  North  America  sometime  during  the  summer  with 
his  powerful  fleet,  to  sweep  the  coasts  and  to  take 
part  in  any  expedition  which  General  Washington 
might  propose. 

The  receipt  of  this  information  led  General  Wash- 
ington at  first  to  hope  that  so  great  an  accession  to 
his  forces,  which  would  give  the  Americans  the  de- 
cided naval  superiority,  might  be  employed  to  advan- 
tage in  the  operations  which  he  was  planning  against 
New  York.  But,  at  the  middle  of  August,  whilst  he 
was  still  in  his  camp  near  Dobbs '  Ferry,  a  dispatch, 
brought  by  a  frigate  detached  for  that  purpose  from 

176 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  West  Indies,  bore  to  liim  the  information  that 
Admiral  de  Grasse  was  at  that  moment  setting  sail 
with  his  fleet  for  North  America,  that  he  had  with 
him,  besides  a  large  sum  of  money  and  a  great  quan- 
tity of  artillery  and  munitions  of  war,  three  thousand 
regular  French  troops  for  land  service,  under  the 
Marquis  de  Saint-Simon ;  that  he  could  stay  upon  our 
coasts  only  until  the  month  of  October,  at  which  time 
his  return  to  the  West  Indies  was  imperative,  but,  in 
coming  North,  he  should  stop  first  in  Chesapeake 
Bay  where  he  hoped  to  be  of  service  to  the  American 
cause  and  that  everything  would  be  in  readiness  for 
a  co-operation  upon  the  day  after  he  made  a  landing 
there.  The  possibilities  of  the  situation  flashed  upon 
the  mind  of  Washington  instantly.  He  knew  that 
Cornwallis  was  then  occupied  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton's 
orders  in  fortifying  the  post  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester,  and  that  LaFayette  was  closely  pressing 
upon  him  from  a  position  occupied  by  the  American 
forces  at  Williamsburg.  If,  therefore,  the  British 
could  be  held  where  they  then  were  until  the  fleet  of 
Admiral  de  Grasse  should  arrive  to  cut  them  off 
from  aid  by  sea,  and  a  sufficient  army  could  be  con- 
centrated upon  LaFayette 's  position  to  block  them  by 
land,  there  could  be  but  one  result. 

12  177 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

He  determiiied  to  move  at  once  with  his  force  of 
Frenchmen  and  Americans,  and  to  march  with  them 
as  rapidly  as  possible  into  Virginia.  First  taking 
the  precaution  to  send  word  to  LaFayette  to  exert 
every  effort  in  order  that  Comwallis  might  not  with- 
draw and  escape  into  Xorth  Carolina,  General 
Washington  made  this  entry  in  his  journal:  "Mat- 
ters having  now  come  to  a  crisis,  and  a  decided  plan 
to  be  determined  on,  I  was  obliged — from  the  short- 
ness of  Cotmt  de  Grasse's  promised  stay  on  this 
Coast,  the  apparent  disinclination  of  their  naval  offi- 
cers to  force  the  harbor  of  Xew  York,  and  the  feeble 
compliance  of  the  States  with  my  requisitions  for 
men  hitherto,  and  the  little  prospect  of  greater  exer- 
tion in  future, — to  give  up  all  ideas  of  attacking  Xew 
York,  and  instead  thereof  to  remove  the  French 
troops  and  a  detachment  from  the  American  army 
to  the  head  of  Elk,  to  be  transported  to  Virgioia.'' 
Breaking  up  his  camp,  therefore,  on  the  19tli  of 
August,  and  leaving  Sir  Henry  Clinton  still  under 
the  impression  that  his  movement  was  a  menace  to 
the  garrison  at  Xew  York,  he  slipped  away  through 
Xew  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania,  and.  on  the  14th  of 
September,  Washington  and  Eochambeau  had  safely 
arrived    at    the    headquarters    of    LaFayette    at 

178 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Williamsburg.  In  the  meantime,  Admiral  de  Grasse 
had  sailed  into  the  Chesapeake  on  the  30th  of  August, 
with  twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line;  he  had  landed 
the  French  troops  of  General  Saint-Simon,  who  were 
then  encamped  with  LaFayette's  men;  he  had  been 
joined  by  eight  French  shijDs  of  war  under  Admiral 
de  Barras,  from  Newport,  with  all  the  military  stores 
and  heavy  siege-guns  belonging  to  Eochambeau's 
detachment ;  and  everything  was  now  in  readiness  to 
begin  operations  when  General  Washington  should 
give  the  word  of  command. 

At  that  moment  Lord  Cornwallis  was  already 
doomed.  There  still  remained  a  month  in  which  he 
was  to  make  almost  frantic  efforts  to  release  him- 
self from  the  trap  into  which  he  had  fallen,  and  dur- 
ing that  time  there  is  no  doubt  that  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
exerted  every  effort  to  save  him;  but  it  was  of  no 
avail,  the  case  was  hopeless.  Cornwallis  always 
blamed  Clinton  for  having  obliged  him  in  the  first 
instance  to  make  the  post  at  Yorktown  and  Glouces- 
ter, which  he  considered  of  not  the  smallest  influence 
on  the  war  in  Carolina,  "and  which,"  said  he,  ''will 
only  give  us  some  acres  of  an  unhealthy  swamp  and 
is  ever  liable  to  become  a  prey  to  a  foreign  enemy 
with  a  temporary  superiority  at  sea."    He  had  with- 

179 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

drawn  his  army  across  the  James  River  in  July,  with 
the  intention  of  establishing  at  Portsmouth  a  garri- 
son of  such  troops  as  should  be  left  by  the  British 
Commander-in-Chief  within  the  limits  of  Virginia. 
But  Clinton  reprimanded  him  sharply  for  having 
made  what  he  called  '*so  serious  and  mortifying  a 
move  as  the  re-passing  James  River,  and  retiring 
with  your  army  to  Portsmouth;"  and  he  added:  "It 
ever  has  been,  is,  and  ever  will  be  my  firm  and  unal- 
terable opinion  that  it  is  of  the  first  consequence  to 
his  Majesty's  affairs  on  this  Continent,  that  we  take 
possession  of  the  Chesapeake,  and  that  we  do  not 
afterwards  relinquish  it.  .  .  .  With  regard  to 
your  Lordship's  returning  to  Charleston,  for  which 
you  say  you  await  my  approbation,  though  I  allow 
your  Lordship  to  be  the  best  judge  where  your  pres- 
ence may  be  most  required,  yet,  as  I  cannot  conceive 
that  offensive  operations  will  be  carried  on  in  Caro- 
lina for  some  months,  I  must  beg  leave  to  recommend 
it  to  you  to  remain  in  the  Chesapeake  at  least  until 
the  stations  I  have  proposed  are  occupied  and  estab- 
lished." Sir  Henry  Clinton's  orders  had  been,  to 
hold  Old  Point  Comfort  in  order  to  secure  Hampton 
Roads;  and  that  York  should  be  secured  so  as  to 
* '  give  the  command  of  the  lower,  or  Elizabeth  coun- 

180 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

try,  and  deprive  the  rebels  of  the  use  of  the  two  best 
settled  rivers  of  the  Chesapeake."  Cornwallis'  en- 
gineers had  surveyed  Old  Point  Comfort  accordingly 
and  had  declared  that  it  would  not  serve  the  purpose 
intended;  therefore  he  had  no  alternative,  in  com- 
pliance with  the  directions  of  his  superior  officer, 
but  to  occupy  York  and  Gloucester.  This  he  was 
proceeding  to  do  accordingly. 

All  the  American  and  French  troops  having 
arrived  at  Williamsburg,  General  Washington  de- 
cided to  advance  upon  the  British  position.  He 
marched  out  on  the  28tli  of  September  with  the  whole 
army  and  took  a  post  about  two  miles  from  York- 
town;  the  Americans  occupying  the  right  and  the 
French  establishing  their  position  to  the  left.  At 
noon  the  heads  of  columns  arrived  upon  their  respec- 
tive grounds  and  drove  in  the  enemy's  pickets.  On 
the  morning  of  the  30th  it  was  discovered  that  the 
British  had  evacuated  all  their  exterior  works  and 
had  withdrawn  to  those  near  the  town.  The  invest- 
ment was  complete  except  upon  the  York  Eiver  above 
the  town,  from  which  direction  the  enemy  could  not 
expect  to  receive  any  succor. 

Up  to  this  moment  Cornwallis  was  confident.  He 
wrote  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton  on  the  29th :  "I  have  ven- 

181 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tured  these  last  two  clays  to  look  General  Washing- 
ton's whole  force  in  the  face  in  the  position  of  my 
outside  works,  and  I  have  the  pleasure  to  assure  your 
Excellency  that  there  was  but  one  wish  throughout 
the  whole  army,  which  was,  that  the  enemy  would 
advance.  ...  I  shall  retire  this  night  within 
the  works,  and  I  have  no  doubt  if  relief  arrives  in 
any  reasonable  time,  that  York  and  Gloucester  will 
be  both  in  possession  of  his  Majesty's  troops."  He 
expected  relief  from  New  York,  for  Clinton  had 
written  to  him :  "  I  think  the  best  way  to  relieve  you 
is  to  join  you  as  soon  as  possible,  with  all  the  force 
that  can  be  spared  from  hence,  which  is  about  4000 
men.  They  are  already  embarked  and  will  proceed 
the  instant  I  receive  information  from  the  Admiral 
that  we  may  venture, ' '  and  on  the  29th  of  September : 
"It  is  determined  that  above  five  thousand  men,  rank 
and  file,  shall  be  embarked  on  board  the  King's 
ships,  and  the  joint  exertions  of  the  navy  and  army 
made  in  a  few  days  to  relieve  you.  .  .  .  There 
is  every  reason  to  hope  that  we  start  from  hence  the 
5th  of  October." 

The  first  week  in  October  was  spent  by  General 
Washington  in  disembarking  his  military  stores  and 
mounting  his  heavy  siege-guns.    This  having  been 

182 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

accomplished,  the  first  parallel  was  opened  within 
six  hundred  yards  of  the  British  lines,  whence  the 
American  and  French  artillery  opened  a  fire  which 
became  so  hea\y  that  it  completely  silenced  the 
enemy's  guns.  On  the  night  of  the  11th  the  second 
parallel  was  opened,  only  three  hundred  yards  from 
the  enemy's  works;  and  from  this  the  fire  of  the 
besiegers  became  destructive  in  the  extreme.  In 
the  meantime,  Clinton  wrote  to  Cornwallis:  ''Your 
Lordship  may  be  assured  that  I  am  doing  everything 
in  my  power  to  relieve  you  by  a  direct  move,  and  I 
have  reason  to  hope  .  .  .  that  we  may  pass  the 
bar  (at  Sandy  Hook)  by  the  12th  of  October,  if  the 
w^inds  permit  and  no  unforeseen  accident  happens." 
But,  on  the  15th,  Lord  Cornwallis  reported  to  him: 
''Last  evening  the  enemy  carried  my  two  advanced 
redoubts  on  the  left  by  storm,  and  during  the  night 
have  included  them  in  their  second  parallel,  which 
they  are  at  present  busy  in  perfecting.  My  situa- 
tion now  becomes  critical;  we  dare  not  show  a  gun 
to  their  old  batteries,  and  I  expect  that  their  new 
ones  will  open  to-morrow  morning.  .  .  .  The 
safety  of  the  place  is  therefore  so  precarious  that  I 
cannot  recommend  that  the  fleet  and  army  should 
run  great  risk  in  endeavoring  to'  save  us."     Sir 

183 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Henry  Clinton,  still  hoping  to  relieve  him,  had  sent 
a  dispatch  from  New  York,  on  the  14th  of  October, 
in  which  he  said:  "Our  fleet  consists  of  twenty-five 
ships  of  the  line  and  two  fifties,  with  a  large  number 
of  frigates.    They  are  now  ready,  and  I  expect  we 
shall  certainly  sail  in  a  day  or  two."    To  which  he 
added,  on  the  15th :  * '  Had  the  wind  been  fair  to-day, 
the  fleet  would  have  fallen  down  to  the  Hook,  but 
I  expect  the  whole  will  sail  to-morrow;"  and  on  the 
18th,  from  Sandy  Hook : ' '  The  fleet  is  assembled,  the 
troops  embarked  on  board,  and  the  whole  will  go  to 
sea,  if  the  wind  continues  fair,  to-morrow  morning." 
It  was  then  too  late.    On  the  morning  of  the  17th 
of  October,  Cornwallis  had  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to 
General  Washington  with  a  note,  which  read  as  fol- 
lows :  "I  propose  a  cessation  of  hostilities  for  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  that  two  officers  may  be  appointed 
by  each  side,  to  meet  at  Mr.  Moore  *s  house,  to  settle 
terms  for  the  surrender  of  the  posts  of  York  and 
Gloucester."    Two   days   later,   the   British    army 
marching  out  of  Yorktown  in  the  presence  of  the 
allied  French  and  American  troops,  at  the  head  of 
whom  were   General   Washington,   the   Comte   de 
Rochambeau  and  the  other  Commanders,  surrounded 
by  their  staffs,  proceeded  to  a  point  agreed  upon,  and, 

184 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

laying  do"\\Ti  tlieir  arms,  surrendered  themselves, 
eight  thousand  men  in  all,  prisoners  of  war.  By  the 
terms  of  the  capitulation  they  were  obliged  to  keep 
their  colors  cased,  in  return  for  the  same  condition 
imposed  as  an  indignity  upon  the  American  garrison 
at  Charleston;  and  General  Benjamin  Lincoln,  who 
upon  that  occasion  had  been  forced  to  yield,  had  now 
by  appointment  of  General  Washington  the  satisfac- 
tion of  receiving  the  British  Commander's  sword 
from  the  hand  of  General  0  'Hara,  whom  Cornwallis, 
alleging  an  illness,  had  sent  to  deliver  it.  And,  as  at 
Charleston,  the  victors  had  expressly  prohibited  the 
American  garrison,  in  marching  out,  from  playing 
a  British  air  or  a  German  air,  so  now  Cornwallis' 
troops  were  required  to  play  either  a  British  or  a 
German  air,  and  they  selected  the  tune, ' '  The  World's 
Turned  Upside  Down." 

This  was  the  most  humiliating  defeat  that  the 
arms  of  Great  Britain  have  ever  sustained ;  it  is  the 
greatest  military  glory  of  America.  It  was  an  opera- 
tion skilfully  planned  and  successfully  carried  out 
by  General  Washington  in  the  face  of  difficulties  that 
are  almost  inconceivable  in  our  day,  and  in  the  midst 
of  dangers  which,  in  case  of  its  failure,  would  have 
overwhelmed    him.    Tt    resulted    in    the    complete 

185 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

triumph  of  the  American  cause,  for  it  broke  the  hold 
of  the  British  upon  this  Continent  and  ended  the 
war.  The  news  of  it  spread  consternation  throughout 
England,  where  the  King  was  still  stubbornly  declar- 
ing that  he  w^ould  bring  the  colonists  back  to  the  per- 
formance of  his  will ;  and  we  have  the  testimony  of  an 
eye-witness,  that  when  the  Prime  Minister,  Lord 
North,  received  the  intelligence  of  Cornwallis'  sur- 
render, he  took  it  "  as  he  would  have  taken  a  ball  in 
his  breast ;  he  opened  his  arms  exclaiming  wildly  as 
he  paced  up  and  down  the  apartment, '  0,  God,  it  is  all 
over.'  Words  which  he  repeated  many  times  under 
emotions  of  the  deepest  consternation  and  distress." 
The  campaign  at  Yorktown  brings  Washington 
and  Cornwallis  into  direct  contrast  as  military 
leaders  in  a  case  where  each  assumed  responsibilities 
coupled  with  circumstances  of  extraordinary  risk. 
Cornwallis  left  his  field  of  operations  in  the  South 
to  come  into  Virginia  upon  an  expedition  readily 
justifiable,  no  doubt,  upon  the  part  of  an  independent 
commander;  and  in  undertaking  it  he  provided 
against  all  the  contingencies  which  he  foresaw.  The 
difficulty  was,  however,  that  when  a  contingency  arose 
which  he  did  not  and  could  not  foresee,  he  was  too 
far  from  his  base,  and  fell  helplessly  into  the  net. 

186 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

The  operation  of  General  "Washington,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  a  great  military  achievement.  He  also 
assumed  risks ;  he  also  moved  far  from  his  base ;  he 
left  the  Hudson  River  and  the  whole  northern  country- 
open  to  immediate  occupation  by  the  enemy  in  case 
of  his  defeat  in  Virginia.  But  all  this  was  plain  to 
him,  and  carefully  thought  out  by  him  beforehand. 
His  resolution  was  courageous;  it  was  almost  des- 
perate; but  his  circumstances  at  the  time  and  his 
slender  resources  justified  him  in  making  a  move, 
as  he  did  boldly  and  deliberately,  in  which  the  whole 
destiny  of  America  depended  upon  success  or  failure. 

After  his  surrender  Lord  Cornwallis  was  not  de- 
tained in  America  as  a  prisoner  of  war,  but  was  per- 
mitted to  return  upon  his  parole  to  England,  where 
he  arrived  early  in  the  year  1782.  Efforts  were  made 
to  bring  about  an  arrangement  by  which  Congress 
should  exchange  him  for  Mr.  Henry  Laurens,  at  that 
time  detained  as  a  prisoner  in  London ;  but  no  result 
was  reached,  and  Cornwallis  remained  under  his 
parole  until  the  declaration  of  peace. 

His  subsequent  life  was  full  of  most  honorable 
activity  in  the  service  of  his  country,  both  at  home 
and  abroad ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  reverse  which  he  met 
with  in  America,  he  was  entrusted  with  duties  of 

187 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

grave  responsibility  which  he  fulfilled  with  a  devotion 
and  a  success  that  made  him,  at  the  opening  of  the 
new  nineteenth  century,  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
Englishmen  of  his  time.  In  1786  he  was  made  a 
Knight  of  the  Garter  and  became  Governor  General 
of  India,  where  he  remained  until  the  end  of  1793, 
when  upon  his  return  to  England  he  received  a  mar- 
quisate  and  a  seat  in  the  Privy  Council.  In  1798  he 
accepted,  at  the  earnest  request  of  Mr.  Pitt,  the  office 
of  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  which  he  held  for 
three  years.  In  1801,  he  went  to  France  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  Great  Britain  to  negotiate  with  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  the  Treaty  of  Amiens ;  and  having  again 
become  Governor  General  of  India,  he  died,  in  the 
Province  of  Benares,  in  October,  1805. 


188 


THE  RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

TO  ARBITRATION  FOR  THE  SETTLEMENT 

OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

Whilst  the  principles  of  International  law  have 
been  developing  in  their  application  to  the  great 
variety  of  questions  which  have  arisen  from  time  to 
time  out  of  the  advance  of  civilization  during  the  past 
hundred  years,  and  their  authority  has  been  steadily 
extended  and  enlarged  as  the  result  of  a  wider  recog- 
nition throughout  the  world,  by  mutual  agreement, 
of  the  rights  of  one  people  in  its  national  and  sover- 
eign capacity  toward  another  people,  no  means  of 
promoting  harmony  has  been  discovered  which  has 
proved  to  be  so  efficient  as  the  recourse  to  arbitra- 
tion in  the  settlement  of  international  disputes.  The 
employment  of  it  in  the  nineteenth  century  increased 
with  such  rapidity  that  it  has  been  shown  by  a  com- 
parative statement  to  have  doubled  in  the  number  of 
cases  in  each  period  of  ten  years  over  that  of  the 
same  length  of  time  immediately  preceding ;  and  if  we 
were  to  enumerate  the  nations  which  have  submitted 
their  disagreements  to  its  adjustment,  we  should  not 
only  include,  in  addition  to  the  United  States,  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe, — Great  Britain,  France, 

189 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Germany,  Austria,  Italy,  and  Russia,— but  almost 
every  country  of  the  world;  for  instance,  besides 
Spain,  Denmark,  Belgium,  Holland,  Norway  and 
Sweden,  we  should  have  Turkey,  Greece,  Persia, 
China,  Japan,  Mexico,  and  all  the  republics  of  Cen- 
tral and  South  America. 

Statesmen  of  all  the  Cabinets  of  the  world  have 
turned  to  this  method  of  arriving  at  conclusions  which 
shall  safeguard  national  honor  and  content  public 
opinion,  on  both  sides  of  a  controversy  that  may  arise 
between  their  own  nation  and  others,  without  having 
recourse  to  forcible  measures  and  without  incurring 
the  danger  of  bringing  upon  their  countries  the  fear- 
ful destruction  and  suffering  that  must  follow  in  the 
path  of  a  modern  war.  Whilst  entire  uniformity  of 
action  has  not  yet  been  arrived  at  between  all  the 
Powers,  there  is  a  sentiment  which  is  constantly 
growing  stronger,  that  in  all  international  disputes 
an  effort  should  be  made  to  reach  an  amicable  adjust- 
ment by  arbitration,  by  mediation,  by  intervention, 
if  necessary,  before  proceeding  to  the  extent  of  open 
hostility ;  and  it  has  become  the  custom,  in  negotiating 
treaties  between  sovereign  states  at  the  present  day, 
to  insert  in  them  an  article  providing  for  the  sub- 
mission to  arbitrators  of  such  questions  as  may  arise 
between  the  contracting  parties  which  cannot  be 

190 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

settled  by  mutual  agreement  through  the  ordinary 
diplomatic  channels. 

What  we  know  as  International  Law  is,  in  fact, 
a  series  of  rules  of  conduct  adopted  and  pursued  by 
civilized  nations  as  the  result  of  common  experience, 
the  sanction  and  authority  of  which  lie  in  general 
assent;  as  they  are  not  laws  in  the  sense  of  legal 
enactment,  and  consequently  are  not  to  be  put  into 
execution  by  process  issuing  out  of  an  established 
court,  they  depend  for  their  enforcement  upon  the 
agreement  of  nations  arrived  at  either  by  convention 
or  confirmed  by  public  acts. 

The  highest  expression  of  the  agreement  between 
the  separate  states  in  regard  to  subjects  in  which  all 
are  directly  interested  took  place  at  the  Conferences 
at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  1907, — those  great  inter- 
national congresses  which  may  rightly  be  called  the 
triumph  of  modern  civilization,  in  which  the  peoples 
of  the  earth  met  together  prepared  to  make  mutual 
concessions  in  order  to  reach  conclusions  beneficial  to 
all,  in  which  also  their  deliberations  were  crowned 
by  the  ''Convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of 
international  differences,"  which  they  published  to 
the  world.  To  this  they  have  given  by  international 
agreement  the  character  of  law,  and  they  have  estab- 
lished the  most  advanced  position  that  international 

19] 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

intercourse  has  ever  attained,  by  declaring,  in  the 
first  Article  of  that  Convention,  that:  "With  a  view 
to  obviating,  as  far  as  possible,  recourse  to  force  in 
the  relations  between  states,  the  signatory  Powers 
agree  to  use  their  best  efforts  to  insure  the  pacific 
settlement  of  international  differences." 

The  Convention  provided  that  arbitration  should 
be  recognized  as  the  most  efficacious  and  the  most 
equitable  method  of  deciding  controversies ;  that  an 
agreement  of  arbitration  may  be  made  with  reference 
to  disputes  already  existing  or  those  that  may  here- 
after arise ;  and,  to  give  it  the  stamp  of  an  accepted 
duty,  the  Powders  decided  that  the  agreement  of  arbi- 
tration implies  the  obligation  to  submit  in  good  faith 
to  the  decision  of  the  arbitrator. 

Thus  the  principle  of  amicable  intercourse  be- 
tween nations  was  fixed  upon  a  substantial  founda- 
tion such  as  it  had  never  had  before.  It  was  strength- 
ened by  further  provision,  adopted  in  the  wisdom  and 
forethought  of  international  jurists  and  political 
leaders  whose  chief  solicitude  it  was  to  prevent  con- 
flict, that,  in  case  of  serious  disagreement,  before  an 
appeal  to  arms,  recourse  should  be  had,  in  so  far  as 
the  circumstances  would  allow,  to  the  good  offices  or 
mediation  of  one  or  more  friendly  Powers ;  and  that, 
even  beyond  this,  it  would  be  useful  that  one  or  more 

192 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Powers,  strangers  to  the  dispute,  should,  on  their 
own  initiative,  tender  their  good  offices  or  mediation 
to  the  states  at  variance;  it  being  understood  that 
such  good  offices  might  be  tendered  even  during  the 
course  of  hostilities,  and  that  the  exercise  of  such 
a  right  should  never  be  regarded  by  either  of  the 
parties  as  an  unfriendly  act. 

In  accordance  with  the  temper  and  character  of 
the  American  people,  and  in  furtherance  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  liberty,  the  dissemination  of  justice  and  the 
extension  of  good  will  amongst  all  men,  upon  which 
our  Government  has  been  erected,  the  representatives 
of  the  United  States  at  The  Hague  were  invariably 
found  in  the  lead  amongst  those  who  supported  the 
adoption  of  these  enlightened  measures,  and  their 
firmness  and  diligence  in  that  regard  contributed 
greatly,  without  doubt,  to  the  ultimate  acceptance  of 
them  by  the  delegates  of  the  other  signatory  Powers. 

But  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  government 
of  the  United  States  has  always  favored  recourse  to 
arbitration  in  the  settlement  of  this  class  of  dif- 
ferences, throughout  the  exceedingly  wide  range  of 
foreign  relations  with  which  it  has  had  political  and 
commercial  experience  during  the  last  century  and  a 
quarter.  Although  men's  minds  have  been  turned  of 
late  more  forcibly  to  the  subject,  because  it  has  as- 

13  193 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

sumed  a  recent  prominence  in  cases  of  public  noto- 
riety, arbitration  is  not  by  any  means  a  new  subject 
in  America ;  indeed,  we  have  employed  it  with  great 
frequency  and  notable  success  ever  since  we  became 
an  independent  nation.  ^^  We  may  trace  its  influence 
distinctly  by  the  expressions  of  public  opinion,  from 
time  to  time,  in  favor  of  the  establishment  of  a  fixed 
system  of  adjustment  of  differences  between  nations. 
Benjamin  Franklin  had  said,  already  in  1783: 

"When  will  mankind  be  convinced  that  all 
wars  are  follies,  and  agree  to  settle  their  dif- 
ferences by  arbitration?  It  would  be  better 
than  by  fighting  and  destroying  each  other. ' ' 

And  we  find  resolutions  introduced  into  the  Legis- 
lature of  Massachusetts  in  1832,  and  again  in  1837, 
declaring  that  "some  mode  should  be  established  for 
the  amicable  and  final  adjustment  of  all  international 
disputes  instead  of  resort  to  war."  The  same  spirit 
animated  the  United  States  Senate,  when,  in  1851, 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Eelations  reported  a  reso- 
lution that:  "it  would  be  proper  and  desirable  for 
the  Government  to  secure  in  its  treaties  with  other 

"It  has  been  sho^\^l,  by  an  investigation,  made  in  1914,  by  the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  that  the  results  of  the 
arbitrations  in  which  the  United  States  have  taken  part,  are  as 
follows:  Total  of  the  awards:  $92,855,444.77.  In  favor  of  the 
United  States,  $69,501,682.3'3  =  74.8  per  cent.;  against  the  United 
States,  $23,353,762.44  =  25.2  per  cent. 
194 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

nations  a  piHDvision  for  referring  to  the  decision  of 
umpires  all  future  misunderstandings  that  cannot 
be  satisfactorily  adjusted  by  amicable  negotiation, 
before  a  resort  to  hostilities";  and  Charles  Sumner 
introduced  in  the  Senate  a  resolution,  in  1872,  the 
substance  of  which  is,  that:  ''The  United  States, 
having  at  heart  the  cause  of  peace  every^vhere,  and 
hoping  to  help  its  permanent  establishment  between 
nations,  recommend  the  adoption  of  arbitration  as  a 
just  and  practical  method  for  the  determination  of 
international  differences,  so  that  war  may  cease  to  be 
regarded  as  a  proper  form  of  trial  between  nations. " 

In  the  meantime,  however,  we  have  constantly 
been  giving,  as  a  Government,  practical  effect  to  these 
sentiments  in  relation  to  the  maintenance  of  peace 
and  friendly  intercourse  between  nations ;  the  United 
States  have  had  arbitrations  of  disputed  questions 
not  only  with  Great  Britain,  but  wdth  Germany, 
France,  and  Russia,  with  Portugal,  Denmark,  Spain, 
Mexico,  China,  Brazil,  Paraguay,  Chile,  Peru,  Vene- 
zuela and  numerous  other  countries,  upon  a  great 
variety  of  questions  through  which  amicable  and 
satisfactory  arrangements  have  been  reached  and 
accepted  by  the  high  contracting  parties. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  examples  in  the  world 
of  this  kind  of  adjudication  is  that  which  relates  to 

195 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

our  northern  frontier,  the  boundary  line  of  which  has 
been  fixed,  by  a  remarkable  series  of  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  through- 
out its  entire  length,  from  Atlantic  to  Pacific. 

It  was  especially  provided  by  an  Article  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  signed  at  Paris,  by  John  Adams, 
Benjamin  Franklin,  and  John  Jay,  in  1783,  that,  in 
order  that  "all  disputes  which  might  arise  in  future, 
on  the  subject  of  the  boundaries  of  the  said  United 
States  may  be  prevented,  it  is  hereby  agreed  and  de- 
clared, that  the  following  are  and  shall  be  their  boun- 
daries," and  this  was  followed  by  a  description  of 
the  line  which,  in  all  good  faith,  was  intended  to 
anticipate  any  misunderstanding,  but  which,  far  from 
forestalling  disagreement,  became  itself  the  source  of 
very  troublesome  disputes.  It  proved  afterwards 
that  the  country  had,  throughout  a  large  portion  of  it, 
never  been  surveyed,  the  maps  were  not  accurate  and 
the  descriptions  given  were  so  indefinite  that  quarrels 
arose  between  the  frontiersmen  almost  immediately 
upon  the  signing  of  the  treaty.  The  line  was  said  to 
run  "From  the  northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  viz., 
that  angle  which  is  formed  by  a  line  drawn  due  north 
from  the  source  of  the  Saint  Croix  River  to  the 
Plighlands. "  The  St.  Croix  River  became,  therefore, 
an  important  determining  factor,  and  its  position  on 

196 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  maps  as  well  as  in  the  territory  itself  was  a  con- 
trolling landmark, — from  which  fact  this  dispute  be- 
tween the  two  countries  has  taken  the  name  of  the 
St.  Croix  disagreement ;  and  the  truth  is,  at  that  time 
no  one  could  tell  what  the  St.CroixRiver  actually  was. 
It  was  impossible  to  determine  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty what  river  had  been  intended  in  the  treaty,  and 
hostile  feeling,  which  became  accentuated  by  each 
succeeding  year,  had  grown  so  serious  by  the  year 
1790  that  General  Washington  brought  the  subject  to 
the  consideration  of  the  Senate,  with  a  recommenda- 
tion that  all  questions  between  the  United  States  and 
other  nations  should  be  speedily  settled;  and  the 
Senate  advised  that  "it  would  be  proper  to  cause  a 
representation  of  the  case  to  be  made  to  the  Court  of 
Great  Britain,  and  if  said  disputes  cannot  be  other- 
wise amicably  adjusted,  to  propose  that  commis- 
sioners be  appointed  to  hear  and  finally  decide  them. ' ' 
But  no  definite  step  was  taken  until  the  year  1794, 
when  Mr.  Jay  went  to  England  to  negotiate  for  the 
general  adjustment  of  differences.  In  the  treaty 
which  he  concluded  in  that  year,  commonly  known 
as  Jay's  Treaty,  a  provision  was  made  that  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  Saint  Croix  River  should  be  referred 
for  final  decision  to  a  Commission,  one  Commissioner 
to  be  appointed  by  the  King  of  England  and  one  by 

197 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  these  two  to 
agree  on  the  choice  of  a  third.  Such  a  Commission 
was  appointed,  and,  after  a  painstaking  investigation 
which  extended  through  nearly  four  years,  it  ren- 
dered its  decision  in  1798,  by  which  the  boundary  line 
starting  from  Nova  Scotia  was  finally  settled. 

But  it  left  the  frontier  still  undetermined  toward 
the  West,  between  New  Brunswick  and  the  State  of 
Maine,  in  regard  to  which  attempts  were  made  for 
years  to  arrive  at  some  satisfactory  agreement,  with- 
out result;  the  dispute,  which  assumed  constantly 
more  threatening  proportions,  having  become  known 
as  "The  Northeastern  Boundary  Controversy."  It 
was  not  until  1826,  when  Albert  Gallatin  was  sent  as 
United  States  Minister  to  England,  that  a  Convention 
was  signed,  under  which  the  contracting  parties 
agreed  to  proceed  in  concert  to  choose  some  friendly 
sovereign  or  state  as  arbiter,  and  to  use  their  best 
endeavors  to  obtain  a  decision  within  two  years.  The 
ratification  of  this  Convention  took  place  in  London 
in  1828,  the  parties  agreeing  to  submit  the  questions 
at  issue  to  the  King  of  the  Netherlands  as  arbiter, 
that  Sovereign  having  intimated  his  consent  to  act. 

After  an  exhaustive  and  laborious  examination 
of  the  case,  the  Dutch  King,  William,  rendered  his  de- 
cision in  1831 ;  but,  not  having  been  able  to  fix  defi- 

198 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

nitely  the  boundary  line,  by  reason  of  the  insufficient 
data  given  him  in  regard  to  a  country  which  had  at 
that  time  been  scarcely  explored,  the  arbiter  aban- 
doned the  effort  to  establish  the  boundary  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  original  treaty  of  peace,  and 
recommended  what,  all  things  considered,  was  a  line 
of  convenience  which  appeared  likely  to  be  acceptable 
to  the  parties  concerned.  The  decision  having  been 
protested  against  by  the  United  States  and  not  in- 
sisted upon  by  Great  Britain,  the  controversy  went  on 
until  1842,  when  it  was  finally  settled  by  a  treaty 
prepared  by  Mr.  Webster,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
and  Lord  Ashburton,  who  had  been  sent  to  Washing- 
ton as  Special  Minister,  which  contained  an  agree- 
ment under  which  Commissioners  were  appointed 
by  each  side  to  run  the  line  upon  the  ground. 

In  the  same  manner,  by  treaty  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  Commissioners,  the  boundary  was  fixed  and 
extended  along  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains, and  from  thence  to  the  Pacific  Ocean ;  the  last 
unsettled  question  being  that  of  the  exact  location 
of  the  line  running  westward,  along  the  49th  parallel, 
to  the  channel  wliicli  separates  the  continent  from 
Vancouver  Island.  In  the  desire  to  reach  an  amica- 
ble conclusion  as  to  this  also,  the  United  States 

199 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

agreed  to  submit  the  controversy  to  arbitration,  and 
united  with  Great  Britain,  in  1871,  to  entrust  the 
decision  to  the  German  Emperor  as  arbitrator.  The 
Emperor  accepted  the  task,  and  by  his  decision,  ren- 
dered at  Berlin,  in  1872,  fixed  the  boundary  through 
the  Strait  of  Fuca,  which  was  accepted  by  both  of 
the  contracting  parties  as  the  definite  line ;  so  that, 
when  General  Grant  referred  to  this  award,  in  his 
message  to  Congress,  in  1872,  he  declared  that  it 
''leaves  us,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States  as  a  nation,  without  a  question  of  dis- 
puted boundary  between  our  territory  and  the  posses- 
sions of  Great  Britain  on  this  Continent." 

Thus,  the  United  States  have  not  only  built  up 
their  national  character  and  established  the  definite 
lines  of  their  public  jurisdiction  by  submitting  to 
the  awards  of  arbitrators,  but  have  greatly  strength- 
ened the  influence  of  the  methods  of  arbitration  itself 
by  bringing  to  its  principles  the  prestige  of  their 
acceptance  of  them  and  approval  by  the  American 
people.  A  very  memorable  example  of  this  is  the  case 
of  the  Geneva  Tribunal,  to  which  were  submitted  and 
disposed  of,  in  1872,  the  disputed  questions  know^n  as 
the  Alabama  Claims  and  others,  arising  out  of  the 
Civil  War,  the  sources  of  violent  feeling  and  acrimo- 
nious discussion  in  this  country  which  threatened 

200 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

for  several  years  to  interrupt  our  friendly  inter- 
course with  Great  Britain.  That  tribunal  was  formed 
by  the  selection  of  five  arbitrators — one  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  one  by  the  Queen  of  Great 
Britain,  one  by  the  King  of  Italy,  one  by  the  President 
of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  one  by  the  Emperor  of 
Brazil.  And  yet  another  example  is  that  of  the  refer- 
ence, not  long  ago,  to  the  Tribunal  at  The  Hague, 
which  finally  adjusted  certain  serious  and  compli- 
cated questions  relating  to  fishing  riglits  on  the  At- 
lantic Coast  of  British  America,  about  which  we  were 
at  variance  with  England  for  almost  a  hundred  years. 
Progress  in  extending  amicable  relations  and  fair 
dealing  between  the  different  nations  is  the  progress 
of  civilization.  We  may  rightly  assert  our  claim  to 
an  advanced  position  in  the  maintenance  and  de- 
fence of  the  principles  upon  which  this  rests.  At 
this  moment  the  President  of  the  United  States  is 
using  his  most  earnest  endeavors  to  establish  with 
several  of  the  foreign  nations  permanent  treaties  of 
arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  international  dif- 
ferences, which  will  have  almost  incalculable  influence 
for  good,  by  the  example  before  the  whole  world  of 
the  great  Powers  exerting  their  authority  toward  the 
administration  of  international  justice  and  equity, 
and  the  preservation  of  peace. 

201 


GENERAL   HOWE'S   CAMPAIGNS  IN  THE 
REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

I 

One  of  the  most  striking  incidents  at  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  in  the  War  of  American  Inde- 
pendence was  the  singular  misconception  upon  the 
part  of  the  British  Government,  and  especially  of 
King  George  III,  of  the  character  of  the  American 
people.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Colonists 
were  principally  of  English  descent,  that  very  many 
of  them  had  been  sent  over  to  be  educated  in  England, 
that  through  the  royal  governors  as  well  as  through 
the  avenues  of  commerce  and  trade  a  close  inter- 
course had  constantly  existed  for  more  than  a  century 
between  them  and  the  mother  country,  the  Ministers 
of  the  King's  Cabinet,  the  majority  in  Parliament, 
the  King  himself,  looked  upon  the  inhabitants  of  this 
Continent,  in  1775,  as  a  race  of  helpless,  spiritless 
provincials  whose  way^vardness  had  led  them  into 
erring  paths  and  whose  nature  required  the  judicious 
correction  of  a  wise  and  beneficent  master. 

The  remarkable  discretion  and  self-restraint  with 
which  the  representatives  of  this  people  discussed  its 
public  affairs,under  the  pressure  of  grievances  recog- 

202 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

nized  by  all,  and  the  devoted  loyalty  with  which  they 
presented  their  case  for  redress  before  the  home 
Government,  failed  to  elicit  from  it  the  slightest 
appreciation  of  their  merit  as  a  people.  For  it  is 
important  to  remember  in  connection  with  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  that  it  was  not,  from  the  outset,  a 
seditious  uprising  against  the  established  authority, 
but  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  a  movement  directed 
against  the  policy  of  the  ministry  alone,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  correcting  abuses,  or  what  were  conceived  to 
be  abuses,  without  disturbing  the  sovereignty  of  the 
King;  indeed,  no  more  earnest  expressions  of  loyalty 
to  Great  Britain  were  probably  ever  written  than 
the  addresses  which  went  out  from  America  to  the 
King  and  to  the  British  nation,  and  actual  war  had 
existed  for  more  than  a  year  before  the  people  took 
the  final  step  which  led  to  the  dismemberment  of  the 
empire. 

The  King  himself,  whose  comprehension  of  the 
case  was  singularly  bad,  was  entirely  honest  in  the 
purposes  he  had  in  view;  and,  with  an  intense  jeal- 
ousy of  the  royal  prerogative  which  always  blinded 
him  and  usually  misled  him  in  matters  relating  to 
America,  evidently  intended  to  be  just  to  all  his  sub- 
jects if  they  would  do  everything  that  he  considered 
right;  not  tliat  he  placed  value  especially  upon  the 

203 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

amount  of  revenue  which  came  out  of  the  taxes  im- 
posed upon  the  Colonies,  but  that  he  would  insist 
upon  laying  these  taxes  if  he  saw  fit ;  and  the  Colon- 
ists must  submit  to  it  precisely  in  that  way; — after 
that,  he  would  be  generous. 

"I  do  not  wish  to  come  to  severer  measures,"  he 
wrote  confidentially  to  Lord  North,  "but  we  must  not 
retreat;  by  coolness  and  an  unremitted  pursuit  of 
the  measures  that  have  been  adopted,  I  trust  they 
will  come  to  submit;  I  have  no  objection  afterwards 
to  their  seeing  that  there  is  no  inclination  for  the 
present  to  lay  fresh  taxes  on  them,  but  I  am  clear 
there  must  always  be  one  tax,  to  keep  up  the  right, — 
and  as  such  I  approve  the  Tea  Duty."  (11  Sept., 
1774) ;  and  he  said  in  another  letter  to  his  Minister : 
''Where  violence  is  repelled  with  resolution,  it  com- 
monly yields ;  and  I  own,  though  a  friend  to  holding 
out  the  olive-branch,  I  have  not  the  smallest  doubt 
that,  if  it  does  not  succeed,  when  once  vigorous  meas- 
ures appear  to  be  the  only  means  of  bringing  the 
Americans  to  a  due  submission  to  the  Mother  Coun- 
try, the  Colonies  will  submit. "    (15  February,  1775.) 

It  is  difficult,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  historical 
events  during  the  century  which  has  passed  since 
that  time,  to  realize  that  this  could  have  been  the  con- 
ception entertained,  by  one  who  ought  to  have  known 

204 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  truth,  of  a  nation  where  public  thought  was 
directed  and  public  opinion  shaped  by  men  like  Wash- 
ington and  Jefferson,  Jay,  John  Adams,  Samuel 
Adams,  Alexander  Hamilton,  John  Dickinson, 
Patrick  Henry,  Benjamin  Franklin,  Robert  Morris, 
John  Hancock,  Richard  Henry  Lee. 

Yet  the  King  declared:  "I  entirely  place  my 
security  in  the  protection  of  the  Divine  Disposer 
of  all  things,  and  shall  never  look  to  the  right  or  left, 
but  steadily  pursue  the  track  w^hich  my  conscience 
dictates  to  be  the  right  one."  (15  Feb.,  1775.)  "Every 
means  of  distressing  America  must  meet  with  my 
concurrence,  as  it  tends  to  bringing  them  to  feel  the 
necessity  of  returning  to  their  duty."  (15  Oct.,  1775.) 
And  when  the  great  Earl  Chatham,  then  in  opposition 
and  ranged  amongst  those  who  believed  that  America 
had  been  condemned  without  a  hearing  and  who 
strongly  objected  to  the  war,  openly  declared  that 
the  American  Congress  had  "conducted  this  most 
arduous  and  delicate  business  with  such  manly  wis- 
dom and  calm  resolution  as  did  honor  to  their  delib- 
erations," and  that  "America,  under  all  her  oppres- 
sions and  provocations,  was  holding  forth  the  most 
fair  and  just  opening  for  restoring  harmony,"  the 
King  resented  his  expressions  with  violent  outbursts 
of  anger,  and  looked  forward  hopefully  to  a  time 

205 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

''when  decrepitude  or  death  should  put  an  end  to 
Chatham,  as  a  trumpet  of  sedition." 

The  most  interesting,  and,  as  it  proved,  the  most 
important  phase  of  this  misunderstanding  of  the 
American  character  was  the  report  given  by  the  royal 
officers  to  the  Cabinet  and  the  King,  that  the  Ameri- 
cans would  not  fight ;  and,  curiously  enough,  although 
the  provincial  militia  had  done  good  service  under 
the  British  standard  in  all  of  England's  former  con- 
tests upon  this  Continent,  it  appears  never  to  have 
occurred  to  the  British  mind  that  these  same  men 
could  at  all  protect  themselves  or  defend  their  owo. 
interests.  It  was  commonly  asserted  in  England 
that  they  could  not  make  soldiers,  some  of  the  more 
violent  critics  even  declared  them  to  be  cowards  who 
would  not  dare  to  face  the  first  show  of  authority. 
Unfortunately  for  the  King,  he  was  strengthened 
in  this  belief  by  men  of  rank  and  experience  like 
Governor  Hutchinson,  of  Massachusetts,  and  his 
Generals,  like  Gage  and  Haldiman,  who  had  just  re- 
turned from  America.  ' '  I  have  seen  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral Gage,"  wrote  he  to  Lord  North,  "who  came  to 
express  his  readiness,  though  so  lately  come  from 
America,  to  return  at  a  day's  notice,  if  the  conduct  of 
the  Colonies  should  induce  the  directing  coercive 
measures.    His  language  was  very  consonant  to  his 

206 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

character  of  an  honest,  determined  man.  He  says 
they  will  be  lions  whilst  we  are  lambs ;  but,  if  we  take 
the  resolute  part,  they  will  undoubtedly  prove  very 
meek.*'  (4  February,  1774.)  It  is  amazing  that  a 
public  servant  like  Gage  should  so  fail  to  under- 
stand the  very  elements  of  the  character  of  the  people 
with  whom  he  had  been  in  daily  contact.  And  yet,  a 
little  later,  w^e  see  in  one  of  King  George's  letters: 
*'Maj.  General  Haldiman  is  arrived,  and  seems  thor- 
oughly acquainted  with  the  sentiments  of  the  Ameri- 
cans. He  says  nothing  but  force  can  bring  them  to 
reason,  and  owns  that,  till  they  have  suffered  for 
their  conduct,  it  would  be  dangerous  to  give  ear  to 
any  propositions  they  might  transmit. ' ' 

The  Earl  of  Sandwich,  one  of  the  Lords  of  Ad- 
miralty, gravely  declared  to  Parliament:  "Suppose 
the  Colonies  do  abound  in  men;  they  are  raw,  undis- 
ciplined and  cowardly.  .  .  .  Believe  me,  my 
Lords,  the  very  sound  of  a  cannon  would  send  them 
off  as  fast  as  their  feet  could  carry  them."  And, 
at  the  thought  of  American  resistance.  Dr.  Johnson 
exclaimed:  '* Audacious  defiance!  Acrimonious  ma- 
lignity !  The  indignation  of  the  English  is  like  that 
of  the  Scythians,  who,  returning  from  war,  found 
themselves  excluded  from  their  own  houses  by  their 
slaves."    (Taxation  no  Tyranny.) 

207 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Such  was  the  intolerant  spirit  with  which  the  in- 
creasing uneasiness  in  America  was  regarded  by  the 
British  Government,  through  the  autumn  and  the  win- 
ter of  1774.  After  the  incident  of  the  throwing  over 
the  tea  in  Boston  harbor  followed  the  closing  of  the 
port  of  Boston,  the  prohibition  to  its  citizens  to  share 
in  the  fisheries  upon  which  they  depended  largely 
for  support,  the  alteration  of  the  charter  of  Massa- 
chusetts and  the  series  of  repressive  measures  by 
which  it  was  intended  to  enforce  submission  and  obe- 
dience ;  but  which  in  fact  merely  irritated  the  people 
and  drove  them  to  further  acts  of  insubordination, 
until,  in  the  spring  of  the  year  1775,  the  Colonies  were 
rapidly  drifting  into  war.  Lieutenant  General  Gage 
had  returned  to  America  with  the  authority  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  King's  troops,  and  at  the 
same  time  as  Governor  of  the  Colony  of  Massachu- 
setts, and  he  was  occupying  Boston,  a  town  of  some 
seventeen  thousand  people,  with  a  garrison  of  four 
thousand  men.  In  the  meanwhile  all  the  country 
had  become  aroused,  and  as  day  by  day  the  British 
soldiers,  many  of  whom  were  encamped  upon  the 
Common  and  quartered  about  the  town,  gaily  enter- 
tained each  other,  enjoying  the  brightness  of  an  un- 
usually mild  winter,  thinking  of  how  to  pass  the  time 
cheerfully,  despising  the  thought  that  it  was  neces- 

£08 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

sary  to  prepare  for  serious  work  among  Colonists 
neither  armed  nor  trained, — the  feeling  of  hatred 
was  growing  deeper  into  the  hearts  of  the  people,  and 
their  stubborn  determination  to  resist  the  aggression 
of  these  men,  whom  they  now  began  to  look  upon  as 
enemies,  was  quickening  the  new  life  which  was  soon 
to  spring  forth  and  unite  the  American  Colonists 
with  the  confidence,  and  vigor,  and  dignity  of  a 
nation. 

"We  still  remain  in  our  camp  on  the  Com- 
mon," wrote  Captain  Evelyn,  of  the  Fourth 
Regiment,  the  King's  Own,  "but  expect  soon  to 
get  into  barracks.  I  have  taken  a  house  for 
George  and  myself,  and  we  hope  to  pass  the 
winter  comfortably.  This  country  is  very  fine, 
the  climate  wholesome,  and  we  are  all  in  good 
health  and  spirits ;  we  get  plenty  of  turtle,  pine- 
apples, and  Madeira.  "We  expect  to  be  shortly 
re-inf  orced ;  and  we  shall  have  no  apprehensions 
from  the  very  great  numbers  in  this  province, 
should  they  ever  come  to  extremities,  as  they 
sometimes  affect  to  insinuate ;  for  though  upon 
paper  they  are  the  bravest  fellows  in  the  world, 
yet  in  reality  I  believe  there  does  not  exist  so 
great  a  set  of  rascals  and  paltroons.  What  all 
this  will  end  in  it  is  impossible  to  guess.  Great 
Britain  has  it  in  her  power  now  to  keep  America 
in  the  dependence  she  has  a  right  to  insist 
upon,"  though  "this  whole  country  is  just  now 
in  a  state  of  actual,  open  rebellion ;  there  is  not 

14  209 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

a  man  from  sixteen  to  sixty,  nay,  to  a  hundred 
years  old,  who  is  not  armed  and  obliged  to 
attend  at  stated  times  to  train ;  there  is  no  act 
of  treason  or  rebellion  which  they  have  not 
committed,  except  that  of  actually  attacking  the 
troops,  from  which  they  are  restrained  only  by 
a  dread  of  the  consequences.  I  believe  never 
was  so  much  mercy  extended  to  any  nation  on 
the  face  of  the  earth.  As  we  have  reason  to 
believe  that  more  troops  and  men-of-war  will  be 
sent  out  in  the  spring,  there  are  a  few  things 
w^hich  George  would  be  very  glad  to  receive  by 
them ;  such  as  a  few  pairs  of  ribbed  thread  and 
silk  stockings,  a  hat  or  two,  and  a  couple  of 
silver  tablespoons ;  but  nothing  would  be  more 
acceptable  than  a  cask  of  porter,  as  our  only 
liquor  for  the  table  here  is  a  stuff  they  call 
spruce  beer." 

This  British  officer,  in  his  letters  home,  reflects 
the  carelessness  with  which  even  men  in  the  army 
viewed  the  situation  on  the  ground  and  the  indis- 
position of  the  British  in  general  to  consider  its  seri- 
ousness. Captain  Evelyn,  in  particular,  discovered 
serious  work  enough  to  be  done  before  long,  and  he 
gave  up  his  life  within  a  year,  before  the  American 
lines  at  New  York. 

At  length,  however,  the  clash  came,  early  in  April, 
1776.  No  matter  who  fired  the  first  shot.  Historians 
and  critics  have  argued  over  this  question,  on  either 

210 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

side.  The  truth  is,  that  the  tension  had  become  so 
great  that,  sooner  or  later,  within  a  very  short  space, 
a  break  was  inevitable.  The  guns  were  ready  to  go 
off,  as  the  French  say:  tout  seuls, — and,  indeed, 
they  appear  almost  to  have  done  so  in  the  little 
action  which  took  place  at  Concord.  Alarmed  at 
the  activity  of  the  population  which  was  evident 
throughout  all  the  towns  and  villages  of  Massachu- 
setts, General  Gage  decided  by  way  of  precaution 
to  send  out  a  force  to  destroy  the  ammunition  and 
provisions  which  the  Colonists  had  collected  and 
stored  in  a  magazine  in  the  village  of  Concord,  some 
twenty  miles  from  Boston.  About  eleven  o'clock  at 
night,  on  the  18th  of  April,  he  detached  800  grena- 
diers and  infantry  for  this  purpose;  who,  embark- 
ing at  the  foot  of  Boston  Common,  under  command 
of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith,  and  landing  in  East 
Cambridge,  were  at  Lexington  early  the  following 
morning  on  the  road  to  Concord. 

There  is  something  solemn  in  the  conduct  of  the 
American  patriots  at  this  critical  moment  of  the 
country's  history.  Earnestly  and  courageously  those 
men,  animated  with  a  zealous  and  unselfish  devotion 
to  their  country  which  has  made  their  actions  classic, 
came  forth  from  their  homes  at  the  sound  of  the 
alarm  bell  which  summoned  them  now  to  keep  faith  in 

211 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  face  of  these  British  troops.  Gravely  they 
arranged  themselves  on  the  village  green  at  Lexing- 
ton, young  men  and  old,  the  minister  in  the  midst  of 
his  flock,  he  having  like  the  others  brought  with  him 
his  firelock  and  powder-horn,  in  fulfilment  of  a  sacred 
duty.  The  British  van  found  them  there  at  sunrise, 
and,  hearing  their  drums  and  alarm  guns,  halted  to 
load;  the  other  companies  of  the  detachment  came 
up;  the  whole  advanced  at  double  quick;  and,  when 
Major  Pitcairn,  at  the  head  of  the  column,  cried  out : 
''Disperse,  you  villains;  lay  down  your  arms  and 
disperse!"  shots  followed  immediately  and  the  War 
of  Independence  had  begun.  Several  men  were  killed 
on  either  side,  but  it  did  not  take  the  British  regulars 
very  long  to  drive  off  this  handful  of  undisciplined 
opponents  and  to  march  to  Concord.  There  the  in- 
habitants had  collected  in  the  same  manner,  and 
similar  scenes  were  enacted ;  after  which  the  British 
troops  fulfilled  their  mission  by  throwing  into  the 
river  about  a  hundred  barrels  of  powder  and  destroy- 
ing a  lot  of  flour  and  provisions.  Turning,  then,  to 
make  his  way  back  to  Boston,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Smith  found  himself  beset  by  enemies  upon  every 
side.  Alarms  had  gone  out  during  the  morning  and 
the  men  from  all  the  surrounding  villages  came  has- 
tening in  to  help  their  fellow  citizens. 

dl2 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Aloug  the  liigliway  upon  which  the  troops  were 
marching  they  were  harried  and  distressed  by  the 
Colonists  who  ran  from  one  point  to  another  and  fired 
at  them  from  "every  fence,  house,  hollows-way  and 
height  as  they  passed  on";  and  they  were  finally 
thrown  into  disorder  and  probably  would  have  been 
destroyed  if  General  Gage,  who  had  gro^^^l  uneasy, 
had  not  sent  out  from  Boston  a  second  detachment 
under  one  of  his  commanding  officers,  Lord  Percy, 
who  came  to  their  rescue  as  they  were  entering  Lex- 
ington. There  is  a  strong  contrast  between  the  ear- 
nestness and  vigilance  of  the  Americans  in  this  case 
and  the  laxity  of  the  pleasure-loving  British,  w^hich 
recurs  frequently  throughout  the  war.  The  Colonists 
knew  beforehand  of  General  Gage's  intention  to  send 
out  this  expedition,  although  British  officers  about 
headquarters  gave  very  little  or  no  heed  to  it,  even 
as  part  of  their  duty.  We  have  the  testimony  of 
this  in  a  letter  written  to  England  shortly  after- 
wards, by  one  who  accompanied  the  forces : 

''Our  secret  had  been  ill-kept;  the  rebels 
knew  our  intention  and  were  prepared.  Lt.  Col. 
Smith's  party  would  have  been  destroyed  had 
not  Lord  Percy  joined  him;  and  even  he  was 
almost  too  late  from  two  stupid  blunders  we 
committed.  The  General  ordered  the  First  Bri- 
gade under  arms  at  four  in  the  morning ;  these 

213 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

orders  the  evening  before  were  carried  to  the 
Brigade  Major's;  he  was  not  at  home, — the 
orders  were  left, — no  inquiry  was  made  after 
him ;  he  came  home  late ;  his  servant  forgot  to 
tell  him  there  was  a  letter  on  his  table;  four 
o'clock   came — no   brigade   appeared — at  five 
o'clock  an  express  from  Smith  desiring  a  rein- 
forcement produced  an  inquiry ;  the  above  dis- 
covery w^as  made ;  at  six  o  'clock  part  of  the  bri- 
gade got  on  the  parade ;  they  waited,  expecting 
the  marines;  at  seven,  no  marines  appearing, 
another  inquiry  commenced ;  they  had  received 
no  orders,     ...     it  came  out  that  the  orders 
had  been  addressed  to  Major  Pitcairn,  who 
commanded  the  marines,  and  left  at  his  quar- " 
ters,  though  the  gentlemen  concerned  in  this 
business  ought  to  have  recollected  that  he  had 
been  despatched  the  evening  before  with  the 
grenadiers  and  infantry  under  Lt.  Col.  Smith. 
This  double  mistake  lost  us  from  four  till  nine 
o  'clock  when  we  marched  off  to  support  Lt.  Col. 
Smith." 
This  exploit  of  the  British  gained  them  nothing 
beyond  the  destruction  of  the  comparatively  insignifi- 
cant stores  at  Concord;- but  it  cost  them  a  loss  of 
prestige  which  was  not  restored  throughout  the  war, 
for  the  Americans  had  now  ventured  to  face  these 
regularly-equipped  regiments,  and  the  whole  country 
was  emboldened  by  the  result.     The  British  with- 
drawal from  Concord  was  hailed  as  a  victory ;  and, 

214 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  explain  the  position  of  weak- 
ness in  which  the  King's  troops  allowed  themselves 
at  once  to  be  placed.  For,  instead  of  resenting  the 
attacks  made  upon  them  along  the  road,  they  con- 
tinued to  retreat,  even  after  Earl  Percy  had  rein- 
forced the  first  detachment ;  they  never  stopped  until 
they  were  safely  within  the  lines  near  Boston,  and 
they  left  with  the  patriots  of  Massachusetts  the  in- 
calculable advantage  of  the  moral  effect  of  success 
upon  the  first  trial  of  strength.  From  this  time  for- 
ward General  Gage 's  garrison  was  actually  besieged 
in  Boston  and  prevented  even  from  coming  out  to 
forage,  by  the  very  men  whom  they  had  affected 
to  despise. 

Although  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  had  thus 
actually  occurred,  there  were  still  hopes  of  recon- 
ciliation in  the  minds  of  the  Americans ;  the  Congress 
which  assembled  in  Philadelphia  in  May  made  yet 
another  attempt  to  appeal  to  the  better  judgment 
of  the  King,  but  whilst  it  prepared  an  address  to  the 
Sovereign  it  also  prepared,  in  the  event  of  failure 
in  that  direction,  to  meet  the  ever-increasing  dangers 
at  home.  General  Gage  proclaimed  martial  law  in 
Massachusetts  early  in  June,  proscribing  by  name 
Samuel  Adams  and  John  Hancock  as  rebels,  and  de- 
claring all  those  to  be  traitors  who  should  remain 

215 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

under  arms  about  Boston,  also  the  members  of  the 
provincial  government  and  the  Continental  Congress. 

Almost  at  that  moment  the  British  reinforcements 
sent  out  from  England  arrived  in  Boston  under  three 
Major  Generals — Howe,  Clinton,  and  Burgoyne; 
and,  on  the  15th  of  June,  the  Continental  Congress 
appointed  General  Washington,  one  of  its  own  mem- 
bers, to  the  chief  command  of  the  army  which  had 
been  rapidly  forming  under  the  influence  of  the 
events  at  Concord,  and  was  then,  to  the  number  of 
fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men,  concentrated  about 
Cambridge. 

This  was  the  attitude,  then,  of  the  affairs  in 
America  when  the  first  actual  engagement  between 
the  Continental  army  and  the  British  forces  took 
place,  before  General  Washington  assumed  com- 
mand, and  whilst  General  Ward  was  still  performing 
that  duty,  on  the  17th  of  June,  at  Bunker  Hill,  which 
also  is  the  first  occasion  upon  which  we  meet  with 
General  Sir  William  Howe. 

The  action  of  Bunker  Hill  presents  some  distinc- 
tive features  which  entitle  it  to  be  remembered 
always  in  our  history;  notably  the  superior  enter- 
prise of  the  Americans  and  their  splendid  personal 
courage  in  battle — most  of  them  being  then  under 
fire  for  the  first  time.    Although  the  British  force  at 

216 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Boston  amounted  now  to  above  5000  effective  men, 
and  although  the  surrounding  country  was  daily 
becoming  more  hostile  and  disturbed,  the  General 
had  advanced  no  outposts  nor  sent  out  parties  of 
reconnaissance;  apparently  not  even  the  ordinary 
patrol  such  as  a  commander  would  naturally  employ 
to  protect  his  lines  and  watch  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  There  were  professional  military  men  and 
experienced  engineers  with  General  Gage  in  Boston, 
and  three  English  Major  Generals  whose  counsel  was 
at  least  available;  and  yet  no  step  was  taken,  until 
after  the  middle  of  June,  to  secure  one  of  the  most 
important  positions  in  the  vicinity  which,  in  a  mili- 
tary sense,  commanded  the  town.  But  with  that  confi- 
dence in  his  own  acts  which  he  still  retained,  General 
Gage,  although  blockaded  in  the  town  of  Boston,  sent 
out  another  proclamation  offering  pardon  to  all  the 
Americans,  except  Samuel  Adams  and  John  Hancock, 
who  would  submit  at  once,  and  threatening  to  punish 
those  who  refused. 

A  little  to  the  north  of  the  peninsula  of  Boston  is 
another,  similar  in  form,  called  the  peninsula  of 
Charlestown,  which  is  separated  from  it  by  the 
Charles  River.  This  peninsula  of  Charlestown, 
bounded  on  the  nortli  by  the  River  Mystic,  and  on  the 
east  by  Boston  harbor,  is  entirely  surrounded  by 

217 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

navigable  water  except  where  it  joins  the  mainland 
by  a  narrow  neck. 

There  were  two  eminences  upon  it, — the  one  near- 
est to  Boston,  about  seventy-five  feet  high,  called 
Breed's  Hill,  and  the  other,  somewhat  more  than  a 
hundred  feet  high,  at  the  foot  of  which  stood  the  tow^n 
of  Charlestown,  called  Bunker  Hill;  this  last  w^as 
sufficiently  prominent  to  overlook  any  part  of 
Boston,  and  near  enough  to  be  within  cannon  shot. 

The  council  of  war  in  the  American  camp  at  Cam- 
bridge, rightly  estimating  the  value  of  this  position, 
decided  to  occupy  and  fortify  it ;  and  being,  as  they 
always  were,  well  informed  of  what  was  taking  place 
within  the  British  lines,  they  knew  that  General 
Gage  contemplated  at  last  the  occupation  of  the 
peninsula  of  Charlestown ;  whereupon  they  decided  to 
forestall  him.  His  purpose  had  been  to  move  out  a 
force  in  that  direction  on  the  18th  of  June ;  the  Ameri- 
cans set  off  from  Cambridge  and  took  possession  of 
the  place  on  the  night  of  the  16th.  Early  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  17th  a  redoubt  about  eight  rods  square 
on  Breed's  Hill  appeared  to  the  astonished  eyes  of 
the  British  sentinels,  and  an  entrenchment  ran  along 
on  the  left  almost  to  the  Mystic  River.  Colonel  Pres- 
cott,  of  Pepperell,  with  a  thousand  men  supplied  with 
entrenching  tools  had  been  at  work  since  midnight 

218 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

and  were  discovered  at  sunrise,  having  nearly  com- 
pleted their  works,  which  in  many  places  were 
cannon-proof.  The  movement  had  been  carried  on  so 
skilfully  and  quietly  that,  although  three  British 
warships,  the  ** Lively,"  the  "Somerset,"  and  the 
''Falcon,"  lay  so  near  that  Prescott  could  hear  the 
sentries  cry  ** All's  well"  throughout  the  night,  he 
was  not  disturbed  until  the  day  broke.  The  guns 
of  the  "Lively"  were  immediately  trained  upon  the 
redoubt,  and  soon  a  battery  was  brought  to  bear  upon 
it  from  Copp  's  Hill,  in  Boston. 

But.  as  the  Continental  soldiers  still  held  their 
ground.  General  Gage  ordered  out  a  detachment  of 
grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  under  General  Howe, 
to  dislodge  them.  This  force  landed  on  the  peninsula 
of  Charlestown  about  noon  of  the  17tli  of  June. 
AVhen  Colonel  Prescott  saw  these  British  troops 
gaining  the  shore  in  the  direction  of  the  Mystic  River, 
somewhat  to  the  north  and  east  of  his  redoubt,  he 
sent  Colonel  Knowlton  with  his  men  from  Connecti- 
cut to  take  a  position  on  the  left,  in  order  to  oppose 
them.  About  two  hundred  yards  distant  from  Pres- 
cott's  redoubt  was  a  fence  of  posts  with  two  rails  set 
in  a  low  stone  wall,  and  extending  about  three  hun- 
dred yards  toward  the  Mystic;  here  Knowlton 's  men 
took  their  stand.     They  made  a  breastwork  of  the 

219 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

fence  by  weaving  grass  between  the  rails,  and  they 
carried  forward  another  post  and  rail  fence  which 
they  placed  behind  the  first  one  and  piled  new-mown 
hay  into  the  space  between  them.  Between  this  grass 
fence  and  Prescott  's  redoubt  was  an  open  space  which 
remained  undefended ;  and  there  was  a  similar  space 
to  the  left  where  the  ground  sloped  off  to  the  river; 
the  rear  was  entirely  unprotected.  Reinforcements 
came  in  from  Cambridge  during  the  morning,  so  that 
the  battle  actually  began  about  two  o'clock;  the  Con- 
tinentals under  Prescott,  Knowlton,  Warren,  Put- 
nam, and  Stark,  who  were  all  aiding  to  prepare  the 
defence,  amounted  to  1500  men. 

When  the  British  first  landed  and  saw  the  Ameri- 
cans ready  to  contest  the  ground  they  halted  and 
sent  back  to  General  Gage  for  more  troops,  who  came 
up  soon  and  then  the  whole  detachment,  consisting 
now  of  more  than  2000  men,  formed  in  two  lines  and 
advanced  up  the  slope.  General  Howe  leading  the 
light  infantry  on  the  right  against  the  grass  fence; 
General  Pigot  with  the  grenadiers  facing  the  redoubt. 
The  attack  was  begun  by  a  sharp  cannonade  from  the 
British  field-pieces  and  howitzers ;  the  troops  advanc- 
ing slowly  in  the  meantime  with  perfect  order  and 
precision.  The  Continentals  had  very  little  powder ; 
not  a  grain  to  waste.    Prescott,  therefore,  ordered 

220 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

his  men  to  hold  their  fire  until  the  enemy  were  within 
ten  or  twelve  rods;  Putnam,  who  was  behind  the 
fence,  told  his  people  to  wait  until  they  could  see  the 
whites  of  their  eyes,  and  not  to  discharge  a  gun  until 
the  vrord  was  given  to  fire.  Every  one  of  these  men, 
raised  in  a  country  w^here  the  woods  abounded  with 
game  and  where  the  inhabitants  were  accustomed  to 
firearms  from  their  infancy,  knew  how  to  use  a  rifle 
with  deadly  aim;  and  the  injunction  now"  given  them 
was  carefully  heeded.  Onward  came  the  British  line 
confident  of  immediate  success  and  easy  victory ;  ap- 
proaching nearly  to  the  Continental  works,  the  word 
fire  was  given  from  within,  and  every  gun  along  the 
redoubt  and  the  breastwork  was  discharged  with  a 
terribly  destructive  effect.  Almost  the  whole  of  the 
British  front  rank  went  down.  The  attacking  force 
was  staggered  by  this  unexpected  outburst  and  by 
the  continued  discharge  of  musketry  from  the  Ameri- 
can works,  where  some  loaded  guns  whilst  others 
fired.  The  British  recoiled,  giving  way  at  several 
points.  General  Howe  was  for  a  few  seconds  left 
nearly  alone ;  for  most  of  the  officers  about  him  were 
either  killed  or  wounded,  and  Stedman,  who  served 
as  a  British  officer  during  the  war,  tells  us  that:  '*It 
required  the  utmost  exertion  of  all  the  officers,  from 

the  generals  down  to  the  subalterns,  to  repair  the  dis- 
ss: 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

order  whicli  this  hot  and  unexpected  fire  had  pro- 
duced. '  * 

It  must  be  said  to  the  credit  of  the  British  soldiers 
that  they  formed  again  and  returned  a  second  time 
to  the  charge ;  and  again  they  were  received  by  the 
same  deadly  fire  which  halted  them  as  before. 
General  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  who  had  been  watching 
the  engagement  from  Boston,  now  hastily  came  upon 
the  ground  and  assisted  Howe  and  Pigot,  who  with 
great  exertion  brought  their  men  once  more  into  line. 
A  third  time  they  advanced,  now  with  fixed  bayonet 
and  without  firing  a  shot.  The  powder  of  the  Ameri- 
cans had  given  out ;  it  was  impossible  to  resist.  The 
last  shots  from  the  redoubt  were  fired  with  the  con- 
tents of  a  cannon  cartridge  which  had  been  opened 
for  the  purpose;  and  with  this  the  foremost  of  the 
British  were  killed  as  they  mounted  the  parapet, — 
among  them  being  the  same  Major  Pitcairn  who  had 
summoned  the  men  at  Lexington  to  disperse.  Pres- 
cott  gave  the  order  to  retire,  and  when  his  men  had 
abandoned  the  redoubt  Knowlton  and  his  Connecticut 
soldiers  left  the  rail  fence,  which  they  still  held 
against  an  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  turn  their  left, 
in  the  direction  of  the  Mystic. 

At  length  the  British  troops  had  gained  the  angle 
of  the  fence  and  had  also  turned  the  redoubt ;  but  the 

222 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

soldiers  were  too  greatly  fatigued  to  use  the  bayonet 
whilst  the  artillery  was  not  effective,  because,  by  one 
of  those  inexplicable  blunders  which  were  not  un- 
common at  that  time  in  the  British  service,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  twelve-pound  cannon-balls  had  been 
brought  for  six-pound  guns.  The  greatest  loss  which 
the  Americans  suffered  during  the  day  took  place 
upon  this  retreat,  and  it  was  at  this  moment  that  fell 
the  brave  and  lamented  General  Warren.  Of  killed 
and  wounded  there  were  some  four  hundred  and  fifty, 
while  upon  the  British  side  one-half  of  the  whole 
detachment  were  either  dead  upon  the  field  or  dis- 
abled ;  their  total  loss  amounting  to  over  a  thousand 
men  of  whom  nearly  a  hundred  were  commissioned 
officers.  Nothing  certainly  could  have  been  more 
clumsily  managed  than  this  attack  of  the  British  upon 
the  American  position,  in  which,  with  the  plainest 
opportunities  either  to  cut  Prescott  off  in  the  rear  or 
to  attack  him  in  the  flank  with  great  advantage,  the 
grenadiers  and  infantry,  accoutred  with  knapsacks, 
cartridge  boxes,  and  three  days'  provisions,  each  man 
carrying  the  weight  of  125  pounds,  were  marched, 
upon  an  intensely  hot  day,  up  a  slope  covered  with 
long  grass,  into  the  most  exposed  position  that  could 
have  been  sought. 

223 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

"We  went  to  battle  without  even  recon- 
noitering  the  position  of  the  enemy, ' '  wrote  one 
of  their  officers.  ' '  Had  we  only  wanted  to  drive 
them  from  their  ground,  without  the  loss  of  a 
man,  the  Cymetry  transport,  which  drew  little 
water,  and  mounted  18  nine-pounders,  could 
have  been  towed  up  Mystic  Channel  and  brought 
to  bear  within  musket  shot  of  their  left  flank; 
.  .  .  or  one  of  our  covered  boats,  musket- 
proof,  carrying  a  heavy  cannon,  might  have 
rowed  close  in,  and  one  discharge  on  their  un- 
covered flank  would  have  dislodged  them  in  a 
second.  .  .  .  Had  we  intended  to  take  the 
whole  rebel  army  prisoners,  we  needed  only  to 
land  in  their  rear  and  occupy  the  high  ground, 
and  by  this  movement  to  shut  them  up  in  the 
peninsula  as  in  a  bag.  But  from  an  absurd  and 
destructive  confidence,  carelessness,  or  igno- 
rance, we  have  lost  a  thousand  of  our  best  men 
and  officers,  .  .  .  the  wretched  blunder  of 
the  over-sized  balls  sprang  from  the  dotage  of 
an  officer  of  rank  in  that  corps,  who  spends  his 
whole  time  in  dallying  with  the  schoolmaster's 
daughters.  God  knows,  he  is  old  enough, — 
he  is  no  Samson, — yet  he  must  have  his 
Delilah." 

It  would  not  greatly  profit  us  now  to  occupy  our 

time  by  criticizing  the  generalship  of  Sir  William 

Howe  in  this  action,  the  defects  of  which  are  plainly 

evident  to  any  observer.     He  exerted  neither  pru- 

224 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

dence  nor  foresigiit;  nor  did  he  bring  into  use  the 
ordinary  rules  of  war  which  as  a  professional  soldier 
he  knew  well  by  study  and  experience,  and  of  which 
he  would  certainly  have  been  watchful  in  facing  the 
regularly  organized  forces  of  any  European  nation. 
It  is  plain  that  he  did  not  prepare  himself  for  battle, 
because  he  did  not  think  that  he  was  going  into 
battle;  but  he  acted  as  if  he  w^ere  dealing  with  a 
riot,  for  General  Howe  unquestionably  believed  that 
he  should  have  very  little  to  do  at  Bunker  Hill  be- 
yond the  mere  dispersing  of  a  mob.  It  is  a  striking 
example  of  the  danger  of  neglecting  the  military 
maxim,  never  to  despise  one 's  enemy,  through  which, 
in  an  incredibly  short  time,  Howe  lost  a  thousand 
of  his  best  troops  and  among  them  over  a  hundred 
of  his  commissioned  officers.  The  truth  is  that  the 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill  was  a  revelation  to  the  British 
army  and  the  British  people.  It  forced  them  to  open 
their  eyes  to  the  facts  wdiich  they  had  hitherto  stub- 
bornly disregarded.  The  same  General  Gage  who 
had  assured  the  King  that ' '  they  will  be  lions  whilst 
we  are  lambs,"  noted  with  astonishment  in  his  offi- 
cial report  to  the  war  office  in  London:  "The  con- 
duct, attention  and  perseverance  of  the  Continental 
troops";  admitting  now  to  the  Minister  that:  "The 
conquest  of  this  country  is  not  easy,"  and  justify- 

15  225 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ing  himself  by  the  remark:  *'I  think  it  my  duty  to 
let  your  Lordship  know  the  true  situation  of  affairs. ' ' 

From  that  day  to  this  there  has  been  no  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  anybody  as  to  this  quality  of  courage 
in  the  American  character;  for,  however  the  resis- 
tance at  Lexington  and  Concord  might  have  been 
treated  and  accepted  as  the  desultory  action  of  an 
excited  populace,  even  if  the  subsequent  events  of  the 
war  had  not  demonstrated  their  true  spirit,  the  bat- 
tle of  Bunker  Hill  established  the  fact  that  Ameri- 
cans are  both  patriots  and  soldiers.  Benjamin 
Franklin  saw  the  bearing  of  it,  at  a  glance,  and  wrote 
to  his  friends  in  England:  ''The  Americans  will 
fight ;  England  has  lost  her  Colonies  forever. ' ' 

Beyond  occupying  the  ground  at  Bunker  Hill,  the 
British  made  no  serious  effort  to  follow  up  that 
action,  which,  although  in  the  sense  of  their  having 
dislodged  the  enemy  it  might  have  been  called  a 
victory,  was  in  fact  little  more  than  a  defeat:  for  it 
had  cost  them  quite  out  of  proportion  to  the  slight 
advantage  they  had  gained  and  it  made  them  cau- 
tious, not  to  say  timid,  in  advancing  beyond  their  en- 
trenchments; while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  had  en- 
couraged the  Americans  to  acts  of  boldness  which 
gave  them  an  appearance  of  strength  which  they 
really  did  not  possess. 

226 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

General  Washington  took  command  of  the  Ameri- 
can army,  at  Cambridge,  on  the  3rd  of  July,  1775,  and 
although  he  found  himself  at  the  head  of  some  four- 
teen or  fifteen  thousand  men,  they  were  not  disci- 
plined, were  not  used  to  service  in  the  field,  were  gen- 
erally armed  with  their  own  guns  which  they  had 
brought  with  them;  under  an  exceedingly  defective 
system  of  enlistments  they  had  been  engaged  only 
for  short  terms,  so  that  their  time  of  service  expired 
and  many  were  constantly  going  back  to  their  homes. 
Furthermore,  there  was  so  little  powder  that  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  sustain  a  general  engage- 
ment. With  this  force  he  had  to  maintain  his  line  of 
blockade  on  the  land  side,  from  Roxbury  on  the  right 
to  the  Mystic  River  on  the  left;  and  to  secure  the 
centre  where  his  o^ti  headquarters  were  at  Cam- 
bridge. But  on  the  other  hand,  and  with  an  incon- 
ceivable lack  of  enterprise,  the  British  General 
allowed  himself  thus  to  be  hemmed  in  until  pro- 
visions failed  and  the  garrison  was  reduced  almost 
to  want.  The  reports  sent  home  of  the  engagement 
at  Bunker  Hill  and  the  situation  of  the  King's 
troops  in  Boston  created  profound  disappointment 
in  England,  upon  which  the  Ministry  decided  to  re- 
call General  Gage  in  the  hope  of  entrusting  the  cam- 
paign to  the  direction  of  a  more  spirited  commander. 

227 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Gage  retired,  therefore,  upon  the  10th  of  October, 
and  the  chief  command  was  given  to  Major  General 
Howe,  with  whom  we  shall  have  to  deal  henceforth. 

William  Howe,  who  was  at  this  time  a  man  forty- 
six  years  of  age  (having  been  born  on  the  10th  of 
August,  1729),  was  descended  from  an  ancient  family 
which  had  long  been  distinguished  in  the  counties  of 
Somerset,  Wilts,  and  Dorset.  His  father  was  Eman- 
uel Scrope  Howe,  Baron  Clenawley  and  Viscount 
Howe,  who  had  been  Governor  of  Barbadoes,  and 
his  mother  was  called  Sophia  Charlotte  Mary, 
daughter  of  Baron  Kielmansegge,  Master  of  the 
Horse  to  George  I.  Personally,  he  was  six  feet  in 
height,  rather  coarse  in  appearance  and  exceedingly 
dark.  One  of  the  Quakers  who  lived  near  the  scene 
of  action  at  Brandywine  who  saw  him  upon  the  field 
at  that  battle,  described  him  as  a  large,  portly  man, 
with  coarse  features,  who  appeared  to  have  lost  his 
teeth,  as  his  mouth  had  fallen  in.  And  one  of  his  own 
officers,  writing  at  the  time,  said  of  him,  that  "his 
manners  were  sullen  and  ungracious,  with  a  dislike 
to  business  and  a  propensity  to  pleasure.  His  staff 
officers  were  in  general  below  mediocrity,  with  some 
of  whom,  and  a  few  field  officers,  he  passed  most  of  his 
time  in  private  conviviality. ' ' 

General  Howe  was  educated  at  Eton,  and  had  been 

228 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

in  the  army  since  1746,  when  he  was  made  a  Comet  in 
the  Duke  of  Cumberland's  dragoons  at  the  age  of 
seventeen.  He  had  greatly  distinguished  himself  in 
the  expedition  against  Quebec  under  Wolfe,  a  com- 
rade of  his  and  an  intimate  friend.  Howe  led  the  for- 
lorn hope  of  twenty-four  men  which  forced  the  en- 
trenched path  when  Wolfe's  soldiers  scaled  the 
lieights  of  Abraham,  on  the  IStli  of  September,  1759. 
He  commanded  a  brigade  afterwards  at  the  siege 
of  Belle  Isle,  on  the  coast  of  Brittany,  in  1761 ;  and 
was  adjutant  general  of  the  army  at  the  conquest  of 
Havana,  in  1762.  When  the  Seven  Years  War  ended, 
no  officer  in  England  had  a  more  brilliant  record 
of  service  than  How^e.  He  must  have  had  feelings 
of  kindness  toward  America,  for  besides  the  fact  that 
many  of  the  Colonists  had  once  been  his  companions 
in  arms,  his  eldest  brother,  George  Augustus,  Vis- 
count Howe,  was  killed  in  the  attack  upon  Ticon- 
deroga,  in  1758 ;  and  the  people  of  Massachusetts  had 
erected  a  monument  to  him  in  Westminster  Abbey, 
"in  testimony  of  the  sense  they  had  of  his  services 
and  military  virtues,  and  of  the  affection  their  offi- 
cers and  soldiers  bore  to  his  command." 

General  Howe  had  been  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
the  Government  toward  the  Colonies,  and  had  told 
his  constituents  in  Nottingham,  whom  he  represented 

229 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

in  Parliament  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  Revolution, 
that  he  would  never  accept  a  command  in  America. 
The  thought  sometimes  forces  itself  upon  one's 
mind,  in  studying  the  career  of  this  officer  in  America, 
and  in  the  effort  to  understand  his  remarkable  con- 
duct of  the  war, — which  was  often  remarkable  rather 
for  what  he  did  not  do  than  for  what  he  did, — and 
his  failures  to  act  which  are  frequently  inexplicable, 
that  po^ibly  this  old  friendship  still  influenced  him, 
and  that  he  preferred  to  sacrifice  his  military  reputa- 
tion, that  he  even  chose  rather  to  let  Great  Britain 
run  the  risk  of  losing  her  Colonies  than  by  his  exer- 
tions to  bring  back  to  subjection  a  people  with  whom 
he  sympathized  and  whom  he  did  not  wish  to  con- 
quer. It  is  true,  indeed,  that  if  this  were  so,  then 
General  Howe  should  not  have  been  in  America,  and 
his  conduct  was  neither  soldierly  nor  loyal;  for,  in 
that  event,  he  would  have  been  arrayed  in  arms 
against  those  whom  secretly  he  befriended,  and  he 
would  have  betrayed  the  trust  reposed  in  him  by  his 
Sovereign  in  protecting  thus  the  enemies  of  the 
King.  We  have  no  right  to  assume  that  this  was 
certainly  the  case,  but  whether  it  were,  or  whether 
he  was  induced  by  some  other  secret  purpose,  there 
is  no  doubt,  as  the  incidents  of  the  next  two  cam- 
paigns will  show,  that  he  never  did  his  utmost  to 

230 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

attain  the  object  for  which  he  had  been  sent  to  this 
country,  and  that  upon  more  than  one  occasion  he 
actually  thwarted  the  designs  of  Great  Britain.  He 
was  an  indolent  and  luxurious  man  who  preferred 
leisure  to  activity;  but  this  alone  does  not  explain 
the  case  upon  the  ground  of  wilful  neglect,  for  the 
frequent  recurrence  of  the  occasions  during  the  war 
when  he  stopped  almost  in  view  of  assured  success 
appears  strongly  to  indicate  method  and  deliberation. 
From  the  time  of  his  having  assumed  command, 
in  October,  1775',  Howe  remained  inactive  in  Boston 
throughout  the  winter;  closely  blockaded  and  con- 
stantly more  nearly  pressed  by  the  approaches  of 
General  Washington,  who  finally  advanced  to  a  com- 
manding position  upon  Dorchester  Heights,  which 
he  fortified  within  range  of  the  shipping  in  the  harbor 
as  well  as  the  troops  of  the  British  garrison.  There- 
upon Howe  abandoned  the  place  hastily,  sent  his  men 
aboard  the  transports,  and,  without  making  an  effort 
to  defend  himself,  sailed  away  with  his  whole  force 
to  Halifax,  in  March,  1776.  His  object  in  going  there, 
as  it  is  stated  by  himself,  was  to  wait  until  provisions 
and  reinforcements  could  arrive  from  Europe,  though 
Halifax  was  practically  stripped  of  provisions  dur- 
ing the  winter,  and  Howe  had  with  him  nine  thousand 
men  including  sailors.    The  British  Secretary  of  War 

231 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

had  contemplated  the  evacuation  of  Boston  during 
the  winter  in  favor  of  New  York  or  some  post  farther 
south,  but  General  Howe  declared  that  Halifax  was 
the  only  place  where  the  army  could  wait,  and  thither 
he  went,  in  the  face  of  the  consequences  which  were 
sure  to  be  unfavorable  to  him.  The  criticism  was 
made  at  that  time,  and  is  no  doubt  true,  that  if  he 
had  taken  up  a  position  upon  Long  Island,  for  in- 
stance, he  would  have  been  able  to  support  his  men 
with  ease  in  a  productive  country,  and  he  would  still 
have  been  within  contact  with  New  York  and  New 
England,  where  his  presence  would  at  least  have 
served  to  occupy  the  attention  of  part  of  the  Con- 
tinental army,  whilst  he  might  from  there  have 
watched  the  movements,  and  anticipated  the  designs, 
of  the  Americans.  His  complete  withdrawal  now  left 
the  field  clear  to  them  without  molestation  to  raise 
and  discipline  the  troops  necessary  to  open  the  next 
campaign. 

Nothing  that  he  could  have  done,  short  of  actual 
surrender,  could  so  have  animated  the  Colonists  and 
stimulated  them  to  new  and  greater  exertions.  The 
capture  of  Boston  spread  an  enthusiasm  throughout 
the  country  the  effect  of  which  can  scarcely  be  over- 
estimated. Everywhere  it  was  hailed  with  delight 
as  a  glorious  victory,  which  indeed  it  was ;  and  Con- 

232 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

gress  voted  a  gold  medal  for  it  to  General  Washing- 
ton. At  tlie  same  moment,  Lord  George  Germain,  the 
Colonial  Secretary  in  the  British  Cabinet,  "ac- 
quainted General  Howe  that,  under  the  circum- 
stances .  .  .  the  step  which  he  very  prudently 
took,  of  withdrawing  from  the  Town  of  Boston,  was 
entirely  approved  by  the  King,  and  in  the  execution 
of  which  he  had  given  the  fullest  proof  of  His  Maj- 
esty's Wisdom  and  Discernment  in  the  choice  of  so 
able  and  brave  an  officer." 

Howe's  plan  of  campaign,  as  we  gather  it  from 
his  official  communications  to  the  War  Office  in  Lon- 
don, was,  to  bring  over  as  large  a  reinforcement  as 
possible  and  to  begin  operations  early  the  following 
spring  by  taking  and  holding  New  York ;  by  sending 
a  sufficient  force  to  Rhode  Island  in  order  to  inter- 
rupt united  action  in  New  England ;  and  by  keeping  a 
garrison  at  Halifax  to  prevent  any  sympathetic  move- 
ment from  that  direction  in  favor  of  the  United 
Colonies.  Unless  a  large  force  were  sent  from  Eng- 
land early  in  the  spring,  he  said,  another  defensive 
campaign  would  be  the  consequence, ' '  for,  by  want  of 
a  force  to  act  early,  the  rebels  would  have  time  to  en- 
trench wherever  they  chose ;  in  which  case,  though  we 
should  get  possession  of  New  York  without  resist- 
ance, we  must  not  expect  to  carry  their  entrenched 

233 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

camps  but  with  great  loss ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary, 
if  the  army  were  in  force  at  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, it  would  probably  by  rapid  movements  bring 
the  rebels  to  action  upon  equal  terms  before  they 
could  cover  themselves  by  works  of  any  consequence ; 
.  .  .  with  a  proper  army  of  20,000  men,  having 
12,000  at  New  York,  6000  at  Rhode  Island,  and  2000 
at  Halifax,  exclusive  of  an  army  for  the  province  of 
Quebec,  the  present  unfavorable  appearances  would 
wear  a  different  aspect."  (15  January,  1776, — from 
Boston,  to  Lord  Dartmouth.) 

In  reply  to  this,  the  Colonial  Secretary  assured 
him  that  considerable  reinforcements  should  be  sent 
to  him  in  the  spring,  and  acquainted  him  that  through 
the  negotiations  made  with  certain  German  Princes, 
there  would  be  a  large  number  of  auxiliaries;  of 
these,  more  than  12,000,  being  the  whole  body  of 
Hessians,  were  intended  to  serve  in  his  army,  whilst 
the  Brunswickers,  Waldeckers,  and  the  regiment  of 
the  Hereditary  Prince  of  Hesse  were  to  serve  in 
Canada.  He  expressed  his  opinion  that  this  latter 
army  would  advance  into  the  Colonies  by  the  passage 
of  the  Lakes. 

At  this  early  moment  we  see  evidences  of  the  plan 
which  was  ultimately  attempted  by  the  British  Minis- 
try :  namely,  to  use  New  York  as  a  base  of  operations, 

234 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

to  gain  the  Hudson  Eiver  and  separate  the  middle 
Colonies  as  much  as  possible  from  New  England,  and 
to  join  hands  between  the  two  divisions  of  the  King's 
army  by  an  expedition  from  Canada  toward  the 
South.  The  resources  of  Great  Britain  having  failed, 
however,  to  produce  a  sufficient  number  of  men  for 
these  enterprises,  recourse  was  had  to  subsidizing  or, 
as  it  really  was,  to  buying  foreign  troops.  The 
British  Government  entered  into  treaties  with  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse- 
Cassel,  the  Hereditary  Prince  of  Hesse-Cassel, 
and  the  Prince  of  Waldeck,  by  which,  as  ap- 
pears from  the  original  documents,  those  poten- 
tates agreed  to  furnish  about  18,000  men,  at  the  rate 
of  £7  4s  4d  per  man ;  all  extraordinary  losses  in  battle 
or  otherwise  to  be  compensated  by  the  King.  In 
addition,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  received  an  annual 
salary  of  £15,519  so  long  as  his  men  received  pay, 
and  double  the  sum  for  two  years  after;  the  Land- 
grave of  Hesse  £108,281  per  annum  and  twelve 
months'  notice  before  payment  should  stop,  after  the 
return  home  of  his  troops.  The  smaller  Princes  were 
proportionately  compensated,  and  they  were  all  guar- 
anteed against  foreign  attack  whilst  their  subjects 
were  thus  employed  abroad.  It  is  said  that  Frederick 
the  Great  looked  with  such  contempt  upon  this  sort 

235 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  recruits  that  he  threatened  to  tax  them  as  it  was 
the  custom  to  tax  cattle,  when  they  were  driven 
through  his  dominions  upon  their  way  to  America. 

Having  lain  at  Halifax  for  more  than  two  months, 
General  Howe  decided  now  to  move  toward  New  York 
in  order  to  meet  there  the  expected  reinforcements 
and  to  open  the  campaign  with  so  great  a  superiority 
over  the  Continental  army  as  to  produce  an  imme- 
diate result.  He  arrived  at  Sandy  Hook  on  the  29th 
of  June,  1776,  and  proceeded  to  land  at  Staten  Island, 
where  he  was  joined  a  few  days  later  by  the  fleet 
from  England,  under  his  brother,  the  admiral.  Lord 
Howe,  with  a  detachment  of  finely-equipped  troops 
provided  with  artillery,  ammunition,  and  every  prep- 
aration for  w^ar  which  was  then  known  to  military 
science.  This  gave  him,  besides  the  control  of  the 
navigable  waters,  an  effective  force  of  30,000  men; 
and  it  must  be  admitted  that,  if  that  army  had  been 
directed  with  even  reasonable  enterprise  and  skill, 
there  was  nothing  in  America  that  could  have  resisted 
it.  The  use  which  Howe  made  of  his  opportunity 
is  astonishing.  After  having  halted  upon  Staten 
Island  for  two  months,  during  which  he  was  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  a  small  portion  of  his  command,  he 
did  not  open  the  campaign  until  the  end  of  August, 
when  he  began  his  operations  by  attacking  General 

236 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Washington's  army  upon  Long  Island.  The  Ameri- 
can Commander-in-Chief  had  rightly  judged,  after 
the  evacuation  of  Boston,  that  the  next  point  of  in- 
terest to  the  British  would  be  New  York ;  and  he  had 
turned  his  whole  energy  into  that  direction,  accord- 
ingly, in  order  to  be  ready  to  defend  it  against  the 
enemy  when  they  should  reappear.  He  had  strength- 
ened the  works  upon  New  York  Island,  and,  aided 
by  the  British  delay,  had  erected  a  fort  at  the  north- 
ern end  of  it  which  was  called  Fort  Washington,  with 
another  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  in  New 
Jersey,  afterwards  called  Fort  Lee,  and  the  channel 
of  the  river  had  been  obstructed  by  hulks  of  vessels 
and  clievaux-de-frise;  batteries  were  erected  also 
along  the  North  and  East  Rivers ;  King's  Bridge  was 
fortified  and  the  whole  island  put  into  as  good  a  state 
of  defence  as  was  possible  under  the  circumstances. 
General  Washington's  force  which  was  opposed  to 
the  formidable  British  armament  consisted  of  some 
nine  thousand  men, — increased  later  by  fresh  enlist- 
ments to  fifteen  thousand, — many  of  them  militia 
fresh  from  home,  totally  unaccustomed  to  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  army  and  the  exposures  of  the  camps, 
which  produced  much  sickness  among  them.  This 
army  of  defence  was  necessarily  widely  distributed 
at  different  points  from  Brooklyn  to  King's  Bridge, 

237 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

over  a  space  of  more  than  fifteen  miles.  General 
Washington  had  also  posted  a  strong  detachment  at 
Brooklyn,  and  had  secured  that  part  of  Long  Island 
at  the  point  immediately  opposite  New  York  by  a 
chain  of  entrenchments  and  redoubts  running  along 
the  high  ground  from  Wallabout  Bay,  the  site  of  the 
present  Navy  Yard,  to  Gowan's  Cove;  whilst  on  the 
water  side  batteries  were  erected  at  Eed  Hook  and 
on  Governor's  Island. 

It  is  worthy  of  mention  that  the  admiral,  Lord 
Howe,  had  brought  with  him  to  America  a  commis- 
sion from  the  King  which  gave  authority  to  himself 
and  his  brother  for  the  establishment  of  peace  and 
the  restoration  of  harmony  between  the  Mother 
Country  and  the  Colonies,  and  it  is  exceedingly  prob- 
able that  Sir  William  Howe  hoped  to  put  an  end  to 
the  war  in  that  manner;  there  is  strong  reason  to 
believe  that  his  concentration  of  the  army  at  Staten 
Island  for  so  long  a  time,  in  conjunction  with  the 
imposing  fleet  of  Admiral  Howe,  was  intended  by 
him  to  impress  itself  upon  the  minds  of  the  Conti- 
nentals with  the  purpose  of  inducing  them  to  take 
steps  toward  a  treaty,  which  he  would  have  accepted 
with  exceeding  gratification.  It  was  found,  however, 
upon  discussing  the  question  in  view  of  a  communi- 
cation sent  by  Lord  Howe  and  his  brother  to  Con- 

238 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

gress,  that  the  powers  of  the  British  commanders  for 
making  peace  consisted  chiefly  of  the  right  to  grant 
pardon  in  the  name  of  King  George,  and  General 
Washington  replied  to  their  messenger  that  "men 
who  had  done  no  wrong  required  no  pardon";  after 
which  further  negotiations  in  that  direction  became 
impossible. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  also  that  it  was  after  Sir 
William  Howe's  landing  at  Staten  Island,  and,  in- 
deed, after  the  arrival  of  his  brother's  fleet  from 
England,  that  the  Continental  Congress  enacted  the 
Declaration  of  Independence. 

General  Howe  began  hostilities  at  length  on  the 
night  of  the  26th  of  August,  having  landed  his  troops 
upon  Long  Island,  in  Gravesend  Bay,  a  little  to  the 
right  of  the  Narrows.  The  American  forces,  some 
ten  thousand  strong,  were  encamped  upon  the 
ground  where  the  city  of  Brooklyn  now  stands,  with 
a  system  of  entrenchments  which  extended  along 
their  whole  line  to  protect  them  in  front.  Beyond 
these  entrenchments  and  running  parallel  with  them 
was  a  range  of  hills  which  separated  the  American 
camp  from  the  position  taken  up  by  the  British. 
The  key  to  the  situation  lay  in  the  occupation  of 
these  hills,  over  wiiich  there  were  several  passes  with 
roads  leading  through  them.    General  Putnam,  who 

239 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

commanded  the  post  at  Brooklyn,  had  thrown  for- 
ward a  strong  detachment,  under  General  Sullivan 
and  General  Lord  Stirling,  to  defend  the  hills  against 
the  evident  intention  of  the  British  to  gain  posses- 
sion of  them.  The  two  armies  were  then  separated  by 
a  distance  of  about  four  miles;  the  British  having 
been  thrown  into  three  divisions,  with  the  Hessians 
under  de  Heister  in  the  centre ;  a  column  under  Gen- 
eral Grant  on  the  left  toward  the  Bay ;  and  another, 
under  Lord  Percy,  Earl  Cornwallis,  and  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  on  the  extreme  right  near  the  opposite  shore 
at  Flatland. 

Before  daybreak  on  the  27th  of  August,  the  day 
upon  which  the  battle  took  place,  the  British  under 
Clinton  succeeded  in  occupying  one  of  the  passes 
through  the  hills,  by  which  he  was  enabled  without 
detection  to  throw  forward  his  right  and  obtain  a 
flanking  position  behind  the  American's  left,  under 
Sullivan.  Early  in  the  morning  the  action  began 
and  an  exceedingly  heavy  cannonade  took  place  upon 
both  sides.  Grant  and  de  Heister  advanced  upon 
Lord  Stirling  and  Sullivan  respectively,  and  very 
soon  the  firing  upon  their  left  disclosed  to  the  Ameri- 
cans the  fact  that  they  had  been  flanked  and  were 
then  in  danger  of  being  surrounded  and  driven  by  the 
Hessians  in  front  upon  the  British  behind,  and  so 

240 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

back  again.  The  only  hope  lay  in  a  retreat  toward  the 
entrenchments.  This  was  accomplished  by  a  portion 
of  the  Continental  troops ;  but  the  rout  became  gen- 
eral, many  w^ere  killed  upon  the  field,  others  were  en- 
gulfed and  drowned  in  the  swamps,  and  at  least  a 
thousand  rank  and  file  were  made  prisoners,  among 
whom  were  both  the  generals  Sullivan  and  Stirling. 
The  whole  British  force,  which  had  suffered  com- 
paratively little,  advanced  now  upon  the  American 
entrenchments  and  against  them  its  attack  was  con- 
centrated, both  officers  and  men  made  confident  by 
the  outcome  of  their  operations,  which,  it  must  be 
admitted,  had  thus  far  been  highly  successful.  But  at 
this  point  occurred  one  of  those  strange  incidents 
which  mark  the  campaign,  and  which  it  is  now  im- 
possible to  account  for.  General  Howe  gave  orders 
to  stop  the  engagement  and  withdraw  the  troops. 
His  explanation  of  this  step,  given  afterwards  be- 
fore a  committee  of  Parliament,  was  that :  "As  it  was 
apparent  the  lines  must  have  been  ours  at  a  cheap 
rate,  by  regular  approaches,  I  would  not  risk  the 
loss  that  might  have  been  sustained  in  the  assault, 
and  ordered  them  back  to  a  hollow  way  in  front  of 
the  works,  out  of  reach  of  musketry. ' ' 

Stedman  tells  us  that  the  courage  of  the  British 
troops,  on  this  occasion,  "was  so  impetuous  that  it 

16  241 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

was  not  without  difficulty  that  they  could  be  re- 
strained from  attacking  the  American  lines;"  but 
Sir  William  Howe  declared  that,  "admitting  the 
works  to  have  been  forced,  the  only  advantage  we 
should  have  gained  would  have  been  the  destruction 
of  a  few  more  men, ' '  and, ' '  in  this  instance  from  the 
certainty  of  being  in  possession  of  the  lines  in  a 
very  few  days  by  breaking  ground,  to  have  permitted 
the  attack  in  question  would  have  been  inconsiderate, 
even  criminal. ' '  This  reasoning,  however,  is  not  ade- 
quate; for  the  result  proved  that  he  was  not  in 
possession  of  the  lines  by  having  captured  them 
within  a  few  days ;  and  we  know  that  if  he  had  taken 
them  by  assault  during  the  action  of  the  27th  of 
August,  and  had  made  the  American  garrison  pris- 
oners, he  would  have  gained  a  victory  which  would 
have  shaken,  if  indeed  it  had  not  completely  broken, 
the  power  of  resistance  in  the  Colonies.  There  is  no 
conceivable  reason  why,  with  his  greatly  superior 
armament,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  British  fleet  to 
hem  them  in  on  the  water  side,  he  should  not  have 
done  this  if  he  had  chosen.  He  sat  down,  however,  in 
front  of  the  American  works  and  broke  ground  for 
a  regular  approach  upon  the  following  day,  the' 
28th,  and  he  gave  General  Washington  an  oppor- 
tunity to  perform  one  of  the  most  daring  and  brilliant 

242 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

feats  of  the  war, — in  carrying  out  which,  on  the  night 
of  the  29th,  he  evacuated  his  lines,  put  his  men  into 
the  boats  and  slipped  across  the  East  Eiver  to  New 
York.  Indeed,  too  much  can  scarcely  be  said  in 
praise  of  this  achievement  upon  the  part  of  the  Con- 
tinental Chief.  Even  the  British  were  struck  by  it 
with  admiration.  "The  circumstances,"  wrote 
Stedman  at  the  time,  "were  particularly  glorious 
to  the  Americans.  They  were  driven  to  the  corner 
of  an  island,  where  they  were  hemmed  in  within  the 
narrow  space  of  two  square  miles.  In  their  front 
was  an  encampment  of  near  twenty  thousand  men ;  in 
the  rear  an  arm  of  the  sea  a  mile  wide  which  they 
could  not  cross  but  in  several  embarkations.  Not- 
withstanding these  difficulties  they  secured  a  retreat 
without  the  loss  of  a  man. ' '  AVhilst  the  British  were 
stubbornly  laying  out  their  regular  approaches  in  his 
front.  General  Washington  stole  from  under  their 
eyes,  and  in  the  space  of  thirteen  hours  passed  over 
the  river  his  nine  thousand  men,  besides  artillery, 
ammunition,  provisions,  cattle,  horses  and  carts; 
and  this  in  the  same  boats  by  which  he  had  brought 
his  men  over,  they  still  having  lain  at  their  moorings 
undisturbed  by  the  British,  who  never  thought  of 
taking  or  destroying  them  to  cut  off  a  retreat.  The 
indefatigable  American  Commander  was  constantly 

243 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

upon  the  ground  during  this  battle  of  Long  Island ; 
and  from  its  commencement,  on  the  morning  of  the 
27th,  until  the  troops  had  crossed  the  East  River,  on 
the  morning  of  the  29th,  he  was  most  of  the  time  on 
horseback. 

Although  the  Continental  army  had  thus  escaped 
capture  or  destruction,  the  defeat  at  Long  Island  had 
a  disastrous  effect  upon  the  minds  especially  of  those 
who  had  been  called  into  service  for  only  a  short  time, 
and  it  left  General  Washington  in  serious  embarrass- 
ment. ''Our  situation,"  said  he,  "is  truly  distress- 
ing. The  check  our  detachment  sustained  on  the 
27th  has  dispirited  too  great  a  proportion  of  our 
troops,  and  filled  their  minds  with  apprehension  and 
despair.  The  militia  are  dismayed,  intractable,  and 
impatient  to  return,"  and,  ''their  example  has  in- 
fected another  part  of  the  army."  Whilst  their 
earlier  contact  with  the  British  army  at  Boston  had 
led  the  Continentals  greatly  to  overestimate  their 
own  powers  at  that  time  and  to  discredit  the  training 
which  makes  a  seasoned  and  reliable  force,  so  now, 
the  sight  of  the  dangers  by  which  they  had  been  sur- 
rounded in  this  late  engagement  broke  their  confi- 
dence and  excited  alarm,  as  might  have  been  expected 
from  troops  without  experience,  discipline,  or  knowl- 
edge of  war.    A  vigorous  and  well-sustained  assault 

^44 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

by  General  Howe  at  that  moment  could  not  have 
failed  to  give  him  a  decisive  advantage,  and  one  which 
probably  would  very  greatly  have  changed  the  course 
of  events  in  America.  "VMiat  followed,  however,  was 
upon  the  British  side  neither  vigorous  nor  well- 
sustained.  These  movements,  most  interesting  in 
detail,  may  be  mentioned  only  in  passing  now ;  though 
well  worthy  of  the  careful  attention  of  American 
students.  Immediately  after  the  victory  at  Brook- 
lyn, preparations  were  made  to  attack  New  York.  A 
part  of  the  British  fleet  sailed  around  Long  Island 
and  entered  the  Sound,  whilst  several  of  the  frigates 
moved  up  the  Hudson  River,  easily  passing  the  bat- 
teries of  Fort  AVashington  on  one  side  and  Fort  Lee 
on  the  other,  and  unhindered  by  the  chevaux-de- 
frise  which  had  been  intended  to  close  the  channel. 
By  the  middle  of  September  they  had  forced  General 
Washington  farther  and  farther  to  the  north  of  New 
York  Island  until,  in  order  to  prevent  himself  from 
being  cut  off  by  the  enemy  who  had  now  landed  at 
Kip's  Bay,  about  the  present  Thirty-fourth  Street, 
he  had  withdrawn  to  King's  Bridge,  which  he  had 
strongly  fortified,  and  held  the  heights  of  Harlem, 
upon  which  he  maintained  an  entrenched  camp.  The 
British,  in  the  meantime,  in  full  possession  of  New 

York,  lay  with  their  main  body  near  the  American 

ii5 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

lines,  their  right  resting  upon  Iloren  's  Hook,  on  the 
East  River,  about  the  present  One  Hundredth  Street, 
and  extending  across  the  upper  part  of  what  is  now 
Central  Park,  their  left  reaching  to  Bloomingdale. 
Thus,  during  more  than  two  weeks,  the  British  had 
taken  no  decisive  step  to  follow  up  their  advantage 
at  Brooklyn,  but,  on  the  contrary,  by  easy  movements 
they  had  given  General  Washington  what  was  most 
serviceable  to  him,  time  to  encourage  his  men  and, 
by  slight  skirmishes  here  and  there,  to  enure  them  to 
their  situation  in  front  of  an  organized  force ;  while 
each  day  that  passed  wore  away  the  season  and 
wasted  the  opportunity  for  an  active  campaign. 

In  this  manner  another  month  was  consumed; 
GTeneral  Washington  had  abandoned  New  York 
Island;  Howe  had  landed  his  main  body  at  Pell's 
Point,  on  the  Sound,  and  had  moved  forward  through 
Pelham  Manor  toward  New  Rochelle.  By  the  middle 
of  October  the  Americans  had  retired  to  a  strong 
position  at  Wliite  Plains,  extending  some  twelve  or 
thirteen  miles  in  a  series  of  entrenched  camps  on  the 
different  heights  from  Valentine's  Hill  near  King's 
Bridge  to  White  Plains,  fronting  the  British  line  of 
march  and  the  river  Bronx  which  lay  between  them, 
and  ready  to  concentrate  at  any  point  as  it  might 
become  necessary. 

24G 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

At  the  end  of  October  followed  what  is  known  as 
the  battle  of  White  Plains.  Two  months  had  already 
passed  since  the  action  upon  Long  Island,  and  it 
appeared  very  likely  that  at  last  General  Howe  was 
about  to  redeem  his  lost  opportunities  for  action 
by  an  enterprise  which  his  present  situation  almost 
in  front  of  the  American  camp  seemed  to  invite.  But 
after  an  attack  upon  a  detached  portion  of  the  Con- 
tinental troops  who  occupied  a  portion  so  remote 
from  the  camp  that  its  capture,  which  was  effected 
with  the  loss  of  rather  a  large  number  of  men,  could 
serve  no  purpose,  and  after  threatening  a  general 
engagement,  which  he  declared  he  had  postponed  on 
account  of  a  heavy  rain,  he  suddenly  withdrew  his 
army  and  retired  toward  New  York. 

It  was  incredible  that  he  should  seriously  intend 
at  that  moment  to  abandon  the  campaign ;  it  seemed 
as  if  this  must  be  either  a  strategic  movement  of  some 
sort  or  an  attempt  to  draw  the  Americans  do^\^l 
from  their  strong  position  to  one  where  they  could  be 
attacked  with  advantage.  General  Washington 
wrote : 

' '  On  Tuesday  morning  the  enemy  broke  up 
their  encampments,  which  were  in  front  of  our 
linos,  after  having  remained  there  several  days 
without  attempting  anything.    They  have  gone 

247 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

toward  the  North  River,  and  King's  Bridge. 
This  sudden  and  unexpected  movement  is  a  mat- 
ter of  speculation.  Some  suppose  they  are 
going  into  winter  quarters  and  will  sit  down  in 
New  York,  without  doing  more  than  investing 
Fort  Washington.  I  cannot  subscribe  wholly 
to  this  opinion  myself.  That  they  will  invest 
Fort  Washington  is  a  matter  of  which  there  can 
be  no  doubt ;  and  I  think  there  is  a  strong  prob- 
ability that  General  Howe  will  detach  a  part 
of  his  force  to  make  an  incursion  into  the  Jer- 
seys, provided  he  is  going  to  New  York.  He 
must  attempt  something  on  account  of  his  repu- 
tation; for  what  has  he  done  as  yet  with  his 
great  army?  Persuaded  that  an  expedition 
to  the  Jerseys  will  succeed  his  arrival  at  New 
York  with  a  detachment  of  his  army,  as  soon 
as  I  can  be  satisfied  that  the  present  manoeuvre 
is  a  real  retreat  and  not  a  feint,  I  shall  throw 
over  a  body  of  our  troops,  with  the  utmost  expe- 
dition, to  assist  in  checking  his  progress." 

Thus  ended  the  series  of  operations  which  were 
started  at  Brooklyn,  but  which  had  produced  as  yet 
no  considerable  result ;  and  now  began,  as  Washing- 
ton had  predicted,  an  attempt  upon  New  Jersey, 
opening,  as  it  naturally  did,  with  the  capture  of 
Forts  Washington  and  Lee.  Fort  Washington  had 
been  retained  as  a  post  of  importance  to  the  Ameri- 
can cause  on  account  of  its  situation,  which  it  was 
hoped  would  still  enable  the  Continental  army  to 

248 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

control  the  navigation  of  the  Hudson.  But  the  Brit- 
ish frigates  had  already  run  by,  as  we  have  seen, 
and  yet  the  fort  was  held,  although  against  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  by  special  direc- 
tion of  Congress.  The  garrison  made  a  gallant  de- 
fence, but  was  forced  to  capitulate,  early  in  Novem- 
ber. If  General  Washington 's  advice  had  been  taken, 
— for  in  this  case  he  did  not  make  his  orders  peremp- 
tory,— the  losses  of  men  and  munitions  of  war,  the 
latter  of  which  was  especially  great,  would  have 
been  avoided  both  at  Fort  Washington  and  Fort 
Lee.  "Upon  the  passing  of  the  last  ships,"  said 
he,  "I  had  given  it  as  my  opinion  to  General  Greene, 
under  whose  care  it  was,  that  it  would  be  best  to 
evacuate  the  place ;  but  as  the  order  was  discretion- 
ary, and  his  opinion  differed  from  mine,  it  unhappily 
was  delayed  too  long,  to  my  great  grief;  as  I  think 
General  Howe  considering  his  army  and  ours,  would 
have  had  but  a  poor  tale  to  tell  without  it,  and  would 
have  found  it  difficult  to  reconcile  the  people  of  Eng- 
land to  the  conquest  of  a  few  pitiful  islands,  none 
of  which  were  defensible,  considering  the  great  num- 
ber of  their  ships  and  the  power  they  have  by  sea." 
Assured  that  active  measures  were  now  to  be 
taken,  Washington  prepared  himself  as  best  he  could 
for  the  encounter  with  his  adversary;  and,  as  we 

249 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

approach  the  famous  retreat  through  New  Jersey,  it 
is  well  to  remember  the  strength  and  condition  of 
these  two  opponents,  in  order  the  better  to  estimate 
the  relative  value  of  the  services  rendered  by  the  one 
and  the  other,  through  the  series  of  remarkable  inci- 
dents which  followed.  The  figure  of  Washington 
stands  out  in  splendid  relief  in  the  midst  of  his  trials 
and  disappointments  and  disheartening  privations, 
as  the  one  invariable  element  of  strength  exerting 
its  influence  upon  the  country,  when  misfortune  and 
reverses  had  driven  the  American  patriots  almost 
to  desperation.  There  was  probably  no  time  during 
the  exceedingly  varied  experiences  of  his  life  when 
his  moral  courage,  his  wise  judgment,  his  unselfish 
devotion  to  the  interests  of  his  countrymen,  his  pru- 
dence, fortitude,  and  determination,  as  well  as  his 
power  to  lead  and  to  govern  men,  illustrated  more 
fully  than  during  this  winter  of  1776,  in  New  Jersey, 
the  exalted  character  of  that  truly  great  man.  No 
feeling  of  mere  sentiment  needs  to  be  invoked  in 
his  behalf  on  the  part  of  a  nation  grateful  for  its 
liberty  and  its  existence.  The  page  of  history  re- 
cords for  us  his  deeds ;  and  his  letters,  written  by  his 
own  hand,  which  fortunately  we  still  possess,  are  the 
sources  of  inspiration  to  every  man,  to  every  soldier, 
who  respects  himself  and  loves  his  country. 

250 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

We  reach  a  low  ebb  in  the  affairs  of  American 
independence  during  the  few  weeks  that  still  re- 
mained before  the  end  of  the  year  1776;  a  period 
at  which  it  seemed  indeed  as  if  the  struggle  for 
liberty  must  fail  for  lack  of  further  strength.  Whilst 
General  Howe  was  lying  with  his  army  at  New 
Eochelle,  and  just  before  his  movement  toward  White 
Plains,  his  already  formidable  army  was  reinforced 
by  the  arrival  from  England  of  a  new  detachment  of 
Hessians  under  General  Knyphausen,  so  that  he  was 
now  in  possession  of  a  force  such  as  had  never  be- 
fore been  seen  in  America,  On  the  other  hand,  Gen- 
eral Washington  was  losing  even  the  strength  he 
had,  by  the  return  home  of  the  regiments  whose  term 
of  enlistments  had  expired.  Fearing  that  he  should 
be  weakened  to  such  a  degree  as  not  to  be  able  even  to 
make  a  show  of  defence,  he  appealed  to  the  New 
England  States  to  call  out  their  militia  to  his  aid. 
"The  situation  of  our  affairs  is  critical  and  alarm- 
ing," he  said;  "the  dissolution  of  our  army  is  fast 
approaching,  and  but  little  if  any  prospect  of  levying 
a  new  one  in  a  reasonable  time.  Large  numbers  of 
it  are  now  on  the  eve  of  their  departure  and  this  at 
a  time  when  the  enemy  have  a  very  numerous  and  for- 
midable force,  watching  an  opportunity  to  execute 
their  plans  and  to  spread  ruin  and  devastation  among 

251 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

us.  The  propriety  of  this  application, ' '  he  added  in 
asking  for  the  militia,  *'I  trust  will  appear  when  it  is 
known  that  not  a  single  officer  is  yet  commissioned 
to  recruit,  and  when  it  is  considered  how  essential 
it  is  to  keep  up  some  show  of  force  and  shadow  of 
an  army." 

Howe  knew  the  condition  of  his  opponents ;  there 
can  be  no  doubt  of  that,  for  he  was  in  constant  com- 
munication with  the  country,  especially  through  num- 
bers of  loyalists  who  went  to  him  to  take  the  oath 
and  embrace  the  offers  which  he  and  his  brother  made 
as  commissioners  from  the  King.  If  he  had  struck  a 
blow  then,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  he 
would  have  crushed  out  resistance  in  America;  for 
the  war  had  broken  out  at  a  time  when  the  whole 
country  did  not  contain  military  supplies  enough  to 
sustain  a  prolonged  contest,  and  already  the  quantity 
was  being  exhausted.  Why  he  did  not  do  so,  it  is 
impossible  to  tell. 

General  Washington  having  sent  about  five  thou- 
sand men  across  the  Hudson,  and  leaving  General 
Charles  Lee  behind  with  seven  thousand  Continentals 
and  Militia  to  make  sure  of  Howe's  movements, 
crossed  over  into  New  Jersey  and  took  command 
there  himself  on  the  12th  of  November.  Howe,  who 
had  posted  his  main  body  upon  New  York  Island, 

252 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

now  detached  Earl  Cornwallis  with  some  five  thou- 
sand regular  troops  to  take  possession  of  New 
Jersey.  Cornwallis  easily  captured  Fort  Lee,  which 
Greene  held  against  the  advice  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  just  as  he  had  done  Fort  Washington  upon 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  and  with  the  loss  of 
which  he  now  also  lost  all  his  blankets,  baggage,  three 
months'  provisions,  and  left  over  four  hundred  tents 
standing  and  all  his  cannon  but  two ;  a  loss  which  the 
difficulty  of  procuring  these  things  at  that  time  made 
doubly  serious. 

Cornwallis  advanced  immediately,  and  Washing- 
ton was  driven  helplessly  before  him,  first  across 
the  Hackensack  River  and  then  over  the  Passaic,  to 
Newark,  where  he  had  arrived  on  the  22nd  of  Novem- 
ber. From  Newark  he  sent  the  most  pressing  calls 
to  Lee,  who  was  still  beyond  the  Hudson,  to  hasten 
forward  and  join  him ;  calls  which  Lee,  from  wilful- 
ness and  apparent  jealousy,  refused  to  obey.  After 
maintaining  himself  for  five  days,  always  hoping  to 
be  reinforced  by  Lee,  and  sending  out  General  Reed, 
a  native  of  New  Jersey,  to  beg  the  people  of  that 
State  for  militia,  for  help  of  any  kind  in  the  danger 
that  threatened,  and  Mifflin  to  Pennsylvania  upon  a 
similar  errand,  he  withdrew  from  Newark  just  as  the 
advanced  guard  of  Cornwallis'  force  was  entering 

253 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  town.  Retreating  still  further  over  ground  which 
it  was  impossible  for  him  to  hold,  he  arrived  on  the 
28th  of  November  at  Brunswick,  where  he  halted  for 
two  days  during  which  he  had  to  suffer  the  loss  of 
nearly  half  of  his  men,  whose  terms  expired  at  the 
end  of  that  month  and  who  claimed  their  discharge. 

On  the  first  of  December  he  wrote  again  to  Lee : 
''The  enemy  are  advancing  and  mean  to  push  to 
Philadelphia ;  the  force  I  have  with  me  is  infinitely 
inferior  in  numbers,  and  such  as  cannot  promise  the 
least  successful  opposition.  I  must  entreat  you  to 
hasten  your  march  as  much  as  possible,  or  your 
arrival  may  be  too  late. "  That  same  day  Cornwallis 
entered  Brunswick,  and  Washington,  breaking  down 
the  bridge  across  the  Raritan,  withdrew  to  Princeton. 
He  had  now  only  three  thousand  men ;  and  they  were 
wretchedly  equipped  and  clothed.  Cornwallis' 
superiority  of  force  alone  bore  down  everything  be- 
fore him  and  enabled  him  to  go  where  he  would. 
But  at  this  point  we  see  another  example  of  that  pur- 
pose of  General  Howe  which  reappears  so  strangely 
and  unexpectedly  at  various  critical  moments  during 
the  war :  He  ordered  Cornwallis  to  halt  at  Brunswick. 

Absolutely  unchecked  by  any  obstacle  but  the  com- 
mands of  his  superior,  and  chafing  under  the  restraint 
thus  put  upon  him,  the  British  General  halted  for  a 

254 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

week,  whilst  General  Washington,  who  was  seventeen 
miles  distant,  at  Princeton,  had  time  to  withdraw 
all  his  baggage  and  heavy  cannon  to  Trenton,  twenty 
miles  away.  Stedman's  contemporaneous  account  of 
this  event  presents  it  as  "an  order  which  saved  the 
panic-struck  and  fleeing  army  of  the  Americans  from 
utter  ruin."  "The  Raritan,"  says  he,  "is  fordable 
at  that  place  in  every  recess  of  the  tide ;  and  had  the 
noble  General  (Cornwallis)  been  left  to  act  at  his 
own  discretion,  he  would  have  pursued  the  weakened 
and  alarmed  enemy  to  the  Delaware,  over  v/hich  they 
never  could  have  passed."  It  must  be  admitted  that 
the  danger  was  imminent.  But  Howe  was  not  equal 
to  the  occasion.  In  his  official  statement  in  this  con- 
nection he  says :  "  I  should  have  been  highly  blame- 
able,  had  I  ordered  the  noble  lord  to  have  followed 
the  enemy  beyond  Brunswick,  when  the  whole  of  his 
corps  had  not  joined  him."  Instead,  however,  of 
concentrating  his  force  in  New  Jersey,  where  it 
might  have  been  said  that  circumstances  called  for 
it.  General  Howe  and  his  brother,  the  admiral,  deter- 
mined to  send  a  large  detachment  into  New  England, 
where  no  danger  existed  and  where  no  warlike  activ- 
ity made  its  presence  necessary.  At  the  moment 
when  hostilities  might  have  been  ended  at  one  stroke, 
the  British  commanders  sent  away  two  English  and 

255 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

two  Hessian  Brigades  under  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 
with  whom  were  General  Prescott  and  the  Earl  Percy, 
to  Newport;  a  force  which  took  seventy  transports 
and  eleven  ships  of  war  to  a  point  where  it  lay  unem- 
ployed during  the  next  three  years. 

Whilst  this  was  taking  place  Howe  had  joined 
Cornwallis  with  a  considerable  additional  force  at 
Brunswick,  and  prepared  to  move  out  toward  Prince- 
ton; which  place  General  Washington  abandoned 
one  hour  before  the  British  arrived.  Howe  halted 
in  Princeton  seventeen  hours,  and  upon  the  following 
day  leisurely  continued  to  Trenton,  where  he  arrived, 
says  Stedman,  "at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon; 
just  when  the  last  boat  of  General  Washington's 
embarkation  crossed  the  river,  as  if  he  had  calcu- 
lated, it  was  observed,  with  great  accuracy  the  exact 
time  necessary  for  his  enemy  to  make  his  escape." 

General  Washington  had  succeeded  in  wasting 
the  time  of  his  opponents  until  the  cold  and  disagree- 
able weather  had  come  on ;  and,  as  he  had  expected, 
they  decided  not  to  continue  hostilities.  He  had 
gone  safely  across  the  Delaware  into  Pennsylvania ; 
he  had  preserved  at  least  a  nucleus  of  an  army,  and 
with  this  he  was  able  to  collect  out  of  the  reach  of 
the  British  all  the  boats  up  and  down  the  river  so 
that  they  could  not  follow  him.    He  had  now  the  satis- 

256 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

faction  of  seeing  them  close  the  campaign  and  settle 
themselves  in  winter  quarters.  The  cantonments  of 
the  British  troops  stretched  through  New  Jersey 
from  the  Delaware  to  the  Hackensack;  the  most  im- 
portant post,  at  Trenton,  being  occupied  by  a  brigade 
of  Hessians  under  Colonel  Rahl,  and  that  at  Borden- 
town,  a  few  miles  south  of  it  on  the  river,  by  Count 
Donop  with  four  Hessian  brigades. 

Cornwallis  went  back  to  New  York  where  a  vessel 
lay  which  was  prepared  to  take  him  to  England  on 
leave ;  and  Howe  returned  also  to  New  York  City  to 
lead  the  life  he  loved,  of  merriment  and  dancing  and 
gambling,  with  his  bottle  at  hand  and  his  mistress  to 
keep  him  company,  before  a  comfortable  wood  fire 
which  made  him  forget  both  the  cold  outside  and  the 
war.  *  *  Our  Commander  has  been  enjoying  his  pleas- 
ures as  usual, ' '  says  a  letter  from  New  York  at  that 
time.  "^Vliat  do  you  think  of  the  favorite  Sultana 
losing  300  guineas  in  a  night  at  cards,  who  three 
years  ago  would  have  found  it  difficult  to  have  mus- 
tered as  many  pence!  Don't  you  think  this  lady  in 
high  luck?  As  to  the  husband,  his  various  places  are 
reckoned  £6000  a  year ;  it  is  said  he  does  not  save  a 
shilling;  yet  he  looks  fat  and  contented." 

Far  different  was  the  situation  during  this  time  of 
the  Americans.     Away  across  the  Delaware  their 

17  257 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

camp  fires  were  still  burning;  the  snows  and  storms 
had  not  sent  them  into  comfortable  winter  quarters ; 
indeed,  there  were  no  such  places  for  them. 

But  we  shall  see,  upon  another  occasion,  how 
General  "Washington  turned  upon  the  enemy,  and 
by  his  glorious  achievements  at  Trenton  and  at 
Princeton  encouraged  the  nation  to  new  efforts  which 
thrust  away  defeat  and  led  on  ultimately  to  victory 
and  success. 

II 

It  is  rarely,  if  ever,  that  a  case  can  be  found  so 
dangerously  bad  without  proving  fatal  as  that  of  the 
American  army  and  the  independence  of  the  United 
States  at  the  close  of  the  year  1776,  and  it  is  impos- 
sible to  see  how  either  could  have  survived  this  crisis 
if  the  forces  of  the  enemy  had  been  directed  against 
them  with  even  ordinary  military  vigor.  The 
people  of  New  York  and  New  Jersey  were  disheart- 
ened by  the  continued  reverses  which  had  fallen  upon 
the  Continental  arms,  and,  now  that  the  British  held 
actual  possession  of  their  territory,  they  not  only 
hesitated  to  take  active  part  in  the  armed  resistance 
but  very  many  went  over  to  the  royal  standards, 
claiming  the  indulgence  offered  by  the  King's  Ad- 
miral and  General;  and  their  example  was  making 

258 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

itself  felt  in  Pennsylvania  as  well.  General  Wash- 
ington's situation  was  one  of  extreme  difficulty  and 
danger.  His  army,  made  up  largely  of  militia  which 
had  been  called  out  for  short  terms,  was  dwindling 
away.  ''I  have  no  doubt,"  said  he,  "but  General 
Howe  will  still  make  an  attempt  upon  Philadelphia 
this  winter.  I  foresee  nothing  to  oppose  him  a  fort- 
night hence,  as  the  time  of  all  the  troops,  except  those 
of  Virginia,  now  reduced  to  almost  nothing,  and 
Smallwood's  regiment  of  Marylanders,  equally  as 
low,  will  expire  before  the  end  of  that  time.  In  a 
word,  if  every  nerve  is  not  strained  to  recruit  the 
new  army  with  all  possible  expedition,  I  think  the 
game  is  pretty  nearly  up,  owing,  in  a  great  measure, 
to  the  insidious  arts  of  the  enemy,  and  disaffection 
of  the  Colonies,  but  principally  to  the  ruinous  policy 
of  short  enlistments  and  placing  too  great  depend- 
ence on  the  militia,  the  evil  consequences  of  which 
were  foretold  fifteen  months  ago  with  a  spirit  almost 
prophetic."  (To  John  Austin  Washington,  18  Dec, 
1776.)  "Upon  the  whole,"  he  wrote,  "there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  Philadelphia  is  the  object  of  the  British 
and  that  they  will  pass  the  Delaware  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. Happy  should  I  be  if  I  could  see  the  means  of 
preventing  them ;  at  present,  I  confess,  I  do  not.  All 
military  men  agree  that  it  is  a  work  of  great  diffi- 

259 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

culty,  nay  impracticable,  where  there  is  any  extent 
of  coast  to  guard.  This  is  the  case  with  us,  and  we 
have  to  do  it  with  a  force,  small  and  inconsiderable, 
and  much  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Our 
little  handful  is  daily  decreasing  by  sickness  and 
other  causes ;  and,  without  aid,  without  considerable 
succor  and  exertions  on  the  part  of  the  people,  what 
can  we  reasonably  look  for,  or  expect,  but  an  event 
that  will  be  severely  felt  by  the  common  cause,  and 
that  will  wound  the  heart  of  every  virtuous  American, 
the  loss  of  Philadelphia!"  (To  Congress,  12  Dec, 
1776.)  "The  subject  is  disagreeable,  but  yet  it  is 
true." 

The  experience  of  General  Washington  in  the  use 
of  militia  instead  of  regular  troops  in  the  extended 
and  continuous  operations  of  a  campaign  is  exceed- 
ingly interesting  and  is  valuable  also  as  a  matter  of 
history,  because  militia  were  more  thoroughly  tried 
during  the  Eevolutionary  War  than  upon  any  occa- 
sion of  modern  times,  and  the  constant  complaint 
which  we  find  Washington  making  to  Congress  shows 
with  what  an  unsatisfactory  result.  ' '  They  come  in, ' ' 
he  said,  "you  cannot  tell  how;  they  go,  you  cannot 
tell  when ;  and  they  act,  you  cannot  tell  where ;  they 
consume  your  provisions,  exhaust  your  stores,  and 
leave  you,   at   last,   at   a   critical   moment."    (To 

260 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Congress,  20  Dec,  1776.)  And  he  gave  it  as  his 
opinion,  at  this  period  of  the  war,  that  the  sav- 
ing in  the  articles  of  stores,  provisions,  and 
a  thousand  other  things,  by  having  nothing  to 
do  with  the  militia  unless  in  cases  of  extraordinary 
exigency  and  such  as  could  not  be  expected  in  the 
common  course  of  events,  would  amply  support  a 
large  army,  well  officered,  which  would  be  daily  im- 
proving, instead  of  continuing  a  destructive,  expen- 
sive, and  disorderly  mob.  Indeed,  he  declared  that,  if 
forty  thousand  men  had  been  kept  in  constant  pay 
since  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  and  the  militia 
excused  from  doing  duty  during  that  period,  the 
country  would  have  saved  money.  (To  Congress, 
5  Dec,  1776.) 

General  "Washington  found  himself  now,  at  the 
middle  of  December,  with  but  three  thousand  men, 
facing  the  hardships  of  an  unusually  cold  winter 
against  which  they  not  only  had  no  preparation,  but 
many  of  them  were  even  without  ordinary  clothing 
and  shoes.  Behind  him  and  about  him  was  a  country 
the  inhabitants  of  which  were  upon  the  verge  of 
abandoning  further  attempts  to  support  a  losing 
cause ;  in  front  of  him  an  army  strong  in  numbers, 
well  provided  with  equipment,  perfectly  disciplined 
in  the  field,  waiting  only  for  suitable  weather  in  order 

261 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

to  continue  its  triumphant  march  and,  by  the  capture 
of  Philadelphia,  to  put  an  end  to  the  war.  Added  to 
bis  other  perplexities,  he  received  the  news  that 
General  Lee,  whose  arrival  he  was  anxiously  await- 
ing, and  to  whom  he  had  written  the  most  earnest 
appeals  to  come  on  from  the  Hudson  with  the  force 
which  was  left  behind  under  his  command,  had  been 
captured,  in  a  manner  not  at  all  creditable  to  him- 
self, by  the  enterprise  of  a  young  English  officer 
and  was  now  a  prisoner  with  the  British.  In  the  in- 
tensity of  his  feeling,  Washington  exclaimed:  "No 
man,  I  believe,  ever  had  a  greater  choice  of  difficulties, 
and  less  means  to  extricate  himself  from  them. ' '  And 
yet,  in  the  next  breath  he  added,  with  that  confidence 
which  never  deserted  him :  ' '  However,  under  a  full 
persuasion  of  the  justice  of  our  cause,  I  cannot  enter- 
tain an  idea  that  it  will  finally  sink,  though  it  may 
remain  for  some  time  under  a  cloud."  (To  J.  A, 
Washington,  18  Dec,  1776.) 

The  conduct  of  Washington  at  this  point  is  one 
of  the  finest  examples  of  his  determined  courage  in 
adversity,  of  which  we  have  many  others  in  the  course 
of  his  varied  and  active  life.  It  is  an  index  to  that 
exalted  character  which  influenced  the  whole  nation ; 
by  which  he  encouraged  the  weak,  aided  the  strong, 
and  took  the  lead  through  the  intricate  paths  along 

262 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

which  they  were  travelling.  With  a  firm  step  and 
a  perfect  self-control  such  as  no  other  man  of  his 
time  possessed,  he  determined  now  to  press  on  in 
the  face  of  the  obstacles  that  lay  before,  in  spite  of 
the  enemies  who  were  about  him.  It  was  a  moment 
so  critical  that  without  some  immediate  and  effective 
remedy  there  was  grave  danger  that  all  would  be 
lost.  Congress  had  adjourned  in  Philadelphia,  and, 
in  apprehension  of  the  approaching  British  army,  re- 
tired to  a  safe  distance  at  Baltimore ;  the  feeling  in 
England  was  one  of  assured  triumph,  as  the  gratify- 
ing reports  were  announced  at  the  Court  that  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  carrying  everything  before  him  in 
New  Jersey.  They  inspired  the  Cabinet  and  the 
people  to  believe  that  the  rebellious  Colonists  would 
soon  be  punished  as  they  deserved,  that  peace  was 
about  to  return,  and,  with  it,  glory  to  the  British 
arms.  King  George  wrote  with  a  comfortable  feeling 
of  success  that:  ''Nothing  can  have  been  better 
planned  nor  with  more  alacrity  executed,  than  the 
taking  of  the  City  of  New  York,  and  I  trust  the  rebel 
army  will  soon  be  dispersed."  And  Lieutenant 
General  Howe  was  receiving  at  New  York  the  Order 
of  the  Bath,  sent  over  to  him  as  a  mark  of  distinc- 
tion for  his  conduct  of  the  campaign,  by  a  grateful 
sovereign. 

263 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Meanwhile,  General  Washington,  still  on  the  Dela- 
ware, said:  "Before  I  removed  to  the  south  side  of 
the  river  I  had  all  the  boats  and  other  vessels  brought 
over,  or  destroyed,  from  Philadelphia  upwards  for 
seventy  miles,  and  by  guarding  the  fords,  I  have  as 
yet  baffled  all  their  attempts  to  cross.  But  from 
some  late  movements  of  theirs  I  am  in  doubt  whether 
they  are  moving  off  for  winter  quarters,  or  making 
a  feint  to  throw  us  off  our  guard."  (To  J.  T.  Wash- 
ington, 18  Dec.,  1776.)  "As  nothing  but  necessity 
obliged  me  to  retire  before  the  enemy  and  leave  so 
much  of  the  Jerseys  unprotected,  I  conceive  it  my 
duty,  and  it  corresponds  with  my  inclination,  to  make 
head  against  them  so  soon  as  there  shall  be  the  least 
probability  of  doing  it  with  propriety."  (To  Con- 
gress, 5  Dec,  1776.)  Since  he  was  convinced  that 
the  withdrawal  to  winter  quarters  was  not  a  mere 
deception  on  the  part  of  Howe,  and  strengthened  by 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  (Lee's  force,  which 
was  now  brought  up  by  General  Sullivan,  and  by 
some  twelve  hundred  recruits  hastily  mustered  in 
Pennsylvania),  Washington  decided  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  their  cantonment  at  Trenton.  It  was  a 
daring  enterprise  which  required  the  utmost  energy 
and  caution  in  its  management.  It  involved  the 
crossing  of  the  Delaware,  which  had  not  as  yet  frozen 

264 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

over  but  was  filled  from  one  shore  to  the  other  with 
blocks  of  floating  ice ;  and  it  presented  the  danger  of 
meeting,  at  the  end  of  a  fatig-uing  march,  an  enemy 
quite  fresh  for  action  and  prepared  to  resist  an 
attack.  It  offered  this  encouragement,  at  least,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  Hessians  felt  perfectly  secure 
from  molestation  during  the  rest  of  the  winter;  that 
Colonel  Rahl,  the  Commandant  at  Trenton,  ridi- 
culed the  idea  that  the  Americans  might  undertake 
an  operation  against  his  veterans ;  and  that  he  had 
taken  no  precaution  to  protect  the  approaches  to  his 
position  by  outworks,  or  to  fortify  any  of  the  strong- 
est buildings  in  the  town  itself.  Every  consideration 
of  reason  and  expediency  impelled  Washington  to 
some  active  measure  by  which  to  revive  the  spirit  of 
the  people. 

Therefore,  having  completed  his  plans,  Washing- 
ton fixed  upon  the  night  of  Christmas  for  the  execu- 
tion of  the  undertaking.  He  had  about  twenty-four 
hundred  men  able  to  accompany  him,  rugged  patriots 
from  New  England,  Pennsylvania,  and  Virginia; 
among  them  an  array  of  names  now  well  known  and 
revered  by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  There 
were  the  Generals:  Greene,  Mercer,  Stirling,  and 
Sullivan ;  Stark,  of  New  Hampshire ;  Hand,  of  Penn- 
sylvania ;  Glover  and  Knox,  of  Massachusetts ;  Webb, 

265 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  Connecticut ;  Scott  and  William  Washington  and 
James  Monroe,  of  Virginia;  and  xllexander  Hamil- 
ton, of  New  York.  The  plan  was,  to  march  up  the 
bank  of  the  Delaware  and  to  cross  at  Makonkey's 
Ferry,  far  enough  above  Trenton  to  escape  the  notice 
of  the  enemy;  and  then  to  march  down  on  the  New 
Jersey  side  and  attack  them.  At  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  Christmas  they  set  out  from  their  camp, 
each  man  carrying  three  days'  provisions  and  forty 
rounds,  and  they  had  eighteen  field-pieces.  It  was 
nearly  dark  when  they  reached  the  ferry,  where  the 
river  was  running  with  a  strong  current  which  car- 
ried along  rapidly  the  masses  of  floating  ice.  General 
Washington  called  for  volunteers  to  lead  the  way, 
and  the  sailors  from  Marblehead  stepped  forward 
to  man  the  boats.  The  night  came  on  exceedingly 
cold;  the  increasing  quantities  of  ice  made  it  hard 
to  stem  the  current ;  the  wind  was  high,  and  at  eleven 
o'clock  it  began  to  snow.  It  was  three  in  the  morning 
before  they  were  all  set  over,  and  they  spent  another 
hour  forming  upon  the  other  side.  About  four  they 
began  their  march  of  nine  miles  to  Trenton,  in  the 
face  of  a  violent  northeast  storm  of  wind  and  sleet 
that  had  now  set  in.  The  hard-frozen  roads  cut  into 
their  feet,  so  that  a  small  party  coming  up  after- 
wards were  able  to  follow  their  route  by  the  blood 

266 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

marks  upon  the  ground  left  by  those  who  had  broken 
shoes.  For  some  distance  they  had  to  ascend  a  steep 
incline  and  then  the  road  ran  through  hills  heavily 
covered  with  timber;  after  passing  these  the  force 
was  divided,  one  detachment,  under  Sullivan,  keep- 
ing close  to  the  river  bank,  whilst  the  rest  proceeded 
with  General  Washington  himself  along  what  is  called 
the  upper,  or  Pennington,  road.  Sullivan,  who  had 
somewhat  the  shortest  line  of  march,  halted  at  the 
outskirts  of  Trenton  to  allow  the  others  time  to 
come  up,  sending  word  meanwhile  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  that  his  arms  were  wet.  "Tell  your  Gen- 
eral," said  Washington,  ''to  use  the  bayonet,  for 
the  town  must  be  taken  and  I  am  resolved  to  take  it. ' ' 
It  was  now  broad  daylight,  but  the  Hessians  were 
still  undisturbed;  the  night-watch  had  turned  in, 
having  reported  all  w^ell,  leaving  only  the  advanced 
sentries  to  keep  the  guard.  Washington  attacked 
the  outpost  on  the  Pennington  road  and  entered  the 
town  by  King  and  Queen  Streets,  now  called  Warren 
and  Greene.  Sullivan  pushed  up  from  the  river  road 
and  joined  the  other  detachment  so  promptly  that 
it  gave  the  Hessians,  who  were  now  thoroughly 
alarmed,  no  time  to  form.  Their  battalions  were 
hastily  called  together,  but  in  the  face  of  so  sudden 
an  attack,  supported  by  the  fire  from  a  battery  which 

267 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

General  Washington  had  ordered  into  position,  they 
became  hopelessly  confused  and  were  unable  even  to 
make  a  retreat.  Colonel  Eahl,  summoned  from  a 
sound  sleep  which  followed  upon  a  night  of  carousing, 
with  which  he  had  no  doubt  been  celebrating  the  holi- 
day, mounted  his  horse,  and,  reeling  in  the  saddle, 
attempted  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops. 
The  action  lasted  thirty-five  minutes,  during  which 
the  Americans  did  not  lose  a  man.  Of  the  Hessians 
a  few  managed  to  escape,  but  almost  the  whole  gar- 
rison was  captured.  Colonel  Eahl  was  killed  by 
a  musket  ball,  and  General  Washington  found  himself 
in  complete  possession  of  Trenton,  with  about  nine 
hundred  and  fifty  prisoners;  with  them  were  taken 
twelve  hundred  small  arms,  six  brass  field-pieces, 
and  all  the  standards  of  the  brigade.  If  his  entire 
plan  had  been  carried  out,  by  which  two  other  de- 
tachments wxre  to  cross  the  Delaware  lower  down,  to 
co-operate  with  him  after  the  attack  upon  Trenton, 
he  intended  to  force  the  British  farther  back  into 
New  Jersey  and  to  break  up  some  of  their  other 
cantonments.  But  the  violence  of  the  storm  on, 
the  25th,  and  the  ice  floating  do\vn  the  stream,  had 
prevented  them  from  crossing ;  therefore  it  was  evi- 
dent, since  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  make  head 
alone  against  the  British,  and  encumbered  now  with 

268 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

nearly  a  thousand  prisoners,  that  his  only  expedient 
was  to  regain  his  former  position  beyond  the  Dela- 
ware. Without  taking  time  to  rest  his  tired  men, 
he  set  out  at  once  in  spite  of  the  driving  northeast 
storm  which  still  continued,  and,  after  a  second  night 
of  exposure  and  immense  labor  at  the  ferry,  landed 
his  force  safely,  on  the  27th,  and  went  back  to  camp. 
The  results  of  this  little  victory  were  of  the  great- 
est moment.  It  marks,  indeed,  one  of  the  great  turn- 
ing points  of  the  war;  it  may  very  confidently  be 
said  to  have  saved  American  independence.  There 
were  years  of  hardship  still  ahead  of  the  Americans 
before  the  struggle  was  finished,  and  occasions  when 
the  prospect  was  dreary  enough ;  but  there  was  never 
a  point  again  at  which  the  country  was  so  disheart- 
ened by  the  reverses  of  a  contest  in  which,  without 
allies  and  without  encouragement,  it  had  no  estab- 
lished confidence  in  its  own  strength.  During  the 
crises  which  followed  in  subsequent  campaigns,  the 
nation  had  the  open  support  of  France,  the  tacit  ap- 
proval of  Spain,  and  each  year  that  passed  left  a 
greater  feeling  of  self-possession  among  the  people, 
who,  in  spite  of  the  imposing  prestige  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, had  not  been  conquered.  At  Trenton,  however, 
the  idea  of  success  was  new,  and  it  came  as  a  restora- 
tive of  which  the  invigorating  effects  were  felt  for- 

2G9 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ever  after.  The  country  heard  of  it  with  astonish- 
ment ;  it  gave  rise  even  to  the  most  expressive  demon- 
strations of  joy;  the  Hessian  prisoners  were  taken  to 
Philadelphia,  where  they  were  paraded  through  the 
streets  in  order  to  show  the  people  that  these  things 
were  really  true.  On  the  British  side  the  surprise 
was  at  least  equally  great;  it  stirred  for  a  moment 
even  the  lethargy  of  Sir  William  Howe,  who  ordered 
Cornwallis  to  abandon  his  furlough  to  England  and 
return  to  the  command  of  his  troops  in  New  Jersey. 
General  Howe  was  highly  censured  by  the  British 
military  critics  for  this  affair.  They  blamed  him,  and 
it  is  a  criticism  made  at  the  time^  for  having  placed 
his  cantonments  so  far  apart  that  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  support  each  other  in  the  event  of  attack ; 
for  having  massed  his  strongest  detachments  at  the 
greatest  distance  from  the  front;  and  for  having 
entrusted  so  important  a  post  as  Trenton  to  Rahl, 
who  is  described  by  a  British  officer  (Stedman),  as 
having  ''been  totally  unfit  for  the  station  he  held," 
and  ''obstinate,  passionate,  and  incessantly  intoxi- 
cated with  strong  liquors."  General  Howe's  defence 
of  this  situation,  as  given  officially  to  Parliament, 
was,  that  his  first  intention  had  been  to  make  Bruns- 
wick the  left,  and  either  Elizabeth  or  Newark  the 
right,  of  the  cantonments,  "and,"  said  he,  "my 

270 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

reason  for  extending  to  Trenton  was,  that  a  consid- 
erable number  of  the  inhabitants  came  in  with  their 
arms,  in  obedience  to  the  proclamation  of  the  Com- 
missioners. I  took  uponme  to  risk  that  post  under  the 
command  of  a  brave  officer,  with  the  support  of  Colo- 
nel Donop  at  Bordentown,  five  miles  distant,  with  a 
very  strong  corps.  The  left  was  the  post  of  the  Hes- 
sians in  the  line,  and  had  I  changed  it  upon  this  occa- 
sion it  must  have  been  considered  as  a  disgrace,  since 
the  same  situation  was  held  in  the  cantonments  as  in 
the  camp.  And  it  probably  would  have  created  jeal- 
ousies between  the  Hessian  and  British  troops,  which 
it  was  my  duty  to  carefully  prevent."  An  apology 
which,  after  all,  explains  rather  than  justifies  his 
action,  for  if  he  felt  obliged  to  give  the  Hessians  their 
position  on  the  left,  his  duty  certainly  was  to  see  that 
his  advanced  posts  opposite  the  enemy's  line  were 
properly  guarded,  no  matter  to  whom  they  had  been 
assigned ;  and  Howe  is  forced  to  admit  that  Rahl  had 
not  erected  redoubts  at  Trenton  as  he  should  have 
done,  as  he  had  ordered  him  to  do;  and,  said  he,  *'if 
Colonel  Rahl  had  obeyed  his  orders  I  sent  him  for 
erecting  the  redoubts,  I  am  confident  this  post  would 
not  have  been  taken."  But  why  did  not  Rahl  obey 
his  orders,  and,  if  he  failed  to  do  so,  why  was  it  not 
known  at  headquarters  1    General  Howe 's  own  narra- 

271 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

tive  shows  how  little  control  he  had  of  the  situation ; 
for  he  declared:  "My  principal  object  in  so  great 
an  extension  of  the  cantonments  was  to  afford  pro- 
tection to  the  inhabitants,  that  they  might  experience 
the  difference  between  his  Majesty's  Government  and 
that  to  which  they  were  subject  from  the  rebel 
leaders." 

The  result  which  he  produced  by  this  policy  in 
New  Jersey  was,  that  he  cured  the  inhabitants  of  any 
lingering  desire  which  they  might  have  had  for  the 
presence  of  the  King's  authority;  the  riotous  con- 
duct of  his  soldiers,  their  disregard  of  personal  honor, 
the  plundering  by  them  of  houses,  and  outraging 
of  women,  made  their  occupation  of  the  territory  an 
evil  from  which  the  people  sought  with  eagerness  to 
escape.  We  have  the  statement  of  the  English  mili- 
tary historian,  Stedman,  that,  at  Trenton,  when  the 
Continental  army  ''had  arrived  in  the  town  the 
troops  in  the  British  service  were  solely  occupied  in 
securing  their  plunder  in  wagons,  and  many  of  them 
were  actually  made  prisoners  while  engaged  in  this 
shameful  avocation."  The  unlucky  Hessians  had 
been  promised  before  they  left  home  that  they  should 
make  their  fortunes  in  America. 

Having  now  broken  up  the  British  posts  at  Tren- 
ton and  Bordentown, — for  upon  the  capture  of  Rahl's 

272 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

detachment  the  other  Hessiau  Commander,  Count 
Donop,  hurriedly  abandoned  his  position  and  with- 
drew to  Princeton  where  he  joined  the  force  under 
General  Leslie, — Washington  saw  the  necessity  of 
taking  advantage  of  his  success  thus  far  gained  in 
order  to  strengthen  the  feeling  of  encouragement 
in  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania.  To  lie  still  might 
be  looked  upon  as  an  evidence  of  weakness,  which 
he  could  not  afford  to  display  either  before  friend 
or  enemy.  He  crossed  the  Delaware  again,  there- 
fore, on  the  last  days  of  December  and  took  up  his 
position  at  Trenton  to  await  the  British,  who  he  knew 
had  been  aroused  by  his  unexpected  attack  and  were 
advancing  toward  him  in  a  strong  body  under  Corn- 
wallis.  The  detachment  of  Continental  troops,  which 
had  failed  to  cooperate  in  the  movement  against 
Trenton,  on  account  of  the  ice  in  the  river,  had  also 
crossed  to  the  New  Jersey  side  and  were  lying  at 
Crosswick's,  under  General  Cadwalader,  and  at  Bor- 
dento"\\Ti  under  General  Mifflin.  He  concentrated  his 
force  of  nearly  four  thousand  men  at  Trenton,  where 
they  arrived  by  a  night  march  on  the  first  of  Janu- 
ary. On  the  following  day  Cornwallis'  troops  ap- 
peared, as  General  Washington  expected,  and  began 
to  advance  upon  him  about  four  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. 

18  273 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

There  is  a  small  creek,  called  Assanpink,  running 
through  the  town  of  Trenton,  which  formed  at  that 
time  a  considerable  barrier  capable  of  being  de- 
fended. Behind  this  creek  Washington  extended  his 
lines  and  prepared  for  the  attack.  But  the  British, 
finding  upon  their  arrival  that  all  the  fords  were 
well  guarded,  halted  with  their  usual  deliberation 
and  kindled  their  fires  for  the  night,  confident  that 
they  could  finish  with  General  Washington  in  the 
morning.  They  were  dealing  with  an  adversary, 
however,  whose  necessities  made  him  exceedingly 
wary  and  whose  fertility  in  expedients  in  the  face 
of  grave  and  threatening  dangers  had  enabled  him 
thus  far  to  hold  the  field,  and  yet  to  escape  the  full 
force  of  a  blow  from  the  great  armament  against 
which  he  was  contending.  It  was  not  likely  that  such 
a  leader  would  lie  quietly  by  during  the  night  in  order 
that  he  might  be  led  out  to  inevitable  destruction  by 
Cornwallis  in  the  morning;  and  yet  the  British  ap- 
peared to  think  he  would  do  so.  They  fired  their 
field-pieces  across  the  creek  until  dark,  with  very 
little  damage,  and  then  sat  down  to  wait  until  day- 
light. Their  sentries  marched  up  and  down  in  sight 
of  the  American  sentries,  and  from  their  camp  they 
could  distinctly  see  the  American  watch-fires  burn- 
ing brightly.     Aware  that  their  force  was  greatly 

274 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

superior  to  his  own,  and  perceiving  that  their  inten- 
tion was  to  surround  him,  General  Washington  pro- 
ceeded to  extricate  himself  by  an  exceedingly  well- 
planned  movement,  through  which  he  avoided  a  di- 
rect retreat  while  it  enabled  him  to  get  behind  the 
enemy  and  strike  them  in  the  rear.  This  led  to  the 
memorable  battle  of  Princeton. 

He  sent  all  his  baggage  very  quietly  to  Burlington 
during  the  evening,  and  at  twelve  o  'clock  he  set  out, 
by  a  roundabout  road,  to  Princeton,  leaving  his  sen- 
tries behind,  still  marching  back  and  forth  in  front 
of  the  British  and  adding  fresh  fuel  to  the  watch- 
fires  to  keep  them  bright.  "One  thing  I  was  certain 
of,"  said  he,  "that  it  would  avoid  the  appearance 
of  a  retreat  (which  was  of  consequence — or  to  run 
the  hazard  of  the  whole  army  being  cut  off) ,  whilst  we 
might  by  a  fortunate  stroke  withdraw  General  Howe 
from  Trenton,  and  give  some  reputation  to  our  arms. 
Happily  we  succeeded."  (To  Congress,  5  January, 
1777.)  He  arrived  about  sunrise  at  Princeton,  where 
the  British  Commander  had  left  only  three  regi- 
ments and  three  troops  of  light  horse,  two  of  which 
were  then  marching  toward  Trenton.  He  attacked 
them  at  once,  and,  by  Washington's  owti  testimony, 
they  "made  a  gallant  resistance,"  but  they  were 
driven  back  in  confusion,  and  when  the  action  was 

275 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

over  they  had  lost  five  hundred  men;  more  than  a 
hundred  were  dead  upon  the  field  and  General  Wash- 
ington took  with  him  three  hundred  prisoners  to  add 
to  the  thousand  he  had  captured  a  few  days  before 
at  Trenton.  The  American  loss  included  several 
valuable  ofiicers,  among  whom  was  the  brave  and 
accomplished  General  Mercer,  whose  death  was  sin- 
cerely mourned  throughout  the  country. 

The  astonishment  was  great  at  Trenton  when  day 
broke  and  the  American  camp  was  found  deserted. 
Firing  in  the  direction  of  Princeton  disclosed  the 
plan  to  Cornwallis,  who  now  became  seriously 
alarmed  lest  the  Continentals  might  push  on  and 
seize  Brunswick,  where  all  his  stores  and  magazines 
were  placed,  as  well  as  also  his  military  chest,  which 
at  that  time  is  said  to  have  contained  twenty  thou- 
sand pounds.  This  was  indeed  the  intention  of  Gen- 
eral Washington,  but  as  some  of  his  troops  had 
chased  the  British  in  their  flight  three  or  four  miles 
it  required  a  little  time  to  recover  them,  and,  before 
this  could  be  entirely  completed,  the  rear  of  the 
British  column,  which  lay  at  Maidenhead,  only  five 
or  six  miles  from  Princeton,  and  had  now  turned 
toward  him,  came  up  to  his  position.  They  were 
detained,  however,  at  Stony  Brook,  half  a  mile  from 
the  battlefield,  where  Washington  had  taken  the  pre- 

276 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

caution  to  break  down  the  bridge,  which  gave  him 
time  to  withdraw  his  forces  in  good  order  in  the 
direction  of  Morristown.  In  view  of  the  exhausted 
condition  of  his  men,  who  had  then  had  no  rest  for 
two  nights  and  a  day,  and  fearing  the  danger  of  losing 
the  advantage  already  gained  by  aiming  at  too  much, 
he  decided  to  relinquish  any  further  attempt.  Corn- 
wallis  hurried  by  a  forced  march  to  Brunswick,  where 
he  arrived  before  the  following  morning.  The  British 
General  made  no  effort  to  pursue  the  American  army, 
and  General  Washington  withdrew  to  Morristown 
where,  as  he  said,  he  should  '^  endeavor  to  put  his 
men  under  the  best  cover  he  could.  Hitherto  we 
have  been  without  any ;  and  many  of  our  poor  soldiers 
quite  barefoot,  and  ill-clad  in  other  respects." 

His  position  at  Morristown  was  an  advanta- 
geous one  in  every  respect;  the  country  behind  him 
was  well  cultivated  and  productive,  so  that  he  was 
able  to  obtain  forage  without  difficulty;  he  was  so 
situated  in  a  hilly,  rugged  district  that  he  was  sub- 
stantially out  of  danger  of  attack,  and  whilst  he 
watched  from  there  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
whom  he  constantly  harassed  by  small  parties  during 
the  winter,  he  was  ready  at  any  moment,  in  case  of 
active  operations,  to  attack  the  British  flank  if  he 
saw  fit,  or  to  reach  either  the  Hudson  Eiver  or  the 

277 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Delaware.  He  had  achieved  a  remarkable  success 
since  December,  after  having  been  forced  into  New 
Jersey  and  driven  back,  step  by  step,  with  an  army 
which  he  himself  considered  not  much  more  than  a 
shadow,  and  pursued  by  a  powerful  and  triumphant 
enemy.  By  his  military  skill  and  the  indomitable 
energy  of  his  own  determination,  he  had  so  reversed 
the  order  of  events  that  he  was  now  actually  master 
of  the  situation.  He  had  fought  the  enemy  twice 
within  their  lines  and  had  crippled  them  by  the  loss 
of  numbers  of  killed  and  wounded,  as  well  as  the  con- 
siderable body  of  prisoners  whom  he  had  taken;  he 
had  saved  Pennsylvania  and  the  Delaware  River  and 
had  so  far  recovered  the  State  of  New  Jersey  that 
the  British,  who  a  month  before  held  it  completely 
in  their  control,  were  now  reduced  to  the  possession 
of  Brunswick  and  Amboy,  from  which  they  exerted 
no  considerable  influence  upon  the  country. 

With  an  inconceivable  lack  of  enterprise.  General 
Howe  remained  inactive  in  New  York ;  the  events  of 
New  Jersey  apparently  having  exerted  no  influence 
upon  his  mind  beyond  the  fact  that  they  had  occurred 
and  that  such  things  were  likely  to  occur  in  time  of 
war.  He  made  no  effort  to  retrieve  his  losses  by 
immediate  action,  though  he  sent  formidable  dis- 
patches to  England  in  which  he  asked  for  more 

278 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

troops  in  order  to  begin  the  next  campaign.  As 
nearly  as  we  are  enabled  by  Sir  William  Howe 's  own 
declaration  upon  this  subject  to  comprehend  his  pur- 
pose, it  seemed  to  be,  to  mass  such  a  force  in  America 
that  it  would  simply  bear  down  opposition  by  its 
own  weight,  in  order  that  every  town  of  importance 
throughout  the  country  should  ultimately  be  taken 
in  this  manner  and  occupied  by  a  garrison,  duly  in- 
stalled with  proper  military  rules  and  method,  within 
supporting  distance  of  some  other  regularly-estab- 
lished garrison  and  that,  the  movements  of  the  Con- 
tinental army  having  been  thus  checked  by  the  pres- 
ence of  the  King's  troops  everywhere,  rebellion  must 
disappear, — it  must  die  for  want  of  nourishment. 
War  appears  with  him  always  to  have  been  theoreti- 
cal; his  plans  were  drawn  with  laborious  precision 
and  set  dowTi  on  paper  for  the  war  office.  If  they  did 
not  succeed  as  they  were  expected  to  do,  the  result 
was  merely  that  there  would  have  to  be  another 
campaign  the  following  year,  and  so  on.  In  the  mean- 
time the  actual  bearing  of  the  situation  was  totally 
lost  sight  of;  the  advantage  that  might  have  been 
taken  of  partial  success,  by  pushing  on  to  further 
achievement,  was  never  availed  of  by  him;  the  abil- 
ity to  anticipate  the  purposes  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
quick  move  to  thwart  them,  which  distinguished  the 

279 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

conduct  of  Washington  throughout  the  war,  was  lack- 
ing in  his  method.  A  disinclination  to  break  with 
ancient  rules  of  war  held  him  bound  to  conventional 
necessities,  even  when  imaginary  obstacles  were  caus- 
ing him  the  loss  of  time  and  opportunity.  For  in- 
stance, he  lay  still  in  New  York  and  declined  to  open 
the  campaign  of  1777  until  the  middle  of  June,  be- 
cause it  was  an  accepted  military  law  in  Europe  that 
a  campaign  must  not  be  undertaken  until  the  green 
forage  had  come  up  for  the  horses ;  and  this  he  ap- 
plied in  a  country  where  there  were  quantities  of  oats 
and  stores  of  grain  on  every  farm  and  the  barns  were 
filled  with  hay.  So,  the  plan,  of  over-running  the  ter- 
ritory by  superior  weight  of  arms  and  holding  it  by 
garrison,  having  failed  in  New  Jersey,  Howe  called 
for  more  troops  in  order  that  he  might  begin  again 
in  the  spring.  He  was  making  war  upon  a  chart,  with 
figures  and  demonstrations,  but  also  without  the 
least  comprehension  of  the  character  and  genius  of 
the  enemy.  It  is  safe  to  say,  that  General  Howe 
could  never  have  conquered  America  if  Great  Britain 
had  been  willing  to  furnish  him  with  troops  and  had 
allowed  him  to  stay  here  until  the  end  of  his  life. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  w^hat  the  general  plan  of 
the  English  Commander-in-Chief  actually  was;  for 
at  first  sight  one  might  be  led,  by  his  failure  to  carry 

280 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

out  to  a  definite  result  any  of  his  movements  up  to 
this  time,  and  by  his  abandonment  of  every  advan- 
tage hitherto  gained,  to  conclude  that  he  probably 
had  no  plan.  We  are  fortunate  enough,  however,  to 
possess  his  own  statement  in  regard  to  this  subject, 
made  by  him  before  a  Connaiittee  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  in  1779.  His  narrative  is  as  follows,  in 
calling  attention  to  a  letter  written  by  him  to  the 
British  Secretary  of  State  on  the  30th  of  November, 
1776,  before  the  loss  of  Trenton, — ' '  in  which  letter, ' ' 
he  said:  "is  set  forth  my  first  plan  for  the  next  cam- 
paign, with  the  force  requisite,  in  order,  if  possible, 
to  finish  the  war  in  one  year.  My  propositions  were 
that  we  should  have  10,000  men  to  act  on  the  side  of 
Ehode  Island,  and  penetrate  eastward  into  the 
country  toward  Boston,  leaving  2000  for  the  defence 
of  Rhode  Island ;  10,000  in  the  province  of  New  York, 
to  move  up  the  North  River  to  Albany ;  5000  for  the 
defence  of  York  Island  and  its  dependencies ;  8000  to 
cover  Jersey,  and  to  keep  General  Washington's 
army  in  check,  by  giving  a  jealousy  to  Philadelphia, 
which,  as  well  as  Virginia,  I  propose  to  attack  in 
autumn,  provided  the  success  of  other  operations 
should  have  admitted  of  sending  thither  an  adequate 
force.  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  I  proposed  as 
objects  for  winter.    But  to  carry  this  plan  into  ex- 

281 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ecution  I  informed  his  Lordship  that  ten  ships  of  the 
line  and  a  reinforcement  of  15,000  rank  and  file 
would  be  absolutely  necessary,  besides  an  additional 
battery  of  artillery." 

It  must  be  remembered  that  he  wrote  this  when 
he  had  more  than  20,000  regular  troops,  fit  for  duty 
and  equipped  for  immediate  service;  and  he  ought 
to  have  known, — there  is  no  excuse  for  his  not  having 
known, — that  the  whole  combined  force  of  America 
could  not  resist  him  in  a  vigorous  campaign.  The 
Secretary  of  State  replied  to  this  letter  that,  although 
he  could  not  send  the  artillery  asked  for,  he  hoped 
to  increase  the  army  to  35,000  and  that  he  would  soon 
ship  7800  men  to  America,  evidently  believing  that 
this  number  would  raise  the  force  to  that  strength, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  General  Howe  had 
asked  for  15,000  additional  men.  ' '  This  misconceived 
calculation  cannot  otherwise  be  accounted  for,  as  I 
apprehend,"  said  Howe,  *Hhan  by  his  Lordship's 
computing  the  sick,  and  the  prisoners  with  the  rebels 
as  part  of  the  real  effective  strength  of  the  army." 
When  he  found,  therefore,  that  he  should  have  to 
expect  a  reinforcement  of  only  about  eight  thousand 
men,  he  modified  his  plan  of  campaign  in  accordance 
with  what  he  conceived  to  be  his  strength,  and  he 
said:  ''During  the  doubts  I  entertained,  whether 

282 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  large  reinforcement  I  had  requested  would  arrive 
in  time  for  the  execution  of  the  extensive  plan  men- 
tioned in  my  letter  of  the  30th  of  November,  1776, 
I  had  information  which  I  thought  might  be  depended 
upon  that  the  reduction  of  Pennsylvania  was  prac- 
ticable, even  upon  the  supposition  that  the  whole 
of  my  strength  fit  for  duty  at  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  might  not  exceed  19,000  men.  I  therefore 
suggested,  in  my  separate  letter  of  the  20th  of  De- 
cember, 1776,  a  second  plan,  which  was  for  acting 
next  campaign  in  Pennsylvania,  and  which,  when 
I  was  told  I  must  expect  a  reinforcement  of  only 
7800  men,  little  more  than  half  my  requisition,  I 
concluded  was  to  be  adopted."  And  yet,  at  that 
moment  Sir  William  Howe  held  possession  of  New 
Jersey,  and,  by  crossing  the  Delaware  River  he  would 
have  found  the  road  to  Philadelphia  open  to  him.  In 
two  days,  by  easy  marching,  he  could  have  thrown 
his  army  into  the  city ;  whence  Congress  had  removed, 
expecting  him  to  do  so.  It  is  marvellous  that  he 
should  have  so  little  comprehended  the  true  condi- 
tion of  his  surroundings,  and  yet  he  could  hardly 
avoid  winning  in  this  contest  by  the  very  weight  of 
the  circumstances.  Even  if  we  accept  his  theory 
that,  by  advancing  beyond  the  Delaware,  he  would 
have  cut  himself  oft'  from  his  communication, — which 

283 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

is  not  true,  because  there  would  have  been  no  hostile 
force  to  resist  him,  for  Washington  must  have  con- 
tinued to  retreat  and  the  country  people  were  not 
unfriendly  to  him, — yet  he  could  have  secured  ample 
force  to  establish  communicating  posts  by  recalling 
the  6000  men  whom  he  had  recently  detached  to  New- 
port ;  who,  for  all  the  good  they  did  him,  might  almost 
as  well  have  been  sent  home  to  England. 

This  new  plan,  of  an  expedition  to  Pennsylvania 
the  following  year,  was  accepted,  with  approval,  by 
the  British  Secretary  of  State,  who  found  the  reason- 
ing upon  which  it  was  based  "solid  and  decisive." 
He  encouraged  General  Howe  to  proceed  with  it  when 
the  spring  should  open;  notifying  him,  however,  at 
the  same  time,  that  he  should  send  a  reinforcement 
which  would  not  exceed  3000  men.  Thereupon  Howe 
gave  up  both  his  former  plans  and  threw  away  every- 
thing he  had  gained  thus  far,  except  the  occupation 
\J  of  New  York.  "Finding  by  the  Secretary  of  State's 
letter  of  the  14th  of  January,  1777,  received  on  the 
9th  of  March  following,"  he  says:  "that  the  rein- 
forcements were  not  to  be  expected,  I  totally  relin- 
quished, in  my  secret  letter  of  the  2nd  of  April,  the 
idea  of  any  offensive  operation,  except  that  to  the 
southward,  and  a  diversion  occasionally  upon  Hud- 
son's River.    I  informed  the  Secretary  of  State  that 

284 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  j^rincipal  part  of  the  plan  formerly  proposed 
could  no  longer  be  thought  of ;  that  the  Jerseys  must 
be  abandoned,  and  Pennsylvania  only  invaded  by 
sea." 

Thus  General  Howe  passed  the  whole  winter  in  \/ 
New  York,  vainly  speculating  upon  the,  campaign  of 
the  following  spring,  having  returned  almost  to  his 
point  of  departure,  leaving  the  w^hole  work  to  be  done 
over  again.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  during 
this  stay  of  several  months  in  New  York  there  was 
the  greatest  relaxation  of  all  discipline  among  the 
troops,  and  it  is  evident  that  corruption  began  to 
make  inroads  into  the  funds  sent  out  from  England 
to  carry  on  the  war.  Place-hunters  became  numer- 
ous, and  according  to  a  letter  written  at  the  time: 
"A  regiment  might  be  formed  of  idle,  useless  com- 
missaries, quarter-masters,  agents,  and  forage  mas- 
ters; there  are  twenty  of  these  appointments  now, 
where  there  was  one  during  the  last  war  in  America. ' ' 
The  same  writer  said  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  ''the 
luxury  and  licentiousness  of  the  army  have  reached 
your  Lordship's  ears  too  frequently  to  make  it  neces- 
sary for  me  to  expatiate  on  that  head.  AMiat  can  the 
nation  expect  from  a  luxurious  and  licentious  army 
and  an  indolent  and  dissipated  general?"  (Matter 
of  Fact,  to  Ld.  G.  Germain.)    Gambling  also  played 

285 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

an  important  part  at  this  period  in  the  lives  of  the 
young  British  officers,  whose  love  of  amusement  nat- 
urally led  them  to  throw  off  the  burden  of  idle 
days  by  returning  to  that  pleasure,  the  taste  for 
which  they  had  brought  with  them  from  home. 

The  occupation  of  New  York  during  this  winter 
became  notorious  for  this  sort  of  dissipation.  In- 
deed, this  recklessness  had  grown  to  be  a  national 
evil  in  England,  where  it  attracted  serious  attention 
and  was  the  source  of  grave  solicitude  in  the  minds 
of  thoughtful  men.  We  have  an  interesting  account 
of  it  left  to  us  by  Horace  Walpole,  who,  in  writing 
of  the  reign  of  George  III,  says  that:  ''the  gaming 
and  extravagance  of  young  men  of  quality  had  now 
arrived  at  a  pitch  never  heard  of.  They  had  a  club 
at  Almack's,  in  Pall  Mall,  where  they  played  only 
for  rouleaus  of  £50  each,  and  generally  there  was 
£10,000  in  specie  on  the  table.  Lord  Holland  had 
paid  above  £20,000  for  his  two  sons.  Nor  were  the 
manners  of  the  gamesters,  or  even  their  dresses  for 
play,  undeserving  notice.  They  began  by  pulling  off 
their  embroidered  clothes  and  put  on  frieze  great- 
coats, or  turned  their  coats  inside  outwards  for  luck. 
They  put  on  pieces  of  leather  (such  as  were  worn 
by  footmen  when  they  cleaned  knives),  to  save  their 
laced   ruffles,   and   to   guard   their   eyes   from   the 

286 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

light  and  to  prevent  tumbling  their  hair,  wore  high- 
crowned  straw  hats  with  broad  brims  and  adorned 
with  flowers  and  ribbons;  masks  to  conceal  their 
emotions  when  they  played  at  quinze.  Each  game- 
ster had  a  small  neat  stand  by  him  to  hold  his  tea 
or  a  wooden  bowl  with  an  edge  of  ormolu  to  hold 
his  rouleaus."  This  class  of  men,  of  whom  there 
were  many  in  the  British  army  in  America,  were 
certainly  not  the  soldiers  necessary  to  make  war 
in  a  country  where  all  the  military  conditions,  of 
extent  of  territory,  means  of  communication,  diffi- 
culties of  moving  an  army,  and  the  natural  ob- 
stacles which  impede  success,  were  different  from 
those  of  Europe  and  called  for  extraordinary  energy 
and  decision  among  the  leaders  of  a  foreign  invad- 
ing force.  Several  of  the  veteran  officers  who  accom- 
panied Howe  and  Cornwallis  testified  afterwards 
that  they  considered  this  the  most  difficult  country 
to  manoeuvre  in  that  they  had  ever  seen. 

Almost  every  step  taken  by  the  British  during 
this  critical  period  of  the  war  shows  distinctly  to 
the  student  of  its  history  how  greatly  their  love 
of  comfort  and  of  sport  is  responsible  for  failure  in 
the  campaigns ;  it  led  to  the  most  destructive  trifling 
during  the  winter  occupation  of  the  larger  cities,  by 
which  the  energy  of  the  whole  body  was  relaxed  and 

287 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

dissipated,  and  to  a  reckless  indifference  to  conse- 
quences in  the  field  which  resulted  in  almost  uni- 
versal failure  to  follow  out  an  advantage  beyond  the 
point  where  the  struggle  involved  hardship  or  ex- 
posure to  physical  discomfort.  There  is  no  question 
of  their  bravery  upon  the  field  of  battle,  where  these 
young  gallants  often  faced  the  enemy  with  admir- 
able courage ;  and  many  of  them  lie  buried  in  graves 
upon  American  soil.  But  the  manners  of  the  time, 
with  the  exceedingly  dangerous  example  of  their 
self-indulgent  Commander,  destroyed  that  natural 
vigor  which  was  an  essential  element  in  a  contest 
with  people  who,  for  the  most  part,  had  always  been 
accustomed  to  overcome  obstacles  and  were  now 
fighting  for  a  cause  in  which  they  were  intensely 
in  earnest. 

It  began  to  be  noticed  even  in  England,  by  this 
time,  that  the  British  control  was  not  being  extended 
throughout  the  Continent  as  rapidly  as  had  been 
foretold.  Howe  had  done  nothing;  and  Burgoyne, 
who  was  then  about  coming  upon  the  scene,  was  full 
of  extravagant  promises.  Some  careful  observers 
expected  little  more  from  the  one  than  the  other; 
and  the  keen  wit  of  Horace  Walpole  linked  them  to- 
gether with  a  sarcasm  which  has  not  yet  lost  its  bit- 
terness, when  he  declared  that,  upon  the  whole,  he 

288 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

preferred  the  method  of  General  Howe's  warfare, 
for,  while  Burgoyne  wrote  letters  that  would  make 
one  imagine  he  had  taken  two  provinces,  Howe,  if  he 
never  did  anything,  at  least  never  broke  his  promise. 
Whilst  the  affairs  of  the  British  were  in  this  con- 
dition in  New  York,  the  case  of  the  Americans  was 
bettering  itself  day  by  day.  General  Washington  had 
induced  the  most  of  his  troops  whose  terms  expired 
on  the  first  of  January  to  remain  with  him  for  six 
weeks  longer.  For  this  service  he  allowed  each  man 
the  sum  of  ten  dollars  as  a  bounty,  and  he  gave  evi- 
dences of  the  narrowness  of  his  resources  and  those 
of  the  country,  as  well  as  of  the  value  of  the  money 
at  the  time,  when  he  wrote  to  Congress  that  he  knew 
this  was  "a  most  extravagant  price,"  but  that  he 
did  not  feel  justified  in  refusing  it,  "when  a  body  of 
firm  troops,  inured  to  danger,  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  lead  on  the  more  raw  and  undisciplined." 
With  the  time  now  left  to  him  by  the  idleness  of  the 
British,  he  was  enabled  to  raise  and  discipline  bodies 
of  new  troops,  under  an  authority  which  Congress 
had  given  him  at  last  after  the  futility  of  relying  upon 
the  militia  had  been  shown,  to  establish  an  army  of 
men  recruited  in  many  of  the  States,  to  equip  them, 
appoint  their  officers,  and  to  fix  their  pay ;  and  car- 
goes of  arms,  with  other  munitions  of  war,  were 

19  289 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

beginning  to  come  in  from  France,  where  the  Ameri- 
can Commissioners  were  secretly  negotiating  for 
them,  just  at  the  moment  when  they  were  needed  to 
strengthen  his  hand.  So  that,  when  the  spring  of 
1777  opened,  he  had  about  8000'  men  ready  to  take  the 
field. 

As  if  to  encourage  him  and  give  him  ample 
opportunity  to  inure  his  men  to  the  life  and  disci- 
pline of  the  camp,  General  Howe  allowed  the  spring 
to  pass  without  molesting  the  American  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and  it  was  not  until  the  month  of  June  that 
the  British  army  came  into  the  field  to  open  the  cam- 
paign. At  the  end  of  May  General  Washington 
moved  out  from  his  encampment  at  Morristown  and 
took  a  position  farther  south,  upon  the  heights  of 
Middlebrook,  where  he  was  protected  by  the  natural 
strength  of  the  ground,  and  in  his  front  by  the  Eari- 
tan  River,  which,  at  that  time,  was  too  deep  to  ford. 
He  had  throwm  General  Sullivan  forward,  with  some 
fifteen  hundred  men,  to  Princeton.  Although  General 
Howe  had  already  decided  that  New  Jersey  was  to 
be  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  movement  toward  Phila- 
delphia by  sea,  he  left  New  York  about  the  middle 
of  June  and  crossed  over  to  Amboy  with  a  large  force, 
moving  thence  to  Brunswick,  with  the  intention  of 
cutting  off  Sullivan  from  the  main  army  and  then 

290 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

pushing  on  to  the  Delaware ;  or,  failing  that,  to  draw 
Washington  away  from  his  present  strong  position 
in  order  to  attack  him  with  advantage  by  a  greatly 
superior  force.  Hov/e  marched  his  araiy  in  two  col- 
umns to  Middlebush  and  Hillsborough,  two  villages 
situated  in  a  level  country  plainly  visible  from  the 
American  camp ;  keeping  the  Raritan  River  between 
himself  and  the  enemy.  AA^ien  he  did  so,  Howe  was 
equipped  as  if  to  cross  the  Delaware ;  and  he  hoped 
that,  by  making  a  feint  in  that  direction,  he  could 
draw  Washington  into  an  engagement;  for  he  was 
convinced  that  the  American  Commander  would 
never  yield  the  road  to  Philadelphia  without  a  con- 
test. This  was  true,  and  the  events  which  followed 
proved  it  by  demonstration.  But,  since  Howe  was 
already  well  upon  the  road  to  Philadelphia,  and 
might  have  reached  it  then  by  lighting  a  battle  for 
which  he  was  entirely  prepared,  it  is  astonishing  that 
he  did  not  force  Washington  into  an  engagement. 
The  chances  are  that  he  could  have  defeated  him 
and  have  moved  to  his  objective  point;  just  as  he  did 
three  months  later,  when,  after  enormous  expense, 
and  the  loss  of  the  whole  summer  of  1777,  wasted 
to  produce  the  very  result  which  then  lay  within 
his  immediate  control,  he  met  Washington  at  Brandy- 
wine  and  entered  Philadelphia  in  September. 

291 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

This  was  one  of  the  greatest  blunders  that  Howe 
committed  during  the  war.  He  refused  for  the  second 
time  to  take  the  direct  road  across  the  Delaware, 
w^hich,  it  is  true,  was  not  open  to  him  without  a  contest 
now  as  it  had  been  in  December  before  the  action  at 
Trenton.  He  would  have  had  to  fight  for  it  at  this 
time ;  but  he  was  forced  now  to  fight,  in  any  event, 
because  the  American  situation  had  greatly  improved 
in  the  interim  and  General  Washington's  army 
offered  a  firmer  resistance.  The  fact,  however,  that, 
by  the  official  returns,  Howe  had  at  that  moment  an 
exceedingly  well-equipped  army  of  30,000  men, 
throws  all  the  weight  of  probability  in  the  direction 
of  success  upon  his  side.  Out  of  General  Wash- 
ington's 8000  soldiers  many  of  them  had  never  left 
their  homes  before. 

Finding  that  he  was  unable  to  draw  the  American 
Commander-in-Chief  into  a  false  position.  Sir 
William  Howe  withdrew  his  army  to  Amboy.  Wash- 
ington followed  him  to  a  point  called  Quibble  Town 
and  threw  forward  several  large  bodies  of  troops, 
under  General  Maxwell  and  Lord  Stirling,  to  harass 
the  enemy's  rear,  which  led  to  the  return  of  part  of 
the  British  forces  under  Lord  Cornwallis,  who  hoped 
to  cut  off  these  advanced  parties ;  but  after  rather  a 
warm  action  between  these  detachments.  General 

g92 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

Howe  finally  withdrew,  on  the  28th  of  June,  from 
the  State  of  New  Jersey,  which  he  was  not  destined 
to  see  again. 

He  proceeded  now  to  carry  out  his  extraordinary 
plan  of  attacking  Philadelphia  by  sea.  On  the  5th 
of  July,  a  little  more  than  a  year  from  the  date  of 
his  arrival  at  Sandy  Hook  from  Halifax,  during  which 
time  he  had  made  no  substantial  progress  toward 
a  termination  of  the  war,  he  embarked  his  army  of 
19,500  men  upon  transports  and  kept  them  pent  up, 
during  exceedingly  warm  weather,  for  over  two  weeks 
before  he  put  to  sea,  which  he  finally  did  on  the 
23rd.  He  had  withdrawn  some  of  the  troops 
who  had  been  sent  to  Newport,  though  the  greater 
part  of  that  force  was  left  there  to  do  garrison  duty, 
under  General  Prescott;  and  the  defences  of  New 
York  were  entrusted  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton  who  had 
just  returned  to  America  from  England. 

The  intention  of  Sir  William  Howe,  upon  leaving 
New  York,  was,  to  proceed  up  the  Delaware  River 
to  Philadelphia ;  therefore  he  headed  his  course  for 
the  Capes  of  the  Delaware,  which  he  sighted  in  a 
week  from  the  time  he  left  Sandy  Hook.  Upon  find- 
ing, however,  that  obstructions  had  been  placed  in  the 
river  which  would  prevent  him  from  going  quite  up 
to  the  city,  he  withdrew  from  the  attempt  in  that 

293 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

direction  and  sailed  around  into  Chesapeake  Bay, 
where  he  landed,  at  the  head  of  the  Elk,  on  the  24th  of 
August.  From  the  time  he  had  put  his  troops  aboard 
the  transports,  early  in  July,  until  they  went  ashore 
at  the  head  of  the  Elk,  he  had  kept  them  constantly 
confined,  which  led  to  much  sickness  among  the  men 
and  destroyed  nearly  all  the  horses.  An  officer  who 
accompanied  the  expedition  testified  that  they  were 
''three  weeks  on  the  passage  to  Elk,  and  detained 
there  to  refresh  the  troops  and  collect  horses,  before 
the  army  was  ready  to  march ;  in  the  course  of  which, 
by  death,  sickness,  desertion,  etc.,  we  had  1500  less 
men  fit  for  duty  than  when  at  the  Delaware. ' ' 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  military  plan  so  ill- 
advised,  so  needless,  and  so  badly  executed  as  this 
one  by  which  Howe  attacked  Philadelphia  by  way 
of  the  Chesapeake.  Of  all  the  circumstances  con- 
nected with  it  there  is  not  a  single  one  to  justify  it. 
There  was  no  reason  why  he  could  not  have  gone  up 
the  Delaware  and  made  his  landing  at  Chester,  saving 
considerably  more  than  a  month,  with  the  fleet  to 
support  him,  and  going  ashore  about  sixteen  miles 
from  his  objective  point,  instead  of  nearly  sixty,  the 
distance  from  the  head  of  the  Elk.  We  have  in  this 
connection  the  contemporaneous  statement  made  to 
the  British  Secretary  of  State,  that  "the  danger  of 

294 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  navigation  in  the  Delaware  River  is  not  greater 
than  in  Chesapeake  Bay;  the  former  is  wider  and 
more  commodious  for  ships  at  Chester,  than  the  River 
Elk  is,  so  far  up.  It  was  also  equally  unfortified." 
And  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  as  the  fleet  could  not  coop- 
erate with  the  army,  Howe  dismissed  it,  and  sent  it 
around  again  into  the  Delaware,  thus  cutting  him- 
self off  from  that  means  of  retreat,  as  well  as  separat- 
ing himself  from  his  supply  of  provisions,  in  case  he 
had  been  repulsed.  At  all  events,  he  had  brought  his 
army  to  the  head  of  Elk,  and,  after  mature  delibera- 
tion, he  was  ready  to  open  the  campaign,  in  the  month 
of  September. 

During  this  time.  General  Washington,  who  had 
been  informed  of  the  sailing  of  the  British  Comman- 
der from  New  York  and  of  the  appearance  of  the 
fleet  off  the  Delaware  Capes,  had  concentrated  his 
forces  on  the  north  side  of  Philadelphia,  awaiting 
to  discover  the  enemy's  plans.  News  having  been 
brought  to  him  that  the  ships  had  come  into  Chesa- 
peake Bay,  he  marched  his  army  through  the  city 
and  advanced  to  Wilmington,  where  he  arrived  while 
Howe  was  landing  his  troops  at  the  head  of  Elk. 
He  was  prepared  now  to  give  battle,  and  to  contest 
the  possession  of  Philadelphia. 

We  have  the  proof,  in  the  records  of  the  British 

295 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

State  paper  ofSce,  that  Howe  took  with  him  from  New 
York  19,500  men.  General  Washington  then  had, 
including  militia  and  volunteers  who  had  been  hastily 
summoned  in  this  case  of  extraordinary  danger, 
something  less  than  12,000  troops  with  whom  to 
oppose  Howe's  army.  But  it  was  a  crisis  which  had 
to  be  met.  Public  opinion  demanded  that  Philadel- 
phia, the  seat  of  Congress,  should  be  defended  if 
possible;  and  every  incentive,  both  in  the  interest 
of  the  cause  of  liberty  as  well  as  to  check  the  boldness 
of  the  disaffected,  urged  Washington  to  make  a  stand 
for  it  with  his  Continentals,  inferior  in  numbers  and 
equipment  as  he  was.  Two  weeks  after  the  arrival 
of  the  British  at  the  head  of  Elk,  the  armies  lay 
opposite  each  other,  two  miles  apart,  skirmishing 
each  day  and  making  ready  for  the  encounter  which  it 
was  evident  must  soon  take  place. 

On  the  9th  of  September,  whilst  at  Newport,  in 
Delaware,  General  Washington  discovered  that 
Howe's  purpose  was  to  engage  his  attention  in  front 
whilst  he  moved  by  his  right,  and,  by  passing  the 
Brandywine  River,  to  gain  a  position  between  him 
and  Philadelphia.  In  order  to  prevent  this,  he  de- 
cided to  change  his  position;  therefore,  moving  off 
about  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  crossed  the 
Brandywine  and  took  possession   of  high  ground 

296 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

wliicli  controlled  its  most  accessible  crossing,  at 
Chadd's  Ford,  on  the  lOtli.  Upon  the  following  day, 
the  11th  of  September,  occurred  the  action  known 
as  the  battle  of  Brandywine,  in  which,  after  a  gallant 
struggle  and  much  hard  fighting,  the  Americans  were 
forced  to  give  way,  having  been  almost  surrounded. 
General  Washington  had  to  retreat  to  Chester.  But, 
by  his  quick  perception,  he  rescued  his  army  and  was 
able  the  next  day  to  take  the  field.  At  midnight  on 
the  day  of  the  battle,  he  wrote  to  Congress : 

"I  am  sorry  to  inform  you  that,  in  this 
day's  engagement,  we  have  been  obliged  to 
leave  the  enemy  masters  of  the  field.  Unfor- 
tunately the  intelligence  received  of  the  enemy's 
advancing  up  the  Brandj^vine  and  crossing  at  a 
ford  six  miles  above  us,  was  uncertain  and 
contradictory,  notwithstanding  all  my  pains  to 
get  the  best.  This  prevented  me  from  making 
a  disposition  adequate  to  the  force  with  which 
the  enemy  attacked  us  on  our  right ;  in  conse- 
quence of  which  the  troops  first  engaged  were 
obliged  to  retire  before  they  could  be  reinforced. 
I  have  directed  all  the  troops  to  assemble  be- 
hind Chester,  where  we  are  now  arranging  for 
this  night.  Notwithstanding  the  misfortune  of 
the  day,  I  am  happy  to  find  the  troops  in  good 
spirits." 

The  British  contented  themselves  by  simply  occu- 
pying the  field  of  battle.  They  made  no  effort  to  fol- 

297 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

low  the  broken  columns  of  tlie  Continental  army, 
which,  defeated,  and  distressed  by  the  burden  of 
a  fatiguing  day,  had  fled  in  great  confusion  to  Ches- 
ter. Sir  William  Howe  did  not  avail  himself  of  his 
victory,  even  to  the  slightest  degree.  He  lay  nearer 
to  Philadelphia  than  Washington,  whom  he  might 
readily  have  intercepted,  and,  besides  cutting  off  his 
crippled  army,  might  have  seized  the  Continental 
stores  and  magazines  which  had  not  been  removed 
from  the  city.  It  is  this  failure  to  act  upon  their  suc- 
cess at  Brandy^vine  that  General  de  LaFayette, 
wounded  himself,  and  hurrying  along  with  the  fugi- 
tive mass  toward  Chester,  singled  out  as  one  of  the 
worst  mistakes  of  the  British ;  who  made,  as  he  said, 
'' plenty  of  others  during  the  war."  The  American 
Commander-in-Chief  showed  remarkable  energy  and 
courage  in  the  movements  which  he  executed  at  this 
time ;  when,  although  defeated  in  the  first  encounter, 
he  still  continued  to  face  the  enemy. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  BrandyAvine, 
Washington  marched  his  army  from  Chester  back  to 
Germantown,  where  he  gave  them  a  short  rest,  and, 
having  renewed  their  provisions  and  supplied  them 
with  anununition,  he  re-crossed  the  Schuylkill  River 
with  the  intention  of  offering  battle  a  second  time 
to  General  Howe.    Both  armies  were  about  to  meas- 

298 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

ure  their  strength  a  few  clays  hiter,  when  a  violent 
rain-storm  rendered  the  ammunition  almost  useless, 
and  General  Washington,  fearing  the  design  of  the 
enemy  to  shut  him  up  between  the  rivers,  w^ithdrew 
to  the  north.  On  the  23rd  of  September  Sir  William 
Howe  crossed  the  Schuylkill  with  his  whole  army. 
On  the  26tli  he  occupied  Germanto^^^l,  and  on  the 
following  day  Lord  Cornwallis,  at  the  head  of  a 
strong  detachment,  took  possession  of  Philadelphia. 
Thus  the  British  general  succeeded  at  last  in 
accomplishing  the  purpose  for  which  he  had  wasted 
more  than  a  year,  sacrificed  the  lives  of  a  great  num- 
ber of  men,  and  squandered  enormous  sums  of 
money ;  and,  as  the  event  proved,  it  did  him  no  good 
when  he  had  attained  it,  for  the  King's  authority 
was  not  strengthened  by  this  conquest,  nor  was 
Pennsylvania  used  as  a  base  from  which  to  extend 
the  royal  control  in  other  States.  The  British  aban- 
doned Philadelj^hia  during  the  following  year,  with- 
out having  exerted  the  slightest  permanent  influence 
upon  the  country,  except  that  of  hatred  toward  them- 
selves. When  they  retired  through  New  Jersey  and 
took  all  their  baggage  across  the  Hudson  Eiver  into 
their  quarters  at  New  York,  they  went  back  to  the 
point  from  wiiich  Howe  had  started  a  year  before 
to  go  to  the  Chesapeake ;  and  from  which,  two  years 

299 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

before,  lie  undertook  the  conquest  of  America  after 
his  landing  at  Staten  Island.  During  that  time  noth- 
ing had  been  accomplished,  except  to  train  and  dis- 
cipline the  Continental  soldiers  by  experience  in  the 
field,  to  unite  the  people  by  creating  a  national  senti- 
ment which  increased  daily  with  the  growing  confi- 
dence in  themselves,  and  to  make  American  Inde- 
pendence a  certainty,  which  might  have  been  post- 
poned by  the  weight  of  circumstances  or  retarded  by 
disaster,  but  which,  after  that,  could  not  be  prevented. 
Much  of  all  this  is  due  to  the  conduct  of  Sir 
William  Howe  alone,  and  from  the  standpoint  of  his 
own  countrymen  he  must  undoubtedly  be  charged 
with  a  great  burden  of  responsibility, — as  great  in- 
deed as  that  of  any  individual  engaged  in  the  contest, 
— for  the  loss  by  Great  Britain  of  her  American 
Colonies.  The  occupation  of  Philadelphia  is  a  strik- 
ing example  of  the  idle,  self-indulgent  life,  in  which 
he  sacrificed  interests  of  paramount  importance  to 
his  countrymen.  There  also  his  personal  influence 
was  exceedingly  damaging  upon  the  men  who  sur- 
rounded him  and  were  under  his  command.  Even 
Stedman,  Englishman  as  he  was,  did  not  hesitate  to 
speak  in  the  strongest  terms  of  condemnation  of  what 
he  calls  ''this  long  winter  of  riot  and  dissipation." 
"A  want  of  discipline  and  proper  subordination  per- 

300 


I 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

vaded  the  Avhole  army,"  said  he,  "and  if  disease  and 
sickness  thinned  the  American  army  camped  at  Val- 
ley Forge,  indolence  and  luxury  perhaps  did  not  less 
injury  to  the  British  troops  at  Philadelphia.  A  very 
unfortunate  inattention  was  shown  to  the  feelings 
of  the  inhabitants.  They  experienced  many  of  the 
horrors  of  civil  war.  The  soldiers  insulted  and 
plundered  them ;  and  their  houses  were  occupied  as 
barracks,  without  any  compensation  being  made  to 
them.  Some  of  the  first  families  were  compelled  to 
receive  into  their  habitations  individual  officers,  who 
were  indecent  enough  to  introduce  their  mistresses 
into  the  mansions  of  their  hospitable  entertainers. 
Gaming  of  every  species  was  permitted  and  even 
sanctioned.  A  foreign  officer  held  the  bank  at  the 
game  of  faro,  by  which  he  made  a  very  considerable 
fortune ;  and  but  too  many  families  in  Britain  have 
to  lament  its  baneful  effects.  Officers  who  might  have 
rendered  honorable  service  to  their  country,  were 
compelled  by  what  was  termed  a  bad  run  of  luck, 
to  dispose  of  their  commissions  and  return  penniless 
to  their  friends  in  Europe.  The  father  who  thought 
he  had  made  a  provision  for  his  son  by  purchasing  a 
commission  for  him  ultimately  found  that  he  had  put 
his  son  to  school  to  learn  the  science  of  gambling, 
not  the  art  of  war." 

301 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

We  have  no  more  striking  illustration  than  that 
given  by  this  English  officer,  of  the  corrupt  state 
of  the  British  army  in  America,  and  no  better  insight 
into  the  causes  of  the  blundering  and  stupid  misman- 
agement of  the  campaigns,  which  otherwise  would  be 
incomprehensible.  General  Charles  Lee,  who  knew 
many  of  these  men  personally,  and  w^ho  came  into 
contact  with  Sir  William  Howe  during  his  imprison- 
ment, gave  a  description  of  him,  in  a  letter  written 
at  Valley  Forge,  in  1778,  to  Dr.  Benjamin  Rush, 
of  Philadelphia. 

"You  would  think  it  odd,"  he  wrote,  ''that 
I  should  seem  to  be  an  apologist  of  General 
Howe.  I  know  not  how  it  happens,  but  when  I 
have  taken  prejudices  in  favor  or  against  a 
man  I  find  difficulty  in  shaking  them  off.  From 
my  first  acquaintance  with  Mr.  Howe  I  liked 
him.  I  thought  him  friendly,  good-natured, 
brave  and  rather  sensible  than  the  reverse.  I 
believe  still  that  he  is  naturally  so ;  but  a  cor- 
rupt, or,  more  properly  speaking,  no  education, 
the  fashion  of  the  times,  have  so  totally  per- 
verted his  understanding  and  heart,  that  pri- 
vate friendship  has  not  force  sufficient  to  keep 
a  door  open  for  the  admittance  of  mercy  toward 
political  hereticks.  .  .  .  He  is,  besides,  the 
most  indolent  of  mortals,  never  took  further 
pains  to  examine  the  merits  or  demerits  of  the 
cause  in  which  he  was  engaged  than  merely  to 

302 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

recollect  that  Great  Britain  was  said  to  be  tlie 
Mother  Country,  George  the  Third  King  of 
Great  Britain,  that  the  Parliament  was  called 
the  representative  of  Great  Britain,  that  the 
King  and  Parliament  formed  the  Supreme 
Power,  that  a  Supreme  Power  is  absolute  and 
uncontrollable,  that  all  resistance  must  conse- 
quently be  rebellion,  but  above  all  that  he  was 
a  soldier  and  bound  to  obey  in  all  cases  what- 
ever. .  .  .  But  I  could  distinguish,  when 
left  to  himself,  rays  of  friendship  and  good 
nature  breaking  out — it  is  true  he  was  seldom 
left  to  himself;  for  never  poor  mortal  thrust 
into  high  stations  was  surrounded  by  such  fools 
and  scoundrels.  He  is,  naturally,  good-natured 
and  complacent,  but  illiterate  and  indolent  to 
the  last  degree,  unless  as  an  executive  soldier  in 
which  capacity  he  is  all  fire  and  activity,  brave 
and  cool  as  Julius  Caesar, — his  understanding 
is,  as  I  observed  before,  rather  good  than  other- 
wise, but  was  totally  confounded  and  stupified 
by  the  immensity  of  the  task  imposed  upon 
him.  He  shut  his  eyes,  fought  his  battles,  drank 
his  bottle,  advised  with  his  counsellors,  received 
his  orders  from  North  and  Germain,  one  more 
absurd  than  the  other, — shut  his  eyes,  fought 
again,  and  is  now,  I  suppose,  called  to  account 
for  acting  according  to  instructions,  but  I  be- 
lieve his  eyes  are  opened." 
After  the  attack  made  upon  him  by  General  "Wash- 
ington at  Germantown  in  October,  and  the  contest  for 

SOS 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

the  Delaware  River  in  order  to  open  communication 
with  the  fleet  under  his  brother,  the  Admiral,  which 
led  to  the  actions  at  Red  Bank  and  at  Mud  Island, 
General  Howe  did  nothing  to  advance  the  British 
cause  in  America.  As  it  was  said  at  the  time,  the 
only  fruit  of  the  whole  campaign  of  1777  ' '  amounted 
to  no  mxore  than  the  acquisition  of  good  quarters 
for  the  army  at  Philadelphia."  (Stedman.)  For 
this  useless  expedition  he  had  abandoned  Burgoyne 
to  his  fate  at  Saratoga,  through  which  event  Great 
Britain  lost  at  one  blow  the  aid  of  her  whole  northern 
army,  and  the  United  States  gained,  as  its  immediate 
consequence,  the  alliance  and  open  support  of  France. 
Howe  knew  that  Burgoyne  was  upon  his  way  to 
Albany,  and  he  knew  that  the  purpose  of  the  expedi- 
tion was  to  unite  with  him  in  holding  the  Hudson 
River  in  order  to  cut  off  New  England  from  the 
Middle  States.  His  principal  excuse  for  neglecting 
to  make  this  junction  v^^as  that  the  orders  from  the 
War  Office  never  reached  him,  which  was  true.  Yet, 
he  was  Commander-in-Chief  in  America,  and  there 
was  no  doubt  that  in  the  management  of  all  military 
affairs  the  Government  intended  him  to  use  the  larg- 
est discretion.  He  was  warned  of  the  danger  which 
threatened  Burgo^Tie  if  he  were  left  to  himself; 
but  Howe  is  said  to  have  shrugged  his  shoulders 

304 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

and  made  the  remark  that  his  capture  would  merely 
lead  to  another  campaign. 

In  the  spring  of  1778,  whilst  the  British  army 
was  still  at  Philadelphia,  this  indolent  general  was 
recalled  at  his  own  request,  because  he  felt  that  he 
no  longer  retained  the  confidence  of  the  Ministry 
necessary  to  the  successful  execution  of  such  impor- 
tant trusts ;  and,  upon  being  relieved  by  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  he  sailed  for  England.  Laying  down  his 
authority  which  he  had  exerted  with  unvarying  in- 
competence, he  was  saluted  upon  his  departure  from 
his  officers  in  Philadelphia,  whom  he  had  indulged 
to  the  point  of  degradation,  by  a  fete  called  ''the 
Mischiana,"  which  recalled  the  extravagance  of 
Court  life  in  France  during  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV, 
and  might  have  done  honor  to  the  successes  of  the 
most  attentive  soldier  returning  triumphant  from 
the  wars.  The  reports  of  it  were  heard  by  right- 
minded  people  in  England  with  mortification,  and  it 
was  referred  to  by  British  writers  with  shame. 

Upon  his  arrival  in  London  he  asked  for,  and 
obtained,  a  Committee  of  Inquiry  from  the  House  of 
Commons,  for  the  purpose  of  shielding  himself  from 
the  bitter  attacks  that  were  justly  made  upon  his 
conduct  of  the  w^ar ;  but,  although  he  was  supported 
by  powerful  influences  in  the  ojjposition  with  whom 

20  S05 


ESSAYS,  POLITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL 

he  allied  himself,  the  evidence  of  officers  and  other 
witnesses  acquainted  with  affairs  in  America  was  so 
adverse  that  his  friends  were  glad  to  abandon  the 
inquiry.  Their  support  of  him  was  sufficient,  how- 
ever, to  shield  him  from  public  disgrace,  and  even  to 
secure  for  him  official  position  in  which  he  passed 
comfortably  the  remainder  of  his  life.  The  facts  of 
the  case  clearly  show,  however,  that,  in  her  efforts 
to  suppress  the  American  Revolution,  Great  Britain 
had  set  up  for  herself  one  insurmountable  obstacle 
which  thwarted  her  designs  and  made  success  im- 
possible.  That  obstacle  was,  Lieutenant  General  Sir 
William  Howe. 


S06 


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Form  L-9-15?»i-7,'31 


R-CDLD-UtG 

"EC  10 197? 
NOV  24(971 


'9h 


1  ms 


cci^^ 


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UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

■    -il!  !MI  III 


AA    000  517  124    4 


ORNIA 


